# A Legitimacy Crisis in the European Union?

## A neo-functionalist examination of the state of legitimacy in the EU

---

A thesis

submitted in fulfilment

of the requirements for the degree

of

Masters of Arts in Political Science

in the

University of Canterbury

by

**Nicole K. Billante**

University of Canterbury

2000

# *Contents*

# *List of Figures*

# *List of Graphs*

# *Abstract*

The extensive deepening and widening of the European Union that has taken place during the 1990's has resulted in the emergence of many issues that challenge the course of integration. The legitimacy of the Union is one of the key areas that has been questioned from a neo-functionalist perspective with the development of a united Europe. In scholarly discussions of legitimacy in the EU many authors have asserted that there is a legitimacy crisis at present. By examining the current state of legitimacy it is argued that the description of a crisis is overstated. However, there is still evidence of significant legitimacy problems that must be addressed by the Union elite in order for further integration to be successful. This analysis also highlights the limitations of the state-framework in EU studies. Through the application of a state concept of legitimacy it is demonstrated that constraints are placed upon examinations of the Union due to the narrow focus of a state model.

# *Acknowledgements*

The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the support of many people (and a couple animals). My experiences as a post-graduate have re-affirmed my belief that the key to being able to write a thesis is good supervision— something I was fortunate enough to have. For this I must thank my supervisors, Martin Holland and Joanna Goven, particularly for their patience in answering my numerous questions. I must also thank the other staff in the Department of Political Science who helped with my studies, most importantly Jill Dolby, without whom we would never survive.

I must also thank Karen Foster for providing the means to support my studies. But specifically, thank you for the patience, flexibility, generosity, and friendship that I was shown during my employment. Also, thank you to Bridget and Cindy who made 9 am starts a little less harsh.

An extremely big thank you must be extended to all my friends who tolerated my less than sociable behaviour at times during the past year. In particular I must thank my dear friends Amber, my partner in crime, and Katherine, one of the most selfless friends a person could have.

Also, to Tom, for his love and friendship and putting up with my tantrums during various discussions on nationalism. Another big thanks to Jim and Joan for opening their home to me and my animals. Your generosity has been immeasurable.

To my darling Panda, the light of my life, thank you for acting as a wonderful distractions and providing me with a break by knowing the right time to sit on my notes.

And last, but certainly not least (to use a terrible cliché) I extend my sincerest gratitude to my mother without whom none of this would have been possible. Her support and generosity throughout my whole education has not only enabled me to complete this thesis, but also made me who I am today. For that I will be eternally grateful. Thank you.

# *Chapter One*

## Introduction

Legitimacy is a political concept that is often alluded to but very rarely discussed in great detail. One key reason for this may be the difficulty in measuring legitimacy of governments. Such difficulty is exacerbated when extended beyond state governments and applied to the ever-changing supra-national body of the European Union (EU). However, it is perhaps because of this difficulty that the issue of European legitimacy has become more pressing in recent times. The lack of literature regarding this issue has only recently been addressed; the problem of legitimacy requires much further exploration. It is the aim of this thesis to identify the complexities of this issue and address possible directions for future research. At the centre of this effort is the question: "Does the European Union lack legitimacy?" and if so in what regard.

Since the initial creation of what has come to be known at the European Union, attitudes towards integration have varied significantly. There are those who have always supported attempts at extensive integration, many with a view towards a federated Europe. However, others have also remained highly critical of integration attempts, maintaining that national interests should remain paramount.

In current discussions of integration two main theoretical frameworks are used: intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. Intergovernmentalism divides politics into areas of high and low politics; low politics concerning economic and welfare issues and high politics covering areas associated with national prestige, i.e. foreign policy and defence (Richardson, 1996, p. 49). Intergovernmentalists argue that integration should

remain largely in the area of low politics, leaving high politics to policy decisions within the states. It is asserted that nationalism will come to the fore when matters of high politics arise because states are not willing to enter into policy affecting national prestige that is not secure and definite (p. 49). Neo-functionalism takes a contrasting view to integration. According to neo-functionalist thought the emergence of greater transnational and transgovernmental pressure[1] would further the integration process (George, 1991, p. 21). The theory of spill-over was at the heart of this thought, which essentially asserted that if states were to integrate one sector of their economies, pressures would force them to integrate further (p. 22). It is arguable that the view of a federated Europe is at the heart of neo-functionalist thought[2].

These varying views greatly influence issues of contention surrounding integration. For example, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher epitomises intergovernmental thought. The influence of Thatcher upon the integration process is characterised by resistance to further integration and impediments to European 'high politics'. Neo-functionalism is embodied in the work of former Commission President Jacque Delors and former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The rapid advances in integration, namely common currency and foreign policy co-operation, were enacted through the neo-functionalist leadership of Delors and Kohl. Application of legitimacy theory to the European Union is one contentious area that is affected by these varying views of integration. It is by no means accepted that notions of political legitimacy can be applied to the European Union without great debate. In fact, the two major theoretical frameworks take opposing views.

---

[1] The pressures that influence political decision makers, such as interest groups and bureaucratic actors are, as explained by George, the pressures that neo-functionalists felt would transcend national boundaries (transnationalism) and could be unregulated by state foreign offices (transgovernmentalism). (George, 1991, p. 21)

[2] or vice versa

Under an intergovernmental framework the need to examine legitimacy of the Union is limited. With the belief that integration concerns should remain within the realm of low politics it is arguable that the European Union can be viewed simply as any other international institution. Therefore, the application of legitimacy theory to the EU should be done within an international relations paradigm. Such theories of legitimacy in an IR paradigm are applied to institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation, and the International Monetary Fund. The application of legitimacy to international institutions is based upon the legitimacy of those states that comprise the members of the institutions. Beetham and Lord clarify this by saying:

> *"The legitimacy of international institutions follows the principle: that system of authority is legitimate whose authority is recognised and confirmed by the acts of other legitimate authorities. The addressees of legitimation claims on the part of such institutions are the member states and their officials, not citizens more generally, for the simple reason that it is only the obedience and co-operation of such officials that is required for the relevant international body to achieve its purposes"*
>
> *(Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 11).*

However, as the Community has developed into the European Union the intergovernmental aspect of the EU has incorporated increasing supra-national elements that affect citizens to a much larger degree. The powers that the European Union holds under the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties undoubtedly affect the citizens of the member states. The rules and decisions of the Union, such as quota policy, directly impinge upon its citizens. This in turn requires acknowledgement by the citizens that the rules and regulations are authoritative and binding (p. 13). This is one important objection to using a framework of legitimacy in an international relations paradigm.

A second objection to the use of these principles of legitimacy is the constant process of change of the EU. The EU is not "a static institution" (p. 15). As the powers and jurisdiction of the EU are further expanded new questions arise regarding the authority and accountability of those powers (Wallace and Smith, 1995, p. 148-151). Such

questions indicate that the role of the public in legitimating authority is becoming a greater issue as the EU develops more supra-national powers, as was demonstrated through the difficulties in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty and the debates over EMU (Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 15).

A further argument against using an international relations paradigm is due to the affect the EU has on the legitimacy of its member states. Since EU decisions affect the internal policies of states (for example, as the effects that criteria for monetary unification had on member states' economies) the legitimacy of the member states can in fact be undermined by the authority of the EU (p. 16). Given that under the above framework the legitimacy of the international institution is built upon the legitimacy of its members, this undermining of member state legitimacy will ultimately undermine the legitimacy of the EU (p. 16). Clearly, this implies that the principle of legitimacy of international institutions is flawed with reference to this aspect of the EU. Therefore, assessing legitimacy within a framework that is purely elite based is now inadequate due to the effect that the EU's decisions can now have upon its citizens and member states' legitimacy.

A neo-functionalist view, on the other hand, accepts that the European Union should not be confined to an international relations (IR) paradigm. The belief in spill-over and further integration sees the European Union becoming more of a state-like actor than an international organisation. The prevalence of EU policies within member-states demonstrates the prevalence of neo-functionalism in the post-Maastricht era and thus sees the Union assuming state-like attributes.

In the *Study of the European Community: the Challenge to Comparative Politics*, Simon Hix discusses the main limitations of an international relations approach to the EU. In the course of doing so the attributes of a comparative politics perspective are highlighted.

The IR approach as noted above has traditionally studied the EU as a intergovernmental co-operation between sovereign states. As Hix notes this has become inadequate because "now that the EC [sic] is more than an international organisation, theories of international politics are of limited use for studying the 'internal' politics of the Community [sic]" (Hix, 1994, p. 1).

As Hix states, the European Union is now more than an international organisation. In fact, Hix argues "politics in the EC [sic] is not inherently different to the practice of government in any democratic system. As in all modern politics, EC [sic] 'politics' is dominated by questions of representation and participation, the distribution and allocation of resources, and political and administrative efficiency" (p. 1). It is this shift away from an international institution that necessitates a framework of legitimacy beyond an intergovernmental framework.

It should be noted however that the European Union is not a neo-functionalist centric organisation. The future of Europe is still very flexible and by no means clear. Stagnation of the integration process may see the realm of high politics stay largely within the confines of the individual states. Yet the avenues for future integration still include possible paths towards federation. The study of Europe needs to include considerations of all these future possibilities. An intergovernmental path of integration can rely on international relations theories of legitimacy in which the legitimacy of the Union would be under little dispute. Neo-functionalism on the other hand requires more extensive studies of EU legitimacy. It is for this reason that the framework of the following paper will be done within the context of a neo-functionalist perspective. Within this framework, the study of legitimacy becomes necessary in that the EU is

considered to be expanding beyond the role of an international organisation and into the realm of state-orientated politics[3].

Furthermore, the focus of discussions on legitimacy can centre on various regime types. This thesis will confine legitimacy discussions to theories particularly applicable to democracies. There are two main reasons for this narrowed focus. Firstly, one of the main criteria for EU membership is that all members must have a democratic political system. Secondly, if democratic states transfer elements of sovereignty to a supranational body, arguably this body must also be built upon democratic principles to make this transfer of sovereignty legitimate in its own right. Hence, the legitimacy of the European Union must be a democratic legitimacy.

With these parameters, the thesis begins with examination of the political concept of legitimacy. Chapter Two examines the theoretical literature of legitimacy in order to construct a workable democratic model that may be applied to the European Union. Chapter Three then applies this model of legitimacy to the European Union creating an ideal model for the EU within a neo-functionalist framework. This creation allows for assessment of the degree to which the Union meets the criteria of the ideal model. Of the factors of legitimacy that are discussed and addressed it is the elements of 'popular legitimacy' that are said by authors such as Beetham and Lord to be most lacking within the European Union.

---

[3] It is accepted that this classification is also inadequate. The creation of the European Union has presented political studies with a new and complex institution that challenges modern notions of political frameworks. Due to this all contemporary theories will be lacking in some regard. However the point to emphasise is the need to disregard theories that place limitations upon conceptualising the European Union, eg: international relations, and adopt theories that provide adaptable solutions to this problem such as comparative politics.

It is this lack of 'popular legitimacy' in which the true complexities of this issue lie for the EU. From here this thesis will concentrate on whether the European Union does in fact lack this legitimacy or whether modern concepts of state legitimacy are simply too narrow to encompass acts of popular support at a supra-national level.

Chapter Four explores the overall hypothesis 'based on the review of legitimacy literature, there is a legitimacy crisis in the European Union'. In testing this hypotheses empirical research from the *Eurobarometre*, based upon the initial method of Miles Hewstone in 1986, will be the primary source of information. A subsequent hypothesis that 'the decline in popular support for unification is a reaction against some level of actions which were perceived to be not in accordance with the values and beliefs of society'. The initial conclusions from these examinations will then be tested against the 1986 findings of Hewstone in order to identify whether there are identifiable trends which will allow for future predictions regarding popular legitimacy. Chapter Four also explores the hypothesis that voter turnout for elections to the European Parliament is an inadequate measure of the population's consent. It is argued that examination of external factor will demonstrate that voter turnout is not a true reflection of public opinion towards integration.

Chapter Five addresses aspects of identity and legitimacy that have been largely overlooked in the bulk of previous legitimacy research. Identity is presented as an area where future studies may find resonance in measuring the Union's legitimacy. Conclusions are drawn regarding the true state of legitimacy within the EU according to a neo-functionalist framework by exploring the complexities of legitimacy issues. At the same time conclusions will also be drawn about the adequacy of a state-centric approach for the examination of political affairs in the European Union.

# *Chapter Two*
# Legitimacy Theory

The question of legitimacy for the EU has come to the fore with recent attempts to enlarge and widen the Union. Legitimacy in the European Union appears to have been largely overlooked until problems with emerged in the 1990's, notably the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Consequently it has only recently become a prominent area of study for contemporary research. However, as the process of integration continues to develop the issue of legitimacy becomes more vital to its continued success. The European Union is increasing its involvement in everyday life in Europe; this would seem to imply a greater need for legitimacy. Before assessing the legitimacy of the European Union an understanding of what constitutes legitimate democratic government is required. Only then can a comprehensive assessment of the legitimacy of the integration process be made.

## Examining Legitimacy

The debate about the legitimation of power and authority has been approached from varying views throughout modern history; legal theorists, philosophers, and sociologists have all discussed the concept. Literature dealing with legitimacy is therefore extensive and complex. In order for any assessment of democratic legitimacy to commence an understanding of the complexities of the theories involved must be reached. Therefore, the initial task in such social science research is the construction of a coherent framework for examination. This begins with the exploration of the primary theories and arguments.

Legitimacy can be associated with many different forms of government. However, in democracies the need for legitimacy is greater than that of other regimes (Dahl, 1965 p. 19). This is largely due to a democracy's inability to impose its wishes

upon a society if there is great opposition: "in democracies political leaders need authority because they are not permitted to acquire sufficient resources to enforce their policies through naked power" (p. 32). This acquisition of resources to force compliance is contrary to basic democratic principle of free will and thus other means of compliance are required. Hence, legitimacy is needed in order for a democratic government to function. It would be plausible to state that democracy is not a prerequisite for legitimacy but rather legitimacy is a prerequisite for democracy[4]. (Lipset, 1959, p. 87).

Stability is often cited as a further reason why legitimacy is important to political powers. The concept that a regime's stability is relative to the regime's legitimacy appears repeatedly throughout legitimacy theory. Max Weber was one of the modern pioneers of this thought. In *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, Weber proposes that regimes follow on a spectrum from (1) expediency to (2) customary order to (3) legitimate order. Stability, according to Weber, follows on a parallel spectrum from least stable to most stable orders (Weber, 1947, p. 114).

Many authors incorporate this idea in their commentaries. Legitimacy's connection to stability is a widely accepted proposition amongst theorists according to Grafstein (Grafstein 1981a, p. 51). In his own work he explicitly states that "the legitimate regime is more likely to be stable than an illegitimate one" (p. 51). He also continues on to say "legitimacy, in effect, is a highly efficient way to secure obedience and thus is conducive to stability" (p. 51). This theme can be found in Lipset's discussions as well. In his work, he concludes that the stability of a political system is dependent in part upon the effectiveness and legitimacy of the political system (Lipset, 1959, p. 86).

[4] However, some authors argue that a democracy is the only legitimate form of government--an argument that shall be briefly highlighted later.

Both Grafstein and Lipset relate efficiency and effectiveness to legitimacy. Other theorists have noted this connection as well. Mereleman proposes that illegitimate political regimes operate far less efficiently than legitimate regimes (Mereleman, 1966, p. 549). Enhanced effectiveness results from legitimacy, according to Beetham, because the ability of the powerful to achieve their goals is increased (Beetham, 1991, p. 33). Thus, for more efficient, effective, and stable government, legitimate authority is advantageous.

It is not sufficient to say that a connection between stability/effectiveness and legitimacy exists simply because it is accepted by many theorists. The reason why legitimacy causes such effects needs also to be explained. The primary explanations stem from the issue of obedience. Beetham asserts that in a legitimate power relationship the power "has the right to expect obedience from subordinates, even where they may disagree with the content of a particular law or institution" (p. 26). When obedience is rightfully expected by a legitimate authority the role that government plays within society becomes easier. Lack of continual resistance allows for easier policy implementation. This translates eventually into stable and effective government. Furthermore, continual resistance would require coercive means to implement policy, which ultimately proves to be expensive. Dahl explains:

> *"When a political system is widely accepted by its members as legitimate, and when the policies of its officials and other leaders are guarded as morally binding by its citizens, then the costs of compliance are low. Conversely, when legitimacy and authority are low, leaders must use more of their money, police, privileges, weapons, status, and other political resources to secure compliance."*
>
> *(Dahl, 1965, p. 32).*

With lower costs and less effort in securing compliance government is better able to execute their objectives. A government that is better able to achieve their aims equates to greater effectiveness[5]. Continual ability to do this ultimately results in greater stability.

[5] Although this is also dependent upon the fact that a government will know how to achieve its aims.

Hence, when legitimate authority results in obedience, government will be more stable and effective because policy is easier to implement. [6]

It thus becomes clear why the EU desires legitimacy. What remains unclear however, is how it attains legitimacy. Beetham reminds us of this by noting that the observer should not confuse legitimacy with the effect that it has on the system (Beetham 1991, p. 38). The increased stability and effectiveness of a government does not translate directly to the meaning of legitimacy. These justify the need for legitimacy but do not explain the concept of legitimacy itself; this is a much greater task.

## The Concept of Legitimacy

Throughout the literature Max Weber's work is continually presented as the starting point for debate. Political theorists have used the work of Weber as the basis for their examinations to such an extent that Weber's concepts have proven to be the dominant models for empirical investigation of legitimacy (Grafstein, 1981a, p. 456). Accordingly, it is appropriate that these theories form the starting point for a contemporary critique of legitimacy literature.

Weber appears preoccupied with the idea of authority, power, and order in his social theory. A key element of his theory construction was the legitimation of authority. He defines legitimacy as the uniformity of social action oriented by belief in the existence of legitimate order (Weber, 1947, p. 113). Social science has commonly paraphrased Weber's understanding to the definition of legitimacy as the *belief* in legitimacy (Beetham 1991, Pitkin 1972, Grafstein 1981a).

---

[6] This argument is quite distinct from analysis of good government. The above explanation merely examines effective and stable government in terms of the ability to achieve government objectives. Whether these objectives are always in line with the wishes of the public is a separate issue and should not be confused with the above discussion. Theoretical analysis of appropriateness of government actions will not be dealt with in this context as it opens the discussion up to larger political theory issues that cannot be discussed adequately within the confines of this examination.

In Weber's view submission to an order can imply a belief in legitimacy. He clearly maintains that "so far as it is not derived merely from fear or from motives of expediency, a willingness to submit to an order imposed by one man or a small group, always in some sense implies a belief in the legitimate authority of the source imposing it" (Weber, 1947, p. 121). Actions, according to Weber, were the indicator of belief; acts of obedience imply the belief in legitimacy (p. 299-300). However, Weber acknowledges that submission does not automatically validate authority. The validation of authority is relative to the degree that the appropriate attitudes will exist—the greater the attitudes, the greater the validation (p. 300). Yet, Weber does not seem to clarify how the social scientist, as an objective observer, is able to differentiate between obedience as a result of these appropriate attitudes and obedience as a result of other motives such as fear, apathy, or instrumentalism.

*The Legacy of Weber*

The influence of Weber's theory can be recognised in the works of many theorists, although distinctions are clearly present[7]. Weber's concept of belief as the defining characteristic of legitimacy is evident, for example, in Seymour Lipset's definition. To Lipset, "Legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society" (Lipset, 1959, p. 86). Robert Dahl is another example of this influence. According to Dahl legitimacy is the "belief that the structure, procedures, acts, decisions, policies, officials, or leaders of government possess the quality of 'rightness', proper or moral goodness" (Dahl, 1965, p. 19). Weber's influence is identifiable in Richard Mereleman's definition, which also derives from Lipset's definition. In brief, Mereleman describes legitimacy as the "quality of 'oughtness' that is perceived by the public to inhere in a political regime" and further that "legitimacy is a quality attributed to a regime by a population. That quality is the outcome of the government's capacity to engender legitimacy" (Mereleman, 1966, p. 548).

[7] To be discussed below

There is a notable distinction between these theorists and Weber. While the influence of Weber can validly be highlighted in the use of belief for defining legitimacy, it must be recognised that these theorists have identified the limitations of Weber's definition. Weber defines legitimacy as *belief* in *legitimacy*; these definitions extend beyond this to regard legitimacy as *belief* in the *qualities* that can be attributed to legitimate government. However, the underlying point is that such definitions illustrate the degree to which Weber's thoughts have been incorporated into subsequent literature. A belief-based definition infers an acceptance of Weber's use of belief's role in legitimacy to some degree. Definitions set the standard for the resulting literature; belief based definitions result in belief-based literature, both explicit and implicit.

Nevertheless, not all legitimacy theorists fully accept Weber's use of belief. For example, Hannah Pitkin (1972), Robert Grafstein (1981a) and Carl Friedrich (1963), Wolfgang Mommsen (1974), and John Schaar (1970) all contend that Weber's definition of legitimacy excludes the possibility for objective assessment of legitimacy. This, according to some, stems from the definition of legitimacy as the belief in legitimacy and intended methodology of Weber. By defining legitimacy in such a manner the opportunity for examination against criteria distinct from the beliefs of the public is excluded.

To Pitkin, it is Weber's intention to maintain neutrality and descriptive scientific elements that create inherent problems in analysis. She paraphrases Weber's argument as: the "sociologist will regard...a political system as legitimate precisely to the extent that people's actions or behaviour are 'oriented toward'...that system" (Pitkin 1972, p. 281). Grafstein also argues that Weber's efforts to construct this neutral concept for empirical research resulted in the "essential meaning of legitimacy" being distorted (Grafstein, 1981a, p. 456). The significant result is that Weber's concept no longer refers to the regime itself. For in short, "Weber virtually identifies legitimacy with stability and effective political power, reducing it to a routine submission to authority" (p. 46).

Weber's tendency as a consequence is to "conflate stable authority and legitimacy" (p. 464). Carl Friedrich agrees with this argument. His major criticism is Weber's tendency to confuse, if not identify, legitimacy with authority (Friedrich, 1963, p. 235). Mommsen also argues this; "legitimacy, in Weber's terms, amounts to little more than an equivalent of the stability of the respective political system" (Mommsen, 1974, p. 84). He contends that this also distorts the meaning of legitimacy because "one cannot escape the conclusion that in the context of Weber's sociological theory of 'legitimate rule' there was no room for illegitimate forms of domination" (p. 83).

The result of such methodology, to Pitkin, is that Weber's approach is that of the visiting anthropologist and this has resulted in defining legitimacy as whatever the 'natives' believe it to be. (Pitkin, 1972, p. 282). The social scientist in this respect is relegated to the role of passive observer who is merely responsive to what is in the mind of the observed subjects "rather than the active seeker after independent, objective social reality" (p. 283). Mommsen argues that this does not allow the researcher to go further and find "substantive reasons why and under which conditions a system may be legitimate" (Mommsen, 1974, p. 84) Pitkin considers the result of these flaws fundamental. She argues that "in seeking to insulate the sociologist from the context of judging and taking a position, Weber in effect made it incomprehensible that anyone might judge legitimacy and illegitimacy according to rational, objective standards" (Pitkin, 1972, p. 283).

With particular reference to democratic legitimacy Schaar argues that this is fundamentally unsound. Schaar argues that "when legitimacy is defined as consisting in belief alone then the investigator can examine nothing outside popular opinion" and "in effect this analysis dissolves legitimacy into acceptance or acquiescence, thereby rendering opaque whole classes of basic and recurrent political phenomena" (Schaar, 1970, p. 284). For Schaar, legitimacy of power has in modern times, in most states, been

reduced to simply: "for power to become authority it must originate in 'democratic consent' and aim at the 'common good' or 'public interest'" (p. 288)[8]

## A Contemporary Theory of Legitimacy

These criticisms highlight the fact that the Weberian idea of legitimacy, stemming merely from a belief in legitimacy, is not entirely acceptable for examining modern authority. The arguments of Pitkin and Grafstein point to the major flaw in such thinking. To base legitimacy purely on belief removes all elements of normative standards which can be applied to democratic governments.

Robert Grafstein's extensive criticisms of Weber's theories led to his introduction of an alternative theory. Grafstein regards the major flaw in contemporary social science theories of legitimacy to be the concept that political order is psychologically based (Grafstein, 1981b, p. 52). He argues that alternatively social science should be viewing political order from an institutional perspective and thus legitimacy as the property of political institutions rather than individual psychologies (p. 52).

The psychological approach relies heavily on the idea that public consensus is the guarantor of political order. Grafstein's key problem with this approach is that the above idea seems to disregard the element of socialisation. He argues "common culture, in the form of shared values, beliefs, or conceptual schemes, does not produce the public co-ordination of behaviour" (p. 55). To Grafstein, our political behaviour is a learned social pattern; we learn patterns of obedience and submission from the society around us[9]. Grafstein argues that the introduction of values is also flawed because the scientific

[8] However, it should be noted that Schaar does not entirely agree with the simplicity of this statement as he states that "democracy is the most prostituted word of our age, and any man who employs it in reference to any modern state should be suspect either of ignorance or of bad motives" and that "public good has not fared much better. It is widely agreed among political scientists that it is more a term of political art than political analysis" (Schaar, 1970, p. 288). Rather Schaar is commenting on how he believes legitimacy in modern states is viewed in general.

[9] It can be argued that Grafstein's view of culture is incorrect. To argue that common culture does not produce 'public co-ordination of behaviour' is flawed if it is argued that the socialisation of 'learned patterns of obedience' in fact stems from the common culture.

connection between values and behaviour becomes vague and largely assumption based. Taking social order as a sign of consensus is essentially, to Grafstein, taking patterns of social behaviour as an indicator of individual values which holds no scientific proof, merely assumptions (p. 56).

The alternative theory of the institutional approach to legitimacy rejects psychological arguments on the whole because "in the purest sense, a legitimate institution secures obedience to its decision by the very fact of having made them through appropriate institutional procedure" (p. 58). It is the appropriate procedures of legitimation that are of concern for the institutional researcher. These appropriate procedures, in Grafstein's belief, are in accordance with the ritual or regulated procedures of the institutions through which governments operate (p. 58)[10]. This leads to Grafstein's definition of legitimacy which contends that "a political institution is legitimate, in effect, when the individual as a matter of course confines his behaviour to some subset of institutionally relevant choices--the 'legal' ones" (p. 67).[11]

However, if one is to follow the lead of Grafstein and attempt to remove belief from the construction of legitimacy all together the result is also flawed. To take into account purely the legitimacy of institutions and acquisition of power creates problems. This approach cannot entirely remove the social element. For institutions to function within set norms and power acquisition to also apply to these norms a social element still appears. The norms themselves are the construction of societal values. These values dictate the way that government is formed. Certain Western societal values result in

---

[10] Grafstein attempts to explain the institutional approach through an extensive game theory. In the course of the game theory, Grafstein argues that institutions become legitimate by limiting citizens' behaviour into appropriate channels. Illegal choices are considered non-problematic in this game theory in Grafstein's view. He states that "Legitimacy means that the institution in question does not have to take specific steps to insure that individuals confine their behaviour to legal choices. The legitimate institution's indifference to the existence of illegal opportunities may reflect an inherent undesirability of the illegal choices" (Grafstein, 1981b, p. 61)

[11] The main aspect to note in Grafstein's definition is that legitimacy is with regard to institutions and he appears to intend this to be the equivalent to power and authority, since this is in response to the work of social science on the legitimacy of power and authority.

democratic practice. An approach which attempts to centre entirely around the appropriateness of procedure overlooks the interdependent relationship this has to values.

Clearly, exclusively institutionalist and exclusively belief-centric views of legitimacy are flawed. If this is the case, then perhaps contemporary legitimacy theory needs to incorporate both aspects. Clearly, legality of power cannot be completely ignored. Yet the role of public belief is also vital to maintaining legitimate government.

The emphasis on belief in the majority of social science literature is not without reason. The social scientist, according to Beetham's generalisation, is interested in the effect that legitimacy has on society. Their approach to legitimacy therefore ignores their personal belief of good governance and concentrates on the opinion of the society that they are studying (Beetham, 1991, p. 6). It is for this reason that most social scientists have accepted Weber's definition of legitimacy (p. 6). Within this context the social scientist does not make moral judgements like that of a philosopher. Instead they simply report on other people's beliefs (p. 8). Beetham notes that one would be mistaken if one were to suggest that the social scientist engage in evaluating a regime by independent normative standards, as are posed by the philosopher. However, he argues that the true mistake is to "divorce people's beliefs about legitimacy from their grounds or reasons for holding them; and these are to found precisely in the actual characteristics of regime, such as its conformity to their values, its ability to satisfy their interests, and so on" (p. 11). He clarifies this by saying that the mistake of social science has been to reduce Weber's "explanation of beliefs to the processes and agencies of their internalisation rather than the analysis of the factors which give people sufficient grounds for holding them" (p. 11). In other words, "a given power relationship is not legitimate because people believe in its legitimacy, but because it can be justified in terms of their belief" (p. 11).

Lipset's argument provides the basis for this view. Lipset argues that belief in legitimacy is relative to the values of the society. He asserts that "groups will regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit in with their primary values". (Lipset, 1959, p. 86-87). Lipset's use of belief is not therefore simply legitimacy from belief in legitimacy, rather legitimacy from the congruent value orientations of the government and society. This still slightly overstates the role of direct belief in legitimating authority. However, when used in conjunction with Beetham's argument the connections between belief, value orientation, and legitimacy are placed into an evaluative framework.

When assessment of values and beliefs is re-configured in such a framework the role it plays in legitimacy becomes more readily identified. This results in evaluating legitimacy in the terms of how far authority conforms to the values and standards of the governed (Beetham, 1991, p. 11). This is essentially an assessment of the degree of congruence between the actions of the authority and the values, beliefs, and expectations that provide it justification (p. 11). The relationship between laws and rules of a government and the beliefs underpinning them becomes one key factor in legitimating authority (p. 12).

It is at this juncture that capacity can be introduced into discussions of legitimacy. The *capacity* to carry out policy in the interests of the people is implicit in the ability to meet this aspect of legitimacy. For actions of government to be congruent with societal values it is implied that the government has the *capacity* to act in the interests of the people.

Democratic governments in particular require further elements in order to be considered rightfully legitimate. Actual action to demonstrate that the public consents to the rule of the present authority is also important in legitimating government. Schaar explains that legitimate democratic authority must originate in democratic consent

(Schaar, 1970, p. 284). Thus, public demonstration of people's consent contributes to the legitimation of power (Beetham, 1991, p. 12).

Beetham states that the most customary methods of demonstrating this consent are "within the conventions of the particular society" (p. 12). The conventions of modern democracies are commonly held to be processes of voting for representation. As Friedrich states "the fact that those who are being ruled have expressed a preference for a person through voting for him in an election has more recently been the preferred mode of establishing right or title to rule" (Friedrich, 1963, p. 233). This is important in that, to Friedrich, legitimacy is a problem of consensus revolving around the question of the right to rule (p. 233).

Public consent of legitimacy can be placed in realistic democratic terms by grounding it "in the acceptance of general rules or laws, ideally by the general will, but actually by majority vote" (p. 234). This according to Friedrich, is the prevalent form of legitimacy in the twentieth century. It accepts that direct democracy is not viable in modern society and majority must be the measure of legitimacy in terms of consent. Expression of consent is therefore important to conferring legitimacy upon these grounds but is also connected to further factors of legitimation.

The interdependent relationship between these factors becomes apparent when introducing the legal aspect. The legal acquisition of power in democracies lies in public consent. As Friedrich explained, public consent has in modern times been expressed through voting in democratic elections. The result of elections is in turn the means by which governments acquire their legal entitlement to rule in democracies. It is through this process that legitimacy is in part established. This is a clear argument for legal experts who identify that "power is legitimate where its acquisition and exercise conform to established law" (Beetham, 1991, p. 4). Although relative to the consent of the public

in democracies, legality is separate from belief by the public in legitimate rule. Whether the acquisition and exercise of power is done within the law is vital for legitimacy but independent from belief (p. 12).

Therefore, it is evident that legal aspects of legitimacy cannot be disregarded entirely. However, it is incorrect to assume, as the legal experts do, that legal acquisition and exercise of power automatically legitimates authority. Friedrich noted that legality must not be confused with legitimacy. It is merely an element of it. He argues that legality can be used as a means of justifying rule but does not legitimise on its own (Friedrich, 1963, p. 234). Friedrich supports this in saying that perfect legality does not always justify rule. Nor does justified rule translate into perfect legality, for a government can be believed to be legitimate when the ruler is actually abusing his power[12] (p. 234).

Hence, it can be argued that the belief and values of society, the consent of the public to rule, and legal acquisition and exercise of power can all be factors in legitimacy. It is perhaps in Beetham's terms that this inter-dependent process of legitimacy is best explained. He summarises this incorporative argument in the context of three factors that contribute to legitimacy. The initial level is the legal validity of the acquisition and exercise of political power. Second is the justifiability of the rules for government action in terms of the belief and values current in the given society. The third factor is evidence of consent derived from actions. (Beetham, 1991, p. 15). In Beetham's view, "these factors, successively and cumulatively, are what make power legitimate" (p. 15).

With slight alteration, taking into account the supporting arguments for such thoughts, Beetham's three levels become the basis for a democratic model of legitimacy. It is thus argued by this thesis that a government can be considered legitimate when:

---

[12] For example, a revolutionary government may come to power with support of a majority but not through legal means. While the nation may deem the government legitimate, fellow states may not, therefore legality once again allows the external observer one criterion for measuring legitimacy

- it acquires and exercises political power through legal means,
- the actions of government are congruent with the values and beliefs of society, and
- there is evidence of consent through action for the authority/power structure by the ruled (public).

These three factors together form the model of democratic legitimacy as represented in figure 2.1.

**Figure 2.1: MODEL OF LEGTIMACY**




It is important to note that these are not alternatives, rather they must all be present to contribute to legitimacy (p. 16). However, these factors need not be achieved completely; a majority can be sufficient. Due to the fact that every society will have members who do not accept the norms that underpin the rules of power, and there will also be those members that refuse to express consent, examination in relative terms is necessary. Therefore, political authority, although measured against the ideal, must simply meet these criteria by a reasonable majority. Hence, the measure of legitimacy may be expressed in the realistic terms of majority, thus allowing for some popular dissent (p. 19). As long as this dissent does not arise in large amounts, the government will remain legitimate, assuming other facts are significantly present.

Beetham thus defines legitimacy as follows: "where power is acquired and exercised according to justifiable rule, and with evidence of consent, we call it rightful or legitimate" (p. 3). The model presented by Beetham incorporates insights from a range of legitimacy theorists. It has been argued here that it is both compelling and workable, and it will therefore be used to analyse questions of legitimacy as they pertain to the EU.

As stated in Chapter One a neo-functionalist framework allows for the application of a state-centric theory to the study of the European Union. By constructing an ideal model of legitimacy from the above theoretical literature, it is now possible to address the larger question of whether the European Union lack legitimacy when examined within a neo-functionalist framework.

# *Chapter Three*
# Legitimacy and the European Union

Chapter Two presents an ideal model of democratic legitimacy. Although ideal models remain unachievable by their very nature they are still useful as measures for assessment. In this instance the model constructed in Chapter Two is presented as a means of measuring the *relative* democratic legitimacy accepting that not all criteria can be fully met. Rather, as previously stated, an observable majority presence of the three factors is necessary in order to constitute legitimate political authority. However, this model applies largely to the legitimacy of nation-states. How then can this model of legitimacy be applied to a supra-national body such as the European Union?

Chapter One discussed the relevance of various theoretical frameworks to the European Union as a whole. Intergovernmentalism was discounted as a theoretical framework for this thesis in that neo-functionalist thought presents the most integrated concept of the European Union. It is this concept that presents the most challenges to legitimacy theory and hence requires more extensive research. This is not to mean however that an intergovernmental perspective should be discounted in all legitimacy research. It is worth understanding the concept of legitimacy from an intergovernmental framework and how this relates to the European Union.

## Intergovernmental Legitimacy

As stated in Chapter One the intergovernmental framework enlists the theory of legitimacy for international institutions in relation to the EU. Moravcsik argues that the European Union can be "analysed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination" and "does

not require a *sui generis* theory". (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 474) If one accepts Moravcsik's argument then examination of legitimacy in the EU becomes much less complex. Legitimacy in this context is measured according to international relations theory. When applying IR theory to the particular workings of the EU, the intergovernmental model does not require great theory construction. As stated in Chapter One, an international institution is legitimate when its authority is recognised by the *legitimate* states that comprise the institution. Therefore, in the case of the Union, an intergovernmentalist would argue that the EU is legitimate with the recognition of its authority by member states. This recognition is conferred through the ratification of EU treaties (Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 61).

The legitimacy of the EU, according to this argument, can be considered rightfully democratic through domestic elections. For, the "elections of national governments, whose members then go on to serve on the European Council and Council of Ministers", bestows the element of democratic consent upon the Union (p. 61). The ratification is also argued by some to contribute to the democratisation of the EU in that the treaties must be ratified in each country according to their democratic conventions (i.e., parliamentary vote or referenda) (p. 61). Judge even argues that the frequency with which the treaties are updated reinforces the national power to legitimate the democratic workings of the Union (Judge, 1995, p. 89).

Clearly, on the whole, the EU appears to meet the criteria presented thus far in the intergovernmental framework. However it is important to note the limitations of reliance on the Council of Ministers as a legitimating element. The Council of Ministers are elected individually in domestic elections rather than being given collective authorisation. As Beetham and Lord state "the Council of Ministers is far more than the

sum of its parts" in that it is an institution of the Union and not just a conference of governments (Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 63). The consequence is that 'national authorisation' can quickly be overridden through majority voting. However, bearing in mind that it is impossible to reach the ideal and that this point is relatively minor, the elements of intergovernmental legitimacy are largely met and stand without significant opposition. This bodes well for the legitimacy of the European Union if this were the only view. However, considering there are those whose visions of Europe extend to a federation with even further governmental attributes, legitimacy needs to be examined from this perspective.

## Beyond intergovernmental legitimacy

As explained in Chapter One the application of a comparative method to the European Union when working within a neo-functionalist perspective is more advantageous than international relations. This does not mean however that this is a perfect solution. The European Union is a unique institution that expands beyond the realm of present theoretical frameworks. As Lord states "comparisons with ideal tests, or with experience based on a... different political form—the nation-state—will often be illuminating but can never be sufficient" (Lord, 1998, p. 15). The challenge to social scientists studying Europe is to conceptualise how present theoretical frameworks may be adapted in order to examine the institutions of the Union. While attempting to study institutions of the European Union it is also necessary to assess the relative application of state-centric frameworks. Thus, the challenge to this thesis is two-fold. Examination of EU legitimacy commences with the model presented for nation-states in Chapter Two. While assessing how the EU fulfils the criteria of the legitimacy model it will be necessary to also question the extent that this may be applied to the Union. Despite this need to

question the degree of application, the model remains the most relevant starting point due to the limitations of an IR model as presented in Chapter One.

The legitimacy of the European Union has only recently come to the fore in discussions of integration. The question of legitimacy failed to be raised for years (Obradovic, 1996, p. 192) largely from a reliance on indirect legitimacy within an international relations paradigm. Many authors have come to question the need for, and consequently initiated debate regarding the role of, direct democratic legitimacy in the Union. Beetham and Lord argue that any legitimation of the EU must be based upon liberal-democratic criteria because this will be the only form of legitimacy that will be "able to ensure citizen support and loyalty to its authority" (Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 22). As discussed previously, loyalty to authority, demonstrated through obedience, is connected to stability, efficiency, and effectiveness. These attributes are ultimately advantageous to the future of the European Union; increase in these attributes provides greater security for integration. Therefore, if the Union should desire these effects, then it is important to establish the legitimacy that fosters them. Beetham and Lord have stated a democratic model is vital for this reason (p. 22).

Wallace and Smith maintain that the European Union cannot sustain legitimacy based on the legitimacy of member states. They argue that "the sense of indirect legitimacy, which characterised the early experience of integration, no longer exists" (Wallace and Smith, 1995, p. 153). Beetham and Lord explain that indirect legitimacy is now problematic in that "some may begin to argue that the Union cannot pretend to draw its legitimacy from the very unit that it so frequently overrides" (Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 38). Thus, the EU "requires at least sufficient legitimation to support continuing acceptance of rules imposed by majority vote over national preferences" (Wallace and

Smith, 1995, p. 153). Obradovic also articulates this need for legitimacy stating that "if the Union is to deal forcefully with issues such as monetary Union, social policy, foreign policy, home affairs and justice, and constitutional reform, it will require active public support for political change, i.e. fully developed policy legitimacy" (Obradovic, 1996, p. 193). Hence it is necessary to partake in deeper analysis of Union legitimacy. Using the model of legitimacy from Chapter Two an ideal model of legitimacy will provide the starting point for such assessment.

## The Ideal Model of EU Legitimacy

### *Legal Legitimacy*

#### Legal Acquisition and Exercise of Power

Although the European Union can, on the whole, be analysed within a state-centric framework, the legal aspects of the EU are not as easily transferred to theories of the state. The members of the European Union are still internationally recognised as sovereign states in their own right, regardless of any state attributes that the EU may exhibit. Therefore, any interaction amongst sovereign states is done within the context of international law, rather than intra-state law. The ideal legal acquisition of power is hence centred on legally binding agreements as per international law. According to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaties are legally bound by international law, with treaties defined as "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation" (as cited in Klabbers, 1996, p. 41-42). These agreements are "legally binding by virtue of the rule pacta sunt servada"—a tradition dating back to ancient Greece, in which "legal bonds were deemed strengthened by the taking of an oath" (Klabbers, 1996, p. 39). As a result, the initial creation of the Union must occur through

ratification of formal treaties. It is through treaty ratification that the EU can be considered legal according to international law. Power acquisition within the Union is bound by the regulations set out in formal treaties. Positions of authority within the institutions are only legally acquired as these regulations dictate. The legal exercise of power can be viewed as adherence to the provisions set out in these formal treaties. Hence, the ideal legal factor of legitimacy for the European Union is the legal ratification, and abiding by the provisions, of formal treaties.

Abiding by the provisions of the formal treaties extends beyond the treaties and into a more comprehensive legal framework. Nugent reminds us that "an enforceable legal framework is the essential basis of decision-making and decision application in all democratic states" (Nugent, 1999, p. 242). Although the EU is not a state, Nugent argues that a legal framework is still necessary in the Union to ensure the possibility for effective EU decision-making (p. 242). While EU law originally stems form international treaties, the creation of European institutions and the power bestowed upon those institutions within these treaties has created several other sources of EU law. EU legislation is one primary source. These laws are constituted as secondary legislation and "are concerned with translating the general principles of the treaties into specific rules" (p. 245).

Case law also significantly contributes to the legal framework of the EU. While judicial interpretation has not traditionally shaped law in many EU member states, the European Court of Justice has had to play a more important role in EU law (p. 257). This largely stems from "the court's duty to ensure that EU law is interpreted and applied correctly" and "the fact that much of the EU statute law is far from clear or complete" (p. 257-258). This has resulted in a significant role for the court in

determining the laws of the Union which ultimately applies to both EU citizens and member states.

This international legal framework provides a strong argument against adopting a purely intergovernmental view of the European Union. For it is the legal framework described above that is "the single most important feature distinguishing the EU from other international organisations. The member states do not just co-operate with one another on an intergovernmental basis but have developed common laws designed to promote uniformity" (p. 276). This is often articulated as European Constitutionalism. Weiler contends that a key milestone in this constitutionalism was when the EC treaties were transformed from "a set of legal arrangements binding only upon sovereign states" to agreements that rendered "individuals too, no longer only states, 'subjects of the law'" (Weiler, 1997, p. 98). Clearly with the introduction of constitutionalism, the EU legal framework gains greater scope and capacity internally.

While all these internal laws contribute to the legal framework that must be adhered to for legal legitimacy the role of international law must not be forgotten. Not only is international law the basis for the treaty ratification which provides legal *acquisition* of power, international law is also present in the legal framework for legal *exercise* of power. The sovereignty of member states dictates that while the EU has its own legislation and internal legal framework, it is still in the eyes of the international community an international institution to which international law applies; the same rules that apply to member states as sovereign actors also applies to the EU as an institution (Nugent, 1999, p. 258). The consequence of this complex legal framework for legitimate legal exercise of power is multi-tiered. On one level the states that comprise the Union must exercise power within both the legislative framework of the EU but also the legal

rules of the international community. On the next level the EU itself must also exercise power within the same legal constraints. Hence this means that for the exercise of power to be legal and thus legitimate the EU and the member states that comprise it must act within the parameters of the legal framework as constructed by EU legislation and interpretation, as well as international law.

*Popular Legitimacy*

The application of the second and third ideal factors must concentrate on the democratic conditions encompassed in legitimacy. Popular or social legitimacy stems from government action combined with consent. The realistic terms within which this may be posed for observations are the three conditions of democracy that affect legitimacy as argued by Lord. While ultimately conditions of democracy on their own, each can be explained as a manifestation of popular legitimacy as well.

Lord argues in *Democracy in the European Union* that authorisation, accountability, and representation are three conditions of democracy. Authorisation is the conferment of consent by the 'the people' (Lord, 1998, p. 17). Hence, authorisation is synonmous with the third factor of legitimacy. Furthermore, Lord explains that "the single act of voting performs a dual role" of consenting for the overall power structure and electing particular political leadership (p. 17); once again this reflects the discussions of consent in Chapter Two.

Accountability can be described as the "political responsibility that ensures that the terms on which political power is authorized are duly observed" and also " the need for power-holders to compete for re-election" which in turn "gives them the incentive to be responsive to the public" (p. 80). The connection that this has to legitimacy can be

explained in terms of both consent and the need for actions to be in line with societal values. Accountability theoretically provides an incentive for the power-holders to be responsive to the public, or the actions of the government to be based upon the values of those who will re-elect them. The opportunity to re-elect representatives provides a means by which consent may be withdrawn (ie failure to be re-elected) if these actions are completely contrary to the beliefs of majority of 'the people'.

Representation is based on the idea that "the public should rule without having to assume the burden of collective decisions" with the goal of the representative system "to put the few who do hold power under systematic pressure to anticipate the needs and values of the many" (Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 79). Beetham and Lord argue that for representation to be just this ideally requires three criteria to exist:

> - *"The insertion of the public's respresentatives into strategic positions in the political suystem where they are able to confer or withhold power, or deny resources, such as finance and legislative authority, that are needed for the effective exercise of power.*
> - *Incentives for representatives to link society to governance by searching out and articulating the principal issue cleavages that define the interests of social groups in relation to the political system.*
> - *An opportunity for the public to choose between 'rival partisan programmes' at the 'same level of aggregation' as the political system itself"*
>
> *(p. 79)*

Elected representation, with the choice between 'rival partisans', provides the public with the opportunity to consent to representatives that they feel will act in line with their values. Furthermore, the ideal conditions of representation provide the means by which representatives may act in accordance with these values. These values themselves may be articulated through the choice of representatives.

Government Actions Congruent with Societal Values

If authorisation, accountability, and representation are the practical application of the ideal model of *democratic* legitimacy this can be applied to the EU through the presence of democratic institutions. The Commission and Council of Ministers are not directly elected and therefore can not under this model be labelled as democratic institutions. However the European Parliament is present as the representative body in the Union. For 'government' action to be congruent with societal values there are two elements that are raised in the case of the European institutions. While the Commission and Council of Ministers do not have to be elected representative they must still act in accordance with societal values. The means by which they may be held accountable, though, must be drawn from direct representation to meet the model. The European Parliament, as the representatives of 'the people', need to have the power to check the actions of those who are not elected representative. As those who are held directly accountable to the European people, the Parliament's ability to provides the checks and balances of democratic institutions enables indirect accountability for those who at present remain appointed officials. Therefore the two elements involved in this factor of legitimacy are the need for firstly all power-holding officials, whether appointed or elected (i.e. the Commission, Council of Ministers, and Parliament), to act in line with societal values and secondly for the elected representatives, at present the European Parliament, to possess authority to check the actions of non elected representatives. While clearly difficult to articulate societal values in the case of integration, the concentration of actions should, ideally, reflect the popular attitudes and beliefs regarding the European Union and the course of integration.

Evidence of Consent

In the course of examining what factors contribute to legitimation of governmental power, evidence of consent was highlighted. Both Beetham and Friedrich noted that voting for representative government is accepted in modern democracies as a clear indication of public mandate. This can also be applied to the European Union. The European Parliament acts as the representative legislative body for the EU. Voting for Members of the European Parliament can thus be identified as a means by which the citizens of the EU are able to express their consent for the Union.

It can also be argued that national referenda are another example of public consent for the EU. However, due to the fact that referenda have not been standardised across all member states this is, although a clearly justifiable means, not an adequate means to assess public consent of all citizens. One can argue that since European parliamentary voting is accessible in all member states this is a more adequate factor of assessing legitimacy. Voting for the EP is therefore presented as the ideal action of expressed consent within the EU. All three factors are represented in the ideal model of EU legitimacy (figure 3.1).

**Figure 3.1: IDEAL MODEL OF EU LEGITIMACY**




## Assessing EU legitimacy

To what extent does the ideal model of legitimacy actually exist in Europe? The ideal model presents the factors of legitimacy that can legitimate the authority of the European Union. However, it should be noted that this is the ideal, and it is accepted that they will not perfectly exist. Rather, as was noted in the theoretical framework, the degree to which they exist is important in attaining legitimacy. As long as they have a strong presence, and the faction of the public who do not accept such ideas remain a small minority, they will act as legitimating factors for the EU. The task of assessing the extent to which this has arisen is the next step.

Cardus and Estruch argue strongly that there is in fact a legitimacy problem in the EU. They conclude that "almost everyone agrees that at the present moment this process is very limited politcally because of the so called democratic deficit" and further "apart from the logical difficulties resulting from the evasiveness of the states themselves as they jostle for positions of strength, what is most lacking as regards the process of

unity is legitimacy" (Cardus and Estruch, 1995, p. 351). However, such an extreme statement must be read with caution. Does the EU lack legitimacy as a whole or are there simply areas in which the legitimacy 'problem' is greater than others? Many of the authors who discusss the need to examine EU legitimacy identify the area of 'popular' or 'social' legitimacy as the most important area of study. Wallace and Smith ultimately conclude that "the European Union can be seen as having legal legitimacy....but still lacks social legitimacy" (Wallace and Smith, 1995, p. 152). Using the ideal model of legitimacy in the EU, it is necessary to examine the accuracy of such statements and conclude which areas in fact present legitimacy problems.

*EU Treaties*

It was concluded in the ideal type that international law dictates legal acquisition of power in the European Union. At each step of the process further integration has occurred within the framework of formal treaties. The Treaty of Rome (1957) that created the ECSC, was the first of the treaties. The subsequent Single European Act (1986/87) was the next step in extending the integration process. The most significant change occurred with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. It is perhaps this treaty that presents the clearest representation of power acquisition through international law in that this encompasses significant gains of power jurisdiction. The power of the Union was further extended with the Amsterdam Treaty that completed the ratification process in 1999. All these treaties demonstrate that the development of the Union has been done within a legal framework. Thus it can be accurately stated that the European Union has acquired power through legal means.

However, legal legitimacy for the EU also requires adherence to the legal framework. The creation of European law has involved the surrendering of some

sovereignty of member states. This is in part because they are required to "submit to a legal system over which they have only partial control" (Nugent, 1999, p.276). Ideally this submission would be uniform and consistent. While this is often the case, sovereignty is a highly emotive subject and institutional measures are available for instances of disregard for EU law. One of the three roles of the European Court of Justice is as an administrative court[13] which provides a forum for private parties to seek protection against illegal executive actions of EU institutions or member states (p. 27). There are obvious cases in which states have challenged the frameworks of European Law, such as the French ban on British beef. However, these situations have always been resolved eventually and legitimately through this legal framework. It can in fact be argued that these cases demonstrate the ability to resolve conflict within European law. Bearing in mind that these instances are not abundant, and that the ideal of no illegal actions is unattainable[14], the adherence to the EU legal framework is relatively stable and can thus be stated to meet this factor of legitimacy.

Therefore the EU appears to possess legal legitimacy and hence supports this part of Wallace and Smith's statement. Yet, this does not support their statement regarding popular legitimacy. Are they correct? Does the European Union lack social/popular legitimacy? Again, the use of the ideal model allows this question to be addressed.

13 The other two roles are a constitutional court and a supreme court

14 As it remains an *ideal* factor

*Authorisation, Accountability, and Representation*

As stated above, popular legitimacy, the element of legitimacy said to be most lacking, stems from the second and third factors of legitimacy. 'Complete'[15] legitimacy is difficult according to Wallace and Smith due to the deliberate "journey" of integration "to an unknown destination" (Wallace and Smith, 1995, p. 140). Such imprecision results in great difficulty in attracting popular support and generating popular consent (p. 140). Deflem and Pampel note the importance of public opinion for the EU to become fully legitimate. They state "the success of Europe's unification depends to no small extent on the support it receives from the citizens of the members of the European Community [sic]... the survival of democratic political systems of advanced capitalist societies rests on popular legitimation in the cultural sphere" (Deflem and Pampel, 1996, p. 120).

The course of integration began with the elite and thus this popular consent was on the whole assumed to exist (Wallace and Smith, 1995, p. 151). Yet Wallace and Smith argue that this popular consent is not as significantly present as assumed. Obradovic supports this argument. She asserts that referenda have shown that a "deep gulf" exists between the perceptions of elite and general public" (Obradovic, 1996, p. 193). Referenda in fact, rather than demonstrating popular support, widened the credibility gap and aggravated the legitimacy problem in the EU (p. 193) This 'problem of popular legitimacy' is often connected to the democratic deficit that many claim exists in Union politics.

[15] Meaning both legal and popular legitimacy

*Democractic Deficit*

As exemplified by Cardus and Estruch, many authors indicate that this 'democratic deficit' in the European Union is a major impediment to the integration process and further a major area of concern for legitimacy. Lord summarises one possible definition of the democratic deficit as "the gap between standards of democratic practice in national and Union politics, [which] arises when powers are transferred from 'more democractic' national institutions to 'less democratic' European ones" (Lord, 1998, p. 14). Although this defintion is not entirely acceptable[16], it is an indication of the view primarily half by neo-functionalists who desire a democratic supra-national government.

The connection between the democratic defict and legitmacy comes under the second factor of actions and values plus the third factor of consent in that this deficit relates to the three conditions (authorisation, accountability, and representation) outlined by Lord. Beetham and Lord assert that the authority of the Union "can be readily shown to be deficient in each of these aspects of a direct democratic legitmacy" (Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 26). Authorisation is lacking because neither the Council of Ministers nor the Commision are propularly authorised within a supra-national framework (p. 26). The accountability of the Commission and Council is also limited. The accountability of the Council of Ministers to national parliaments is highly tenuous and the accountability of both bodies to the European Parliament is limited by the restraints that exist on the powers of the Parliament (p. 27).

---

16 due to the complex nature of the issue of the democratic deficit. A definition of 'democratic deficit' is dependent upon the initial concept of the degree to which democracy is necessary in the European Union which is in turn dependent upon the view one takes of the nature of integration— debates which are outside of the scope of this thesis. However, as a neo-functionalist view is the framework for this thesis the above definition is accepted as workable.

However, it should be noted that since the time that Beetham and Lord reached such conclusions regarding accountability, the European Parliament has demonstrated its ability to check the power of the Commission. In a series of moves by the EP the Commission was forced collectively to resign in March 1999. Accusations of fraud and favouritism arose, centring around two Commissioners, when the Parliament refused to approve the EU's accounts because of suspicions regarding mis-management. As a result they tabled a vote of censure (*The Economist*, 09.01.99, p. 48). However, this "bid to make history collapsed: Euro-MPs voted by a margin of 162 votes for a compromise resolution, which called for an independent inquiry into the allegation[s]" (*The Economist*, 16.01.99, p. 49). Ultimately this independent investigation found the Commission "guilty of tolerating fraud, mismanagement or nepotism in programmes under its collective control", which resulted in the resignations (*The Economist*, 27.03.99, p. 64). However, as Holland notes, the six cases highlighted by the enquiry were of a "comparatively minor nature" (Holland, 1999, p. 24). Perry concludes that the enquiry simply found what would be present in any democratic bureaucracy: "some corruption, rather more fraud and mismangement, and even more unsupported accusation"[17] (Perry, 1999, p. 30). This did show however, that Parliamentary censure can no longer be dismissed by the Commission as theoretical and must be accepted as a political reality (*The Economist*, 30.01.99, p. 49). *The Economist* describes this increase in accountability as the Parliament beginning "at last to flex its flabby muscles, and to behave in the way that an elected overseer of an unelected body ought to" (*The Economist*, 16.01.99, p. 50).

However, this power ought not to be overstated. The resignations, while on one hand demonstrating some level of accountability also exposed great weaknesses on the

[17] However, it should be noted that Perry continues on to say that this should not "be read as a downplaying [of] the value or significance of the expert enquiry" as he was highly critical of the actions of the Commission and the need for accountability.

other. Two individual Commissioners were at the heart of this scandal, yet the vote of censure only has the ability to dismiss the Commission as a whole. Somewhat rediculously, even the Commission President does not even have the ability to dismiss individual Commissioners. The procedures, set up initially in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, hold "no providions for expressing either a vote of confidence in the Commission or, conversely, of sanctioning individual Commissioners" (Holland, 1999, p. 24). Commissioners remain individually accountable to their respective member states only[18] (*The Economist*, 30.01.99, p. 50). Also, the vote of censure is the EP's "only instrument of control over the EU executive" (*The Economist*, 09.01.99, p. 48). Therefore, paradoxically, whilst this exercise demonstrated some level of accountability, it also, at the same time, exposed the "limited democratic accountability of the Commissioners" (Holland, 1999, p. 24). This further highlighted the fact that "somebody, somewhere... needs the political power to sack individual commissioners" (*The Economist*, 30.01.99, p. 50). And according to the ideal model of democratic legitimacy this power should lie in the hands of elected representatives.

The limited powers of the European Parliament contribute greatly to the represention deficit in the European Union. The European Parliament at the start of the decade could accurately be described as the weakest institution in the triangle of Parliament, Commission, and Council of Ministers (Jacobs and Corbett, 1990, p. 3). With the ratification of Maastricht and Amsterdam came increased powers for the Parliament which greatly equalised this triangular relationship. However, whilst the European Parliament now has increased official avenues for influencing EU policy, the

[18] Who often ardently protect their Commissioner out of national pride and interest

realitities of EU politics still place limitations on some of this influence. Nugent describes five main means that the EP possesses for influencing policy:

1. policy discussions with the Commission at the pre-proposal legislative stage
2. EP can formally adopt ideas of its own for suggested legislation
    i. through initiative reports
    ii. majority of MEP's can request the Commission submit appropriate proposal
3. appropriations by EP in annual budget
4. indirect influence on annual legislative programme through EP committees
5. the views of the EP must be sought prior to approval of important, significant, or sensitive legislation.

(Nugent, 1999, p. 205-207)

In reality however formal ideas of the EP are often difficult to act upon because, firstly, the Commission is not required to follow through initiative reports from the EP and secondly, poor attendance by MEP's to plenary sessions makes majority requests for Commission proposals difficult to achieve (p. 205-206). Further, Parliament's views are required before legislation may be approved, but, depending on the legislative procedure, it is not required that these views be enacted into policy.

The legislative procedure significantly affects the power of the European Parliament. Prior to 1987, the consultation procedure, in which the EP is asked for simply an opinion on Commission proposals for Council legislations, was the only procedure for referring legislation to the Parliament (Jacobs and Corbett, 1990, p. 163-166). It is significant that parliamentary opinion must be sought for any piece of

legislation to be considered legal[19]. Yet Jacobs and Corbett re-iterate that "no matter how extensive the possibilities for Parliamentary involvement in the dicussion of Community legislation, the bottom line of being able to block proposals or impose its will on the other institutions was lacking" (p. 164).

The introduction of the co-operation procedure in 1987 provided a greater means for pressuring the Commission and Council to take EP opinion into account through a second reading and absolute majority voting to amend or reject the 'common position' of the Council (p. 169-171). However, this does not act as a veto and the Commission and Council are still not obliged to include EP amendments (Nugent, 1999, p. 208). The potential for veto was finally introduced with the creation of the co-decision procedure. If Parliament is able to reject a proposal through an absolute majority, it is referred to a conciliation committee[20] provided parliament amends this propoal with an absolute majority. An agreeement in the conciliation committee results in another vote in Parliament and Council requiring majority votes for approval. Failure to do this means that the proposal falls and thus provides the Parliament with a potential means for veto (p. 208)[21]. The treaty article upon which the proposal is based determines the legislative procedure to be followed (p. 208). All three methods are still used.

---

19 A requirement that was reinforced by the ruling of the European Court of Justice In 1980 which annulled a piece of Community legislation because Parliament had not yet given Its opinion (Jacobs and Corbett, 1990, p. 164).

20 comprised of equal representation from Council and parliament

21 There is one further procedure that provides the EP with similar power over proposal. In the assent procedure "the EP must consider proposals at a single reading and with no provision for amendments. In some circumstances the assent requires an absolute majority of Parliament's members. Again, the EP thus has veto powers under this procedure". (Nugent, 1999, p. 209)

These methods of influence on EU policy and legislative procedures demonstrate that no longer can the EP be described as an ineffectual insitution. Yet, although the Parliament is no longer ineffectual, the power to act as a representative body and check on non-elected insitutions can be described as insufficient for the purposes of legitimating the European Union. The main limitation on the power of the European Parliament remains the dominance of the Commission and Council of Ministers, althought the mediocre calbre of MEP's also contributes as a limitation. As the only directly elected body, the parliament is limited in their ability to fully act in a representative role due to these legislative procedures and political realities. The Commission, despite recent events, remains the "mainstay of the EU's institutional structure"[22] (*The Economist*, 30.01.99, p. 49). Legislation can not always be influenced, not to mention vetoed, by those who are elected to act in the interests of EU citizens. This remains a strong institutional deficiency in the represnetation of the European public.

Combined with this insitutional representation deficit is a traditonally poor voter turnout. Voter turnout for EP elections is significantly less than that of national elections[23]. This has led many to describe the character of EP elections as 'second-order' (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Hewstone, 1986; J. Smith, 1996, p. 276; Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 27,). The evidence of consent through elections consequently appears to be significantly lacking[24].

---

[22] Although an intergovernmentalist would be prone to disagree with such a statement, whereas to the intergovernmentalist the Council of Ministers could be described as 'the hallmark' of intergovernmental co-operation.

[23] See Appendix Two for these figures

[24] This low voter turnout shall be explained and explored in greater depth in Chapter Four

Thus it can be demonstrated how the democratic deficit in the European Union leads to insufficient authorisation, accountability, and representation[25]. As illustrated in the theoretical model these three factors are largely intertwined with the popular legitimacy that is said to be lacking in the European Union. Although it can be noted that the accountability in the Union has significantly increased, authorisation and representation (with respect to low voter turnout and a non-elected Commission and Council) are still partially lacking under a democratic governmental framework. When tested against the ideal model of legitimacy, the EU appears wanting. The second factor concludes that the Council, Commission, and Parliament must act in accordance with the values and beliefs of the society they govern and for the European Parliement, as the elected representatives, to possess authority to check the actions of non-elected representatives. With claims of a lack of popular support for deepening of the Union, and difficulties in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, it would appear that whether the actions of the EU elite are congruent with society's values and beliefs is questionable. However, as previously noted, societal values are difficult to define. Therfore more accurate conclusions regarding this measure may only be reached after deeper analysis[26]. Accountability to the EP has notably increased with the resignation of the Commission, but overall accountability is still limited. Individual Commissioners and the Council of Minsters are only answerable to their nation-states; the EP has the power only to dismiss the Commission as a whole[27]. Lastly, the third element of ideal EU legitimacy

---

25 Re-iterating again that this deficit is only present when viewed from the supra-national view. An intergovernmentalist could justifiably argue that the EU is 'democratic' within an International Relations paradigm.

26 To be addressed in Chapter Four.

27 However, it is important to note that a new Commission is subject to the *approval* of the Parliament through the investiture procedure created under the Maastricht Treaty (Holland, 1999, p. 24).

states that voting for the European Parliament constitues evidence of consent. Yet, this democratic consent can not be resoundly claimed when voter turnout has decreased each year.

According to the analysis provided by the ideal model of legitimacy in the European Union it appears that indeed a legitimacy problem does exist. In agreement with the statement of Wallace and Smith it is the area of popular legitimacy that is shown to be the weakest according to this model. However, returning to the argument that application of state-centric theory needs to be closely scrutinised before reaching conclusions, the validity of this apparent lack of legitimacy must be further questioned. Does the EU in fact lack popular legitimacy or rather does this legitimacy exist but a state centric focus is too narrow to measure legitimacy at the supra-national level? With closer examination of the state of, and elements contributing towards, popular legitimacy in Europe it will become possible to assess whether this initial conclusion is correct. While on one level assessing the legitimacy of the European Union, the remainder of this thesis will also provide analysis of the application of the state model of legitimacy to a supra-national institution.

# *Chapter Four*
## EU Popular Legitimacy

The theoretical framework for the discussion of legitimacy noted the importance of 'the people' in legitimating government. It has been recognised that the involvement of the public is most important for the aspect of popular legitimacy that has now become the primary focus of discussion. The perception that the governed are able to act as a legitimating force is relatively recent. Although the roots of the idea that 'the people' were able to legitimate government can be traced to Ancient Greece and Rome, this concept became most pervasive in the early modern era (Calhoun, 1997, p. 70). Increasing political participation saw culmination of the concept in the revolutions of the age, namely the English Civil War and the American and French revolutions (p. 71). It is from this period onward the legitimacy was seen to ascend from the general population; "'the people' constituted a unified force, capable not only of rising *en masse* against an illegitimate state, but capable of bestowing legitimacy on a state that properly fitted with, and served the interests of, its people" (p. 69).

Consequently, there is an important role for 'the people' in the legitimation of the European Union[28]. It has arguably been demonstrated that the European Union sufficiently meets the criteria presented for legal legitimacy, yet popular legitimacy is still lacking within the ideal model constructed from the theoretical literature. Therefore, the values and beliefs of 'the people' of Europe must now come under scrutiny; it is the people who may ultimately dictate the future of the European Union. The following two chapters will address the issue of the true nature of public attitudes towards the EU. With research into popular attitudes and voting behaviour it will be possible to assess whether initial conclusions regarding the legitimacy crisis in the EU are correct or

[28] Again, re-iterating that this is purely within an intergovernmental framework. The legitimacy of the European Union within an international relations paradigm centres around the role of the state; the people are only involved in bestowing legitimacy upon the state that thus in turn can bestow legitimacy upon the international organisation.

whether the theoretical framework requires modification for application to a supra-national body.

## Research Method

In 1986 Miles Hewstone published a study entitled *Understanding Attitudes to the European Community*. Hewstone identified the need to compile research that identified trends in popular attitudes. The primary source for his research was the *Eurobarometre* public opinion surveys conducted by the European Commission. These surveys are carried out twice yearly in each member state. As Reif and Inglehart explain "no other region of the world has produced a social research program [sic] that is comparable in cross-national scope or in the regularity with which these measures are conducted" (Reif and Inglehart, 1991, p.1). This comprehensive nature of the *Eurobarometre* research ultimately enabled Hewstone to carry out extensive analysis of popular attitudes towards integration.

Kohler states that public opinion surveys are limited due to the fact that "they have to operate with straightforward questions in order to get unequivocal answers which necessarily give only a simplified picture of a complex and differentiated reality" (Kohler, 1984, p. 445). However, when dealing with human belief, research methods are always limited. Polls still yield a more accurate picture of public opinion than can be obtained from sources such as newspapers and informal interviews (Hewstone, 1986, p. 17). Furthermore, the *Eurobarometre* remains one of the most preferable public opinion surveys for two reasons. Firstly, the same questions are carefully translated and posed simultaneously in all member states of the Union. Secondly, key questions are repeated on several occasions creating a time series that can chart short and long term trends in public opinion (p. 22). This allows the social scientist to examine the results of the *Eurobarometre* with the full confidence that consideration has been given to overcoming difficulties of surveys.

In examining the deeper implications of the popular legitimacy of the European Union public opinion is key. Based on the initial work of Hewstone, the *Eurobarometre* will be used for this investigation of public opinion throughout the remainder of this thesis. Once the initial analysis of popular attitudes is complete a comparison with the conclusions of Hewstone will be carried out, allowing further insight in the trends that become apparent. In order to gain a clearer view of this public opinion the case studies for comparison are limited to ten member states[29]. These are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. All these states have participated in every election for the European Parliament (with the exception of Greece who first voted in 1981 upon joining the Community). By choosing these states it allows for exploration of trends over a twenty-year period in both voting and public opinion. This will in turn facilitate the identification of relationships, or lack thereof, between popular attitudes and voting behaviour.

This method will also allow the testing of several hypotheses regarding. Firstly, the overall hypothesis of this chapter is that 'based on the review of legitimacy literature, there is a legitimacy crisis in the European Union'. Two subsequent hypotheses, which ultimately enable testing of the aforementioned hypothesis, are 'the decline in popular support for unification is a reaction against some level of actions which were perceived to be not in accordance with the values and beliefs of society' and ' voter turnout is an inadequate measure of consent at the supra-national level.

Several questions from the *Eurobarometre* have been chosen in order to compile a data set of public opinion since April 1979[30]. Most questions reflect various attitudes

[29] This differs from Hewstone's method. Hewstone used four member states only: France, Germany, Italy., and the United Kingdom.
[30]Complete data tables available in Appendix One

towards the Union while others reflect attitudes towards life in general. While all questions have some level of 'trend' analysis available this varies per question. The variation is due to the fact that, although the majority of questions have been asked throughout the twenty-year period, this is not always the case. In other instances there are gaps in the data where the questions may have been omitted from the surveys during some years. However, major trends are the focus here and these minor absences of data should not distort this analysis.

## Relationship between EU elite actions and public values and beliefs

In Chapter Three the ratification of Maastricht was presented as one possible example of disjunction between elite actions and societal values and beliefs. The Maastricht Treaty was hailed as marking the "new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" (Duff, 1994, p. 19). Yet the road to realising the Union was not without problems. One of the most significant problems for ratification came on 2 June 1992 when the Treaty was rejected by the Danish public in a referendum vote of 50.7% to 49.3% (Corbett, 1993, p. 65). As Vanhoonacker describes this rejection was serious because "the reticence of the Danes woke up many European citizens who until then had been merely indifferent with regard to the Treaty and stimulated them to have a closer and more critical look at the implications of further European integration" (Vanhoonacker, 1994, p. 5). This criticism, furthermore, was not "confined to... traditionally Eurosceptic countries" (p. 5). For example, increased debate in Ireland followed the Danish rejection and opposition appeared to be gaining support (Corbett, 1993, p. 66). Some of the most rigorous debate about ratification took place in France, one of the traditional "motors of the European integration process" (Vanhoonacker, 1994, p. 6). Ratification was barely approved in France in a referendum with a margin of 51% to 49% (p. 6). Corbett describes the ratification procedure in the United Kingdom

as a 'rollercoaster' (Corbett, 1993, p. 68). "After prolonged and acrimonious debate" (Pryce, 1994, p. 3) the Maastricht Treaty was eventually ratified in all of these countries, allowing the formation of the new Union[31]. Such difficulties seemed to highlight the extensive opposition to moves towards a federated Europe. As Pryce explains "the treaty which was designed to take Europe further along the road to 'and over closer union' has itself proved to be source of controversy" (p. 3).

The significance of these difficulties relates closely to the second and third factors of legitimacy. If the public is in fact opposed to further integration[32] then attempts at deepening and widening the Union can arguably be described as contrary to societal values and beliefs. Further, marginal majority votes for ratification can be analysed as undermining evidence of consent necessary to legitimate the authority of the Union. Thus, Obradovic (1996) has argued that the ratification process highlighted the legitimacy problem that is said to exist in the EU.

However Franklin et al argue that the difficulty in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty may in fact be less of a reflection of attitudes towards European integration and more a matter of attitudes towards national governments. Rather than voting based upon their feelings regarding Europe, it has been proposed that voters may in fact have used this forum for voicing dissatisfaction with national governments (Franklin et al, 1995, p. 102). They argue that "referenda conducted in the context of national party politics, with the government of the day urging ratification of a treaty they have themselves negotiated, will inevitably be contaminated by popular feelings about the government" (p. 102). In this

[31] As described in Corbett 1993: The Irish referendum ended with 69% voting in favour of Maastricht (p. 66). The United Kingdom passed the bill that incorporates Maastricht into UK law by a majority of 244 during the second reading in the House of Commons. (p. 68). The House of Lords approved the Maastricht Bill 141 to 29 on the final vote, with the Royal Assent given the same day. (p. 75) The Danes held a second referendum after negotiating a 'national compromise' which saw 56.8% of people voting in favour of ratification (p. 73). See text for the results of the referendum in France. For a full description of ratification procedures in the member states see Corbett 1993: 64-76 or Laursen and Vanhoonacker 1994.

[32] as some would conclude from the referenda results

context voting for referenda could actually be viewed as a response to immediate circumstances rather than deep-rooted beliefs regarding integration (p. 105). The empirical data presented by Franklin et al appears to support the hypothesis that the difficulties of ratification in France, Denmark, and Ireland[33] were connected to ill feelings regarding their national governments. Consequently, it would appear that any definitive conclusions regarding public attitudes towards European integration as a result of the Maastricht referenda should be presented with caution (p. 114-115).

These conflicting interpretations call for further investigation into the beliefs the public hold. The values and beliefs of the public towards the European Union and the integration process can be approached through a study of public attitudes, as they are ultimately underpinned by values and beliefs. An interesting trend appears in the EU as a whole with EU citizens were asked about their feelings of overall support for the attempts at unification. The predominant response has consistently been support to some extent for unification. The notable trend is that the percentage of citizens who are 'very much for' integration has steadily declined in the 1990's while those that are 'to some extent against' and 'very much against' has increased slightly during this period (see graph 4.1).

[33] It is important to note that the ratification in Ireland was not as contentious as the other two examples, but still included serious debate and opposition. It is included in this list, rather than the United Kingdom, because it was used as a case study by Franklin et al in their empirical research

**Graph 4.1: Support for unification amongst all member states**




This overall trend is apparent in most of the ten member states. However, there are some notable exceptions. Greece was the only country in which those that were 'very much for' outnumbered (significantly in 1989-1991) those that 'were to some extent for'. One *common* trend, however, is the waning of *strong* support for unification. Eight out of the ten member states, including Greece, all saw a decline in the number of people who responded 'very much for' unification[34] from around 1992 onward. Significantly, this corresponds with debates surrounding the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. During this period Belgium, France, and Germany have the most marked rise in opposition at the expense of strong support. However, moderate support remains high in most member states. Rather than opposing unification, it would appear that most citizens now simply choose to view integration more cautiously. Overall support for unification remained in the majority. The responses within most nations were similar percentages.

The Danes, however, possess attitudes opposite to these trends. Opposition to unification was higher in Denmark than any of the other ten states. Strong opposition surpassed those who 'very much' supported unification in the 1980's. The 1990's saw an

[34] One of the notable exceptions sees Luxembourg with a *temporary* increase again in 1995. The lowest point for Luxembourg was actually 1989, followed by a relatively consistent response of around 30% (except for 1995). This however is significantly lower than their average of 45% in the 1980's.

increase in those that 'very much' supported unification; such an increase was only marginally higher than the strong opposition at the end of the 1990's. (see graph 4.2).

**Graph 4.2: Support for unification in Denmark**




The interesting trend to note in Denmark is a decline during the 1990's (particularly 1991-1992) of opposition in comparison to the large percentage of the citizens opposed to integration in the late 1980's. During the period of ratification Denmark was one of the few countries that saw a decline in this opposition, yet ratification was a highly contentious issue. This could at the outset support the idea that the Danes were instead voicing opposition to national government as argued by Franklin. However, before making such a conclusion it should be noted that approximately 30% of the population in the 1990's were still responding either 'to some extent against' and 'very much against' unification. Although this is lower than other periods in Denmark, this remains a higher percentage than the majority of any other member states studied[35].

General attitudes towards membership in the European Union seem to follow a very similar trend as support for Unification (see graph 4.3).

[35] Opposition in Germany peaked in April 1993 at just over 30%, but this was a significant increase in comparison to all other surveys. The United Kingdom consistently averages around 20-25% against unification to varying degrees.

**Graph 4.3: Attitudes towards EU membership in all member states**




The percentage of people in the EU who believe membership is a 'good thing' peaked in April of 1991 at 72% but had dropped to 49% in April 1999. Again, the steady decline can be traced from the time of the Maastricht Treaty. In response to this decline was an increase in the percentage of people who feel that membership was neither good nor bad. So this trend does not result in a significant rise in negative attitudes, but rather a move towards indifference.

Ireland was the country most opposite to this trend with a steady increase of nearly 30% in positive attitudes towards membership in the EU. Denmark and Greece broke with the trend slightly by showing an increase in positive attitudes over the 20 year period[36], but they both also showed a decline since the Maastricht Treaty. Half of the countries showed similar feelings towards EU membership with a general average of around 60% of citizens responding that membership is a good thing[37]. Three countries, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands, showed greater support, with averages of 72.4, 77.1%, and 79.3% respectively. The United Kingdom was the country with the fewest citizens who believed EU membership is a good thing, with on average, just 39.8% of the

[36] This question in Greece in fact spans 18 years, as Greece did not join the EU until 1981.

[37] For a more comprehensive breakdown of these averages please see the data tables in Appendix One.

British population viewing membership positively[38].

A question regarding the feeling of whether one's own state had benefited from membership in the EU was also asked. The response was consistent with the previous trends (see graph 4.3), but with a lower average than the question regarding EU membership as a 'good thing'[39] (see graph 4.4).

**Graph 4.4: Belief in whether EU membership is beneficial amongst all member states**




Again there is a decline in positive attitudes after 1992. This, however, was not the feeling amongst all member states. Notably, Ireland, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands were amongst the states that felt that membership had been most beneficial. Greek citizens also began to express these views in the 1990's— representing a significant increase from the 1980's. Italy's view, although initially high, dropped by nearly 20% since 1983, representing the most significant decline and almost the largest deviation from feelings regarding membership on the whole.

[38] Denmark also falls significantly below the general average with only 45.5% of people believing that EU memberships is a good thing. It should be noted that this average has not been very consistent. This question has a standard deviation of 11. Responses to this question have varied greatly over this period with the highest level of positive responses appearing in Sept 1992 (68%) and the lowest positive responses recorded in April 1985 (29%).

[39] The EU average for membership as a 'good thing' was 57.8%. The EU average for whether or not membership had been beneficial was 49.9%.

The results of such questions present two significant and consistent trends. Firstly, attitudes on the whole are positive. Although not always a significant majority, the number of EU citizens who appeared to have positive attitudes towards integration and membership in the European Union outweighed the percentage of citizens with negative feelings. Secondly, these positive attitudes appeared to be largely moderate. The decline in strong positive answers in the first two questions is not present amongst the moderate attitudes which constitute a noticeable majority in most member states. This is noteworthy. Although attitudes appeared to have altered since the creation of the 'Union' as opposed to 'Community', this should not be interpreted as a shift against integration altogether. Rather one analysis could conclude that the public appear to support the Union as a concept, but have reacted against the swift nature with which extensive integration has been furthered since the end of the Cold War[40].

To summarise, the responses by national categories display several trends. Firstly, only a few countries demonstrated consistently strong support for both integration and membership in the Union. Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands all showed high levels of positive attitudes. Ireland consistently responded more positively in the 1990's than in the 1980's. Interestingly, two of the countries that dominate European politics and integration, France and Germany, performed relatively in line with the European average. One might have expected that these countries, as pioneers of integration, might have responded on average higher. Conversely, the United Kingdom was, by far, the most negative towards integration and membership. Lastly, Denmark stands out as an intriguing case. A large percentage of the Danes appeared to be opposed to integration and membership (although not a majority, they did represent a large minority). Yet a vast majority actually felt that EU membership has benefited Denmark— a response that appears inconsistent when compared to responses to the first two questions.

[40] An argument that will be explored with more evidence below.

The results portray a relatively positive impression of public opinion regarding the EU in most member states. However, this does not in its own right define the parametres for actions on the part of the Union elite[41]. If the public appear to hold moderate/centre views, the actions of officials should ultimately reflect these beliefs. The possible reaction against the extensive deepening of the Union as a result of the Maastricht Treaty can be taken to imply a problem with elite actions. Thus it is hypothesised that the public were in fact reacting against some level of actions which were perceived to be not in accordance with the values and beliefs of society.

### *A Reaction Against Maastricht?*

The percentage of the population that would have voted to ratify Maastricht in 1992 and 1994 (during four surveys) were consistently the majority in most member states (see graph 4.5). Only the United Kingdom possessed a majority that was opposed to ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in all three surveys. Danish citizens initially responded against ratifying Maastricht, but this turned into a reasonable majority by the end of 1993. Overall, though, the European Union average was a majority of 62.5% in favour of Maastricht.

**Graph 4.5: Average percentage in favour of ratification in individual member states in 1992 and 1993**




[41] As relates to the second factor of legitimacy.

This initially appears to discredit the hypothesis that people appear to believe that the actions of the EU elite through Maastricht are not congruent with their beliefs and values. Yet this answer is too simplistic. The Maastricht Treaty encompasses many aspects of European politics. Therefore, with an exploration of one of the major policy issues of encompassed in the Treaty it may be possible to gain insight in to the more complex nature of the issue.

Economic Monetary Union (EMU) is one highly contentious policy that was included in the Maastricht Treaty. Described by some as the main achievement of the IGC, the objectives, timetable, and conditions for the achievement of monetary union were set out in the Treaty (Duff, 1994, p. 20). The significance of EMU as a case study is that it is a classic illustration of the European debate. From a federalist perspective monetary union signifies great strides towards deeper integration. For intergovernmentalists however, EMU represents a significant loss of national sovereignty. Hence, monetary Union presents an area in which public opinion allows permits understanding of attitudes towards integration as a whole.

From the time of the Intergovernmental Conference which first saw the creation of the Treaty on European Union, the *Eurobarometre* has asked questions concerning the major policy areas to be included in the Treaty. In all years except 1997, a moderate majority of European citizens responded that they were in favour of a single currency (see graph 4.6).

**Graph 4.6: Support for EMU amongst all member states**




Yet, there was still a strong dissenting minority opposed to monetary union. This opposition was concentrated specifically in Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom[42]. Germany's opposition stands out as unusual; the traditionally pan-European leader of integration was to be found agreeing with the Euro-sceptic nations. This German dissent is in part due to the consistent worry of "inflationary consequences of European monetary institutions" (Kaltenthaler, 1997, p. 91) and "an emotional attachment to the D-mark" (*The Economist*, 25.01.97, p. 45). As stated in *The Economist* "Germans loathe the prospect of losing their beloved D-mark" (*The Economist*, 13.12.97, p. 51). This disapproval was not helped by the problems centring on the Central Bank in 1997—a debate surrounding "France's wish to have the Euro managed in the 'political' French manner rather than the independent German one" (*The Economist*, 25.01.97, p. 45). However, despite the lack of public support the public did accept monetary Union as inevitable (*The Economist*, 25.01.97, p. 45; *The Economist*, 13.12.97, p. 51).

The strongest support for EMU could be found in Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, and Italy. Luxembourg, which traditionally responded with strong pro-European views did not have high levels of support until 1997. The result of this divide

[42] The Denmark and the United Kingdom both possessed a strong majority of citizens that were opposed to EMU. Germany citizens appeared to be relatively divided evenly on the issue. The mid 1990's saw the opponents to EMU in the majority, but the proponents became the majority from 1998 onward.

between strong support and strong opposition results in a misleading EU average. The strong dissenting minority increased due to the concentration of opposition, particularly in Denmark and the United Kingdom, a trend that is largely in line with other responses to *Eurobarometre* questions. Therefore, with the exclusion of these two countries and Germany, a high level of support is evident amongst the remaining member states. This indicates thus far that the European public, as a whole, were not reacting against the major policies in the Maastricht Treaty (such as EMU), but rather a few traditionally 'Euro-sceptic' countries were namely responsible for negative responses to Union elite.

Another area in which support for Maastricht may have been concentrated is the desire for greater democracy in the EU. The Maastricht Treaty presented possible remedies to the democratic deficit that is argued to exist in the Union. The problems of representation and accountability were addressed through such measures as the increased role of the European Parliament and European Court of Justice[43]. Attitudes towards the workings of democracy within the EU may in fact provide insight to this issue.

Within the European Union as a whole, the percentage of those who were fairly satisfied with democracy in the EU was nearly on par with those that appear to be not very satisfied (see graph 4.7).

[43] See Duff, 1994, p. 19-35 for an outline of the major reforms encompassed in the Maastricht Treaty.

**Graph 4.7: Satisfaction with democracy in the EU amongst all member states**




Further, those who were not at all satisfied surpass those who are very satisfied with democracy in the Union. On the whole when these figures are conflated into satisfied and not satisfied this shows an overall dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in the European Union (see graph 4.8).

**Graph 4.8: Satisfaction with democracy in the EU (conflated)**




The relationship between the public's attitudes towards democracy and the actual democratic reforms made under Maastricht are interesting. It has already been noted that the ratification of Maastricht meant that several steps were taken to rectify the democratic deficit. Yet, from the time of these reforms there was a decline in the satisfaction with democracy in the European Union. There are two plausible

explanations for this. Firstly, it is possible that the public were dissatisfied with these reforms and therefore became further disillusioned with the democratic workings of the Union. However, the second explanation is that this decline was an emotive response, not one based on knowledge of the reforms. The opposition to Maastricht that created difficulties in the ratification process was well publicised. The consequence of such publicity may well have been a misunderstanding of the true issues and reforms in Maastricht resulting in an ill-informed public that continued to hold negative images of Union democracy. In the last *Eurobarometre* the trend was reversed, however. This can perhaps be attributed to the resignation of the Commission that demonstrated the increased accountability to Parliament.

In the overall analysis no significant majority could be observed that was satisfied with democracy in the European Union. This is important to the analysis of legitimacy. It was established in Chapter Three that the democratic deficit undermines the second factor of legitimacy and that a sizeable dissenting minority also undermines any claims of consent. Therefore, the effects of such dissatisfaction with democracy in the European Union are significant in this analysis. However, this must be read with caution.

Franklin et al argued that feelings towards national governments affect views of the European Union. In analysing attitudes towards democracy this trend appears in the majority of member states. Respondents were asked separately their satisfaction levels with democracy in their own countries. In more than half the countries the results to this question and the question of democracy in the EU are similar. This in turn means that while dissatisfaction with democracy is indeed important to address, the issue is slightly more complex. Hence, yet again this means that the effects on the analysis of legitimacy are telling, but not complete. At this juncture, it is apparent that citizens identify some level of deficit in the workings of democracy. The ideal model noted the potential for the European Parliament to rectify this problem, as elected representatives the Parliament may provide greater means for accountability, authorisation and

representation. Hence, in order to assess whether this negativity towards democratic workings is detrimental to the EU's legitimacy it is necessary to understand the public's attitudes[44] towards the European Parliament as well.

## Accountability to the European Parliament

The ideal model of legitimacy for the European Union stipulates that accountability is a necessary element for EU legitimacy to be considered democratic. As there is only one elected body, the European Parliament, it was concluded that non-elected representatives should be accountable to those officials who were chosen as representatives, the MEPs, by the European public. However, while this is the ideal for the democratic governmental model of legitimacy in the EU, is this truly favoured by the public? It has been reported that the European Parliament has a less than favourable reputation. For example, *The Economist* has described the Parliament as "a body that rivals the Commission when it comes to sleaze and waste" and MEPs as "hardly models of financial rectitude" (*The Economist*, 16.01.99, p. 49-50). If the public holds a view of the Parliament that is in line with such a reputation, can the EP claim to truly represent the public? And if this is the case, should the EP possess further powers to act as a check on the EU executive? Furthermore, does the European public actually desire a greater role for the European Parliament (which would be necessary to check executive powers adequately)? If it does not, this could sufficiently call into question this element of the second factor of ideal European legitimacy.

The first question asked in the *Eurobarometre* regarding the European Parliament concerned awareness. When the public were asked whether they had "in recent times read or heard anything about" the European Parliament, the trend, not surprisingly, reflects increased exposure of the EP in election years (see graph 4.9).

[44] Which is different to real knowledge of the workings of parliament and democracy in general in the European Union.

**Graph 4.9: Percentage of people who have heard of the European Parliament amongst all member states**




The peak responses of the percentage of citizens who had heard of the Parliament appeared during election years[45]. In between elections, the number of people who responded no was often the majority. Interestingly, Italy and Luxembourg, two countries with relatively strong public support for the EU, showed the greatest awareness of the EP. The more telling aspect of this question was the impression of the Parliament held by those that had heard of it.

The majority of the EU citizens from 1986 onward had a favourable impression of the Parliament. Unfortunately, this question was not asked after 1993 and it is difficult to therefore assess the impression of the EP in the post-Maastricht era[46] (see graph 4.10).

[45] With the exception of 1994. There is a steady increase of yes response in 1994, but these actually reach their peak in the year following the election, 1995.

[46] As well, it is difficult to see any correlation between elections and impressions due to the years the question was asked.

**Graph 4.10: Impression of the European Parliament amongst all member states**




This average though is misleading in some regard as there are great variations in individual national responses, but similarities amongst some countries are still evident. Until the late 1980's/early 1990's, those that had a favourable impression of the EP were in fact in the minority in Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. However, in most instances the countries now all have a majority, although slim in some instances, that hold a favourable impression of the EP[47].

National media can often influence impressions and awareness and therefore, although insightful, these results should be accepted with caution. The overall information to be taken from these questions is the general trend towards more favourable impressions of the EP in all member states, despite national variations[48]. Beyond impressions of the Parliament, desired role for the EP is also enlightening and aids understanding of the public's attitude towards their elected European representatives.

[47] Denmark has had extremely close responses in the 1990's. A slim majority held favourable impressions in 1990 and April 1991. From October 1991 onward Denmark remained the only country in which the majority held an unfavourable impression.

[48] Greece, Ireland, and Italy all possess significantly higher levels of positive impressions of the EP than other member states.

Consistently the public response has been a desire for a more important role for the European Parliament (see graph 4.11). This opinion peaked in 1991 and declined steadily after this time.

**Graph 4.11: Desired role for the EP amongst all member states**




An interesting trend to note is the affect that elections appear to have on the desired role for the Parliament. There is a consistent decline amongst those who desire a more important role for the EP during election years, with generally an increase in the desire for the role to be about the same. It is possible that the increased exposure that result from elections have an affect on the impression of the role of Parliament. Hence, it is plausible that if the Parliament was consistently a prominent figure to the public the desired role for the Parliament may change.

One explanation regarding the decline in opinion after 1991 may lie in the increased role that the EP gained under both the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. It is possible that this increased role was satisfactory for a percentage of the population and contributes to a slight overall increase in those who felt the role should remain about the same. However, there was also a slight increase in the percentage of the people who would prefer to see a less important role for the Parliament during the mid 1990's. This

returned to previous percentages during the last few surveys. Another possible explanation may lie with media exposure. It was noted that elections affect the desired role of Parliament and this may be a consequence of media exposure. Thus, it is possible that the EP has had greater exposure in the 1990's and this instigated a decline in the desire for a greater role. Yet, this is a highly tentative explanation as there is not a significant increase in the percentage of people who 'have heard of the parliament' during this period (refer back to graph 4.9). Nonetheless, a majority of people feel that the Parliament deserves an increased role. In combination with the feeling of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU, it would perhaps be fair to say that the European people are calling for greater accountability, authorisation, and representation in the Union.

This does not however explain the overall decline in support for the European Union in the 1990's. The hypothesis that 'the decline in popular support for unification is a reaction against some level of actions which were perceived to be not in accordance with the values and beliefs of society' has not yet been fully explored. It is clear that the Maastricht Treaty is not the cause of this decline. The democratic deficit does appear to be of concern to European citizens, but this was present before the decline. Therefore, while the view of democracy most probably is reflected in the declining opinion, it is necessary to understand if there are many other areas which may have contributed to the incremental loss of public support as well[49].

As a result of the above examination it appears that the EU is indeed failing to meet the criteria of the second factor of the ideal model of legitimacy for Europe in some regards. While attitudes towards integration are positive, attitudes towards democracy and the EP indicate that some disjunction exists between the actions of the EU elite and the beliefs of the European people. The evaluation of EMU appeared to

[49] The actions of the European Union in Bosnia and Kosovo were publicised failures of EU foreign policy and could be one an example of one such issue which contributed to declining public support.

demonstrate that the explanation that this disjunction is in reaction to Maastricht is too simplistic and misguided. Two conclusions regarding the second factor of legitimacy can therefore be reached at this stage. Firstly, while most member states are positive towards integration and major policy directions, there is a concentration of opposition in a few member states that affects the overall congruency between elite actions and the values and beliefs of the European public. As this opposition indeed represents large majorities in individual states, it is arguable that whole nations opposed to elements of elite action undermine this factor of legitimacy[50]. Secondly, the apparent belief in a need for a more representative democratic Union also undermines the second factor of legitimacy, in which it was noted that authorisation, accountability, and representation were important for a legitimate democratic government. Therefore, while in many ways the Union can demonstrate apparent congruence between elite action and societal values and beliefs, these two conclusions prevent one from arguing that there is *not* a legitimacy crisis in the European Union.

## A Comparison with Hewstone

The study undertaken by Hewstone in 1986 analysed several similar questions. A comparison between his conclusions and those reached above may provide further insight into the issue of popular attitudes and thus the status of popular legitimacy in the European Union. Despite the length of time between the research, such a comparison is useful; this length of time can be viewed as beneficial in some regard. The conclusions of this thesis will ultimately be re-enforced and strengthened if Hewstone identifies similar attitudes. Comparing results with Hewstone will also facilitate analysis of any significant shifts in attitudes. Identification of past changes of attitude trends enables the formulation of substantive predictions about attitudes that affect legitimacy.

[50] It has consistently been accepted that minority opposition is acceptable, if not expected, amongst the overall population and therefore should not be considered detrimental to legitimacy. However, since the European Union remains an amalgamation of many different citizenry, whole nations showing opposition is to be considered a significant dissenting minority that has the potential to undermine legitimacy.

Hewstone's *Eurobarometre* analysis begins with the same question as this chapter: 'In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?'. In accordance with the conclusion above, he construes that the results "reveal a vast level of broad popular support for a united Europe" (Hewstone, 1986, p. 24). He also notes that the United Kingdom is distinct due to their lower levels of support, yet there is still "net support" which(p. 24). Hewstone describes that "although the British may be negative about the Common Market [sic], they cannot accurately be described as non- or anti-European" (p.24).

However, this question has dealt with the general idea of integration and more specific questions reveal a slightly less positive outlook. Hewstone next examined the responses to the question regarding Community membership as a 'good' or 'bad thing' and states that "support for this more specific form of European polity is not as high as that for a the general idea of European unification" (p.28). Again, a similar conclusion was reached in the analysis here.

Hewstone's preliminary conclusion that he made at this juncture is worth noting for comparison. He asserts that the "picture is *not* as bleak as has sometime been painted" (p. 26). The overall trend was positive, but not exceedingly so. This supports the findings of this thesis after the same questions, meaning that there has been little change in the trend— neither in a positive direction nor negative.

Hewstone also examines attitudes towards the European Parliament. During this he notes that it can "be seen as the most-supra-national and democratic of the Community's institutions, as well as the one closest to the citizens" and is therefore has been an important area of study in the *Eurobarometre* (p. 35). The results 'reveal a strong

backing for this institution' (p.35). However, this is qualified by Hewstone when he notes that a high proportion (but not necessarily majority) of citizens in each state expect MEP's to support national interests 'whether or not they are good for Europe' (p. 35-36). However, there was still a majority in all countries examined, except the UK, that felt MEP's should act in the best interest of Europe (p. 36).

The overall conclusions that Hewstone reached from his study of the *Eurobarometre* are also in accordance with those made thus far in this thesis. Firstly he states that there is a "broad consensus on several issues— most importantly, the unification of European and support for Community [sic] membership" (p. 37). However, "if support for the Community [sic] is tangible, it must be kept in perspective" (p. 37). Through the use of some questions which were not included above[51] Hewstone ascertained that while "support for Europe may be evident and stable... Europe and the Community [sic] are not psychologically salient[52]" (p. 37). The overall impression left from the analysis is, again, the same as presented here: "respondents are characterised neither by enthusiasm nor hostility" (p. 37). In summary, "public opinion is less pro-European than the integrationist might like, but not as hostile as they may fear" (p. 37).

[51] Although one of Hewstone's questions is used in Chapter Five. Some of the remaining questions were not asked in the 1990's and therefore not included in the primary research of this thesis.
[52] Hewstone also suggests Handley 1981 for further discussion of this point.

As for the concentration of opposition as discussed above, the same observation is made by Hewstone as well. While Hewstone did not include Denmark in his study, he notes the uniqueness of British attitudes. He comments that "public opinion in the UK is, and always has been, less positive than in... other... countries... .opinion in the UK is obviously much more capricious" (p. 28). Hewstone makes the important point that this is not overall disapproval of integration because the British "do support the loose notion of European unification, but they appear unsure or unconvinced that the Common Market (as they like to call it) is the best means of bringing it about" (p. 38). Consequently, "the British are *not* anti-European, but they are *not* pro-Community [sic]" (p. 38).

It is clear that the conclusions reached thus far in this thesis are in accordance with the findings of Hewstone in 1986. The implication of this for future patterns of public opinion can be seen as significant. There has been little change in the overall conclusions that can be reached from the *Eurobarometre* in fifteen years. Supporters of integration would have hoped for an increase in the enthusiasm of the public. Yet, the public do not appear any more enthusiastic at the turn of the century than they did before the end of the cold war, despite vast deepening and widening of the Union. Yet, this is not entirely negative. The speed with which integration has progressed in the 1990's could have incited an extreme reaction. This is clearly not the case. Although there has been a decline of support to some extent, the overall trend of what appears to be indifference continues amongst most of the European public. This does however beg the question as to why such indifference remains despite vast attempts to become more

accessible to the public (through such measures as voting for the Parliament, creation of symbols such as a flag and anthem, funded EP campaigns to promote the EU, etc.)[53].

This is continued indifference is significant for the future of legitimacy. It is difficult to credibly state that the Union can expect any rise in public support in the near future as a result of such findings. Consequently, if it is ultimately concluded that there is a legitimacy crisis in the European Union, than there is little evidence that this will be rectified in the foreseeable future. However, such a conclusion cannot be reached until all aspects of the popular legitimacy have been examined. Thus it is necessary to now turn to voter turnout to complete the examination of the state of legitimacy in the European Union.

## Voter Turnout

The final factor of legitimacy lies with evidence of consent. The ideal model of legitimacy for the European Union states that elections for the European Parliament provide an adequate forum for the expression of consent by European citizens. Voting for the European Parliament began in 1979. Since this time voter turnout has decreased each year. The gradual decline is presented in Graph 4.12, shown below. Upon initial viewing, this decline appears ominous for the examination of legitimacy. The 'consent' seems to be declining. However, to take the figures at face value would be misguided. Given the positive attitudes towards integration discussed above, it is one further hypothesis of this thesis that voting is an inadequate measure of consent at the supra-national level.

[53] A question that will be addressed to some degree throughout the remainder of this thesis. To try and answer the question entirely would detract for the larger question of legitimacy and therefore will remain an implicit argument throughout.

**Graph 4.12: EU voter turnout**




A breakdown of voting statistics in individual countries demonstrates that this trend of declining voter turnout is not uniform amongst all member states[54]. Of the ten original voting member states Belgium, Denmark, and Luxembourg have all had a fairly consistent voter turnout since 1979[55]. Voting in Ireland and The Netherlands is characterised instead by volatility[56] during the same period. Beyond stability, actual percentage of voter turnout varies significantly between member states. Belgium voter turnout is the highest average at 90.8%[57]. On the opposite end the United Kingdom has the lowest voter turnout with only 27.8% participation on average (see graph 4.13 for examples of these comparisons). Clearly these variations demonstrate that generalisations about the voting patterns in the European Union are flawed.

[54] A comparison of European voting to national voting which will provide some further insight into this variation will be explored below.

[55]Defined for the purposes of this paper as a standard deviation of less than or equal to 3.

[56]Ireland has a standard deviation of 10.6 and The Netherlands is the highest of the ten states with a standard deviation of 11.2.

[57] the reason for which shall be discussed below

**Graph 4.13: Variations in EU voter turnout**




These variations in voter turnout appear problematic in examining consent at the European level. One of the initial examples that supports this is the high level of voter turnout in Belgium and Luxembourg. At the outset the average turnout of 90.8% for Belgium and 87.4% for Luxembourg indicates popular consent. However, this portrayal is significantly called into question by the fact that both Belgium and Luxembourg have mandatory voting[58]. Compare this to the attitudes of these nations to unification and EU membership and voter turnout is even further questionable (see graphs 4.14 and 4.15).

**Graph 4.14: Relationship between voter turnout and attitudes towards integration in <u>Belgium</u>**




[58] Greece has mandatory voting as well.

**Graph 4.15: Relationship between voter turnout and attitudes towards integration in Luxembourg**




Whilst the voter turnout in Luxembourg is in line with the belief that membership in the European Union is good, Belgium is less consistent. Therefore, it presents the question of whether the mandatory voter turnout in Belgium has more of an influence over voting than actual attitudes towards the Union. During the 1995 national elections a "growing apathy towards the obligatory vote" appeared amongst the Belgian electorate (Down, 1996, p. 171). Two in five voters reported that they would not vote if it were not required by law (p. 171). If it can be assumed that this apathy extends to European elections as well, then the evidence of consent is in fact undermined and in fact falsely represented through voter turnout.

On the opposite end of the spectrum is The Netherlands. The Netherlands remains exceedingly high in response to questions regarding EU membership as a good thing, almost on par with Luxembourg. However their voter turnout reached a

significantly low level in 1999 of 29.9%, surpassed only by the traditionally low turnout of the United Kingdom (see graph 4.16).

**Graph 4.16: Relationship between voter turnout and attitudes towards integration in The Netherlands**




Such examples demonstrate that any correlation between attitudes and voter turnout is tentative at best. As highlighted in the case of Belgium, external influences, such as national voting policy, may account for greater influence in voting behaviour than public opinion. In fact national issues have typically dominated European elections since 1979 (J. Smith, 1996, p. 276). This national tendency arises due to "the fact that European elections [do] not directly lead to a change in government nor to major changes of direction in policy making, and the perception of the EP as a powerless institution [makes] it difficult to mobilise voters by campaigning on 'European' themes" (p. 276). The breakdown of the 1999 election results reflects this strong tendency for national attitudes to dominate at the European level. One of the key striking features of this election was a general swing to the centre-right. Greece saw their ruling party decline in percentage of the vote as a protest to Greek governmental support for NATO bombing of Kosovo. In many other countries voting also could be analysed as protest votes against "the way EU governments were running things at home" in that centre-left

ruling parties were 'punished' with votes for the centre-right (*The Economist*, 19.06.99, p. 53). Hence, the voting public was using the European forum to send messages to their national governments.

It is also important to recognise the connection (or lack there of in some cases) between voter turnout for national elections and European elections; this may again re-enforce the idea that national agendas dominate European elections. In the case of Belgium, for example it has been argued that mandatory voting has the biggest influence on voter turnout. This was supported with the evidence that there is little correlation between attitudes and turnout. A comparison between voter turnout at national elections and European elections also supports this as voter turnout is relatively on par (see graph 4.17). This differs from other countries in which there is no mandatory voting in that national voter turnout is often far higher than for European elections[59].

**Graph 4.17: Voter Turnout in Belgium**




The Netherlands was also highlighted as an interesting case study of voter turnout. Above it was shown that there appears to be little correlation between the relatively positive opinions on integration and the declining voter turnout. When

[59] See the Appendix Two for turnout levels in various countries

comparing this turnout to turnout for national elections the results are interesting (see graph 4.18).

**Graph 4.18: Voter Turnout in The Netherlands**




While the voter turnout is significantly lower for EP elections than national ones, there is still an observable similarity in the declining levels of electoral participation. This is noteworthy. Although the levels are clearly not reflective of a national trend, the decline does appear to be. It can thus be argued that while the low turnout does not necessarily reflect national trends the decline may do so. The United Kingdom also shows a similar correlation in trends (see graph 4.19). This further supports the argument that voter turnout is dominated by national tendencies.

**Graph 4.19: Voter Turnout in the United Kingdom**




Further, EP elections have been described as second order elections, namely from their tendency to more closely resemble local rather than national elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Hewstone, 1986; J. Smith, 1996, p. 276; Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 27). The idea that there is less at stake in EP elections than in national general elections meant that citizens are "both less inclined to vote and when they [do] vote, more prone to cast protest votes" (J. Smith, 1996, p. 276). Statements and analyses such as these stem from the assumption that this low voter turnout is of concern. However there are others who would argue differently.

Elections in the United States are typically characterised by extremely low voter turnout[60] (Lipset 1960). However, on the whole the majority of the population rarely attacks the government of the United States as illegitimate. It has been argued that one reason for this is a lack of dissatisfaction with the way government operates; it is a possibility that non-voting in such Western democracies is actually a reflection of stability[61] and a response to the decline of major social conflict (p. 217). This is an extension of the argument that a radical change to society or direct effect of government

[60] It is accepted that difference political cultures work in different ways—an argument that will be highlighted below.

[61] As high levels of voter turnout can be destabilising in some instances

policy on individuals (ie government employees) ferments electoral mobilisation (p. 180-186). Hence a lack of this need to mobilise is reflected in lower voter turnout and thus portrays a society that is relatively content with government.

This is not an argument accepted by all. There are those that still assert that democracy is best served by increased participation in that this portrays the consent that is desperately needed for democratic government to claim legitimate authority. According to this argument "a state in which a large part of the population is apathetic, uninterested, and unaware is one in which consent cannot be taken for granted and in which consensus may actually be weak" (p. 216). The conclusion that Lipset ultimately reaches is that democratic societies are actually able to exist with differing levels of participation[62]. While voting can be a valid form of evidence of consent, Lipset argues that it is underlying attitudes that are more important. Understandably, political culture can also dictate voting (such as compulsory voting in Belgium) rather than a desire to consent to a government and thus the underlying attitudes become equally important. He argues that "thus neither high nor low rates of participation and voting are in themselves good or bad for democracy; the extent and nature of that participation reflect other factors which determine far more decisively the system's chances to develop or survive" (p. 219).

A combination of these arguments ultimately appears to support the hypothesis that voter turnout is an inadequate measure of consent. There are several possible reasons for this. Firstly, those who would argue that low participation signifies satisfaction would theorise that the general population is not overly dissatisfied with the working of the Union and therefore does not feel the need to voice European political sentiment. However, it has already be shown that there are elements of the Union in which the public would like to see reforms, such as the democratic deficit. This therefore weakens this argument.

[62] Including the fact that it is possible to have too much participation

A second, more plausible, argument stems from a possible belief in the lack of importance of voting for the European Parliament. Since these votes do not influence policy, as national votes have the potential to, EU citizens may not be inclined to mobilise in support of the Union. There is, after all, no EU government being elected. In other words, the public may view the connection between voting and consent as weak in this context. This argument can account for countries in which there is little correlation in attitudes and voter turnout, such as The Netherlands. However, it excludes countries in which it could be argued that a correlation exits; the United Kingdom has the lowest voter turnout and the most negative attitudes towards unification. Also, although attitudes remain on the whole positive, there has been an observable decline in the 1990's. Thus, this decline could quite possibly have contributed to lower voter turnouts in the past two elections. Still, this constant decline of voter turnout does not on the whole follow the same patterns as attitudes towards the Union. Hence, both arguments are problematic with no clear answers apparent.

A further problem in considering the role of voting as consent in the European Union has been introduced above: the fact of a lack of elected government. The role that voting plays within the state framework is more definitive. Elections serve to create government. In the case of the European Union this is not the case as there is no 'government' per se. There are legislative institutions, but intergovernmental co-operation (which is still strong in the Union) prevents the creation of an independent European government. This consequently alters the importance of voting at the supra-national level. Such lack of importance requires consideration of the role that voting should have in the legitimation of the authority of the EU.

There is, however, too much evidence to the contrary to argue that voter turnout is an accurate representation of public views towards the EU. National issues (and national voter turnout in some cases) dominate European elections— an important point

that can influence the motivations behind votes. Also, the process of voting varies in each country. It has already been put forth that mandatory voting in Belgium effects voter turnout. Lastly, voting patterns appear largely inconsistent with public attitudes in various countries. This affects the connection to consent, particularly when voter turnout is below levels of support. The implication for legitimacy is complex as a result. Based on the model constructed from the theoretical literature, sufficient *evidence* of consent cannot be attained. Thus the examination must focus on whether any evidence of consent beyond the theoretical framework may be observed. The result of opinion surveys would suggest that some level of consent exists in most member states[63]. Hence, can a form of consent other than voting apply in the EU, or this assumption wrong? Does the European public simply not consent to the authority of the European Union?

## The implication for EU legitimacy

Contemporary views of the legitimacy crisis in the European Union are problematic. Descriptions of a lack of popular support appear to be overstated. Such arguments rely on difficulties in treaty ratification and low voter turnout. Yet these examples are argued to have been influenced by issues beyond public opinion, namely national policy. Furthermore, a relatively positive attitude towards the European Union appears to be expressed throughout relevant *Eurobarometre* questions. Rather the opposition described by legitimacy critics appears to be concentrated in a minority of member states (i.e. Denmark and the United Kingdom). It has been consistently argued that low levels of opposition can not be viewed as serious threats to legitimacy because unanimous support remains an unattainable ideal. As long as these opponents remain a small minority any threats to legitimacy are thwarted. However, opposition by whole nations constitutes a larger force than minority opposition. As a result, the hypothesis that 'based on the review of legitimacy literature, there is a legitimacy crisis in the European Union' is not supported. However, while the legitimacy *crisis* has been overstated, there are still elements in which legitimacy *problems* do exist. The task for the European elite is to

[63] The United Kingdom is certainly an exception to this.

identify why vast concentrations of opposition lie within a few member states when other member states report exceptionally high levels of support. Any further problems in this area can certainly result in a legitimacy *crisis* in the EU. A key element of legitimacy is that government actions must be congruent with the values and beliefs of society. If the evidence portrays that some sections of the public are beginning to question this due to the extensive deepening of the Union legitimacy seems to demand that the elite curb the speed towards elements of a neo-functional Europe or discover a means by which the public will not find this speed threatening to their values and beliefs. Since accountability and representation contribute to the congruence of actions, responsiveness to the public's desire for a greater role for the EP may be a means of achieving this.

This will not, however, entirely resolve this problem of the EU claiming legitimate authority, as there is a lack of evidence of consent. If there is simply a lack of consent for integration, a legitimate Union can never be claimed. However, public opinion would indicate that this is most unlikely. Instead the task for both the EU and social scientists studying its legitimacy is to understand what evidence may be used to adequately represent consent. Clearly the state-centric framework is too limiting for this element of legitimacy. Although evidence of consent is still necessary in some regard the state centric evidence, such as voting, is inadequate due to dissimilar contexts[64]. Thus it is necessary to extend conceptions of consent beyond state models.

The deeper examination of popular legitimacy that has been carried out thus far has enabled several hypotheses to be addressed. The outcome has resulted in several remaining problems for the legitimacy of the European Union. The focus of analysis must now turn to possible solutions for the problems of finding parametres for elite actions and evidence of consent.

[64] Such as the lack of influence on policy and changes of government

# *Chapter Five*
# Identity

In the previous chapters common notions of popular legitimacy within the European Union have been called into question. The problems that still face the EU in fulfilling the requirements for democratic legitimacy within a neo-functionalist framework are in large part connected to the values and beliefs of the European Public. Many argue that the solutions to such problems lie within the realm of identity. It is not enough to feel that European membership is a 'good thing'; rather, these theorists argue, that identification with Europe would provide a much stronger base for legitimation of the Union[65].

## Identity and Legitimacy

The role for identity in legitimating political power stems largely from the concept of 'the people'. In Chapter Four the role of 'the people' in the process of legitimation was explored. As the authority of the people in bestowing legitimacy arose, the notion that these people be socially unified began to appear in force: "whether expressed as 'nation' or 'people', reference to some recognisably bounded and internally integrated population was integral to the modern notion of popular will and public opinion...it was important that the 'people' be (or at least be seen as) socially integrated" (Calhoun, 1997, p. 71).

Habermas' argument can be used to further support this connection when he states "the *claim* to *legitimacy* is related to the social-integrative preservation of a normatively determined social identity. *Legitimations* serve to make good this claim, that is to show how and why existing (or recommended) institutions are fit to employ political power in such a way that the values constitutive for the identity of the society will be realised"

[65]The need to examine the role of identity in legitimating the EU only becomes necessary when dealing largely within a neo-functionalist framework. It has already been noted that in an intergovernmental framework the EU and its authority can rightfully be considered legitimate. Hence the appeal to an identity is unnecessary within this context. Furthermore, a European identity is and should remain secondary to an intergovernmentalist whereas the nation-state, and with this the national identity, are paramount.

(Habermas, 1979, p. 182-183). Popular support is thus a reciprocal relationship. When the collective will of the identity unit is satisfied by the actions of government the government thus attains the popular support needed to carry out policy.

Such popular support ultimately lies at the heart of any analysis of legitimacy because legitimacy essentially "focuses on the question of whether people feel a sense of obligation to an order" (Obradovic, 1996, p. 194). Appeal to a collective identity is an appeal to this sense of obligation. In practical terms, any sense of obligation to a government can translate into obedience. The collective identity is important to this obedience because "procedures of democratic decision making, especially that of majority decision, require sufficient trust between citizens for them to accept that being out-voted does not constitute a threat to their identity or essential interests" (Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 33). This trust is a greater likelihood within a collective identity than within a fragmented society. Weiler describes the rationale in this argument in that "a minority will/should accept the legitimacy of a majority decision because both majority and minority are part of the same demos, the same people" (Weiler, 1997, p. 116).

Consequently, it is clear that a collective identity contributes greatly to the legitimation of government. A government that acts in accordance with values of the identity will meet the second factor of legitimacy. Popular support can thus be expected, as articulated above, consequently providing consent that meets the third factor of legitimacy. Hence, if a government has legally acquired power and represents a cohesive collective identity it should ultimately become legitimate.

## The 'nation' as 'the people'

The 'nation' did not originally appear in the above concepts as the only collective identity able to legitimate authority. Originally nations "in the classic usage...are communities of people of the same descent, who are integrated geographically, in the form of settlements or neighbourhoods, and culturally by their common language, customs and traditions,

but who are not yet politically integrated in the form of state organisation" (Habermas, 1992, p. 3). However, "with rise of claims to popular sovereignty and republican rule, the notions of nation and people were increasingly intertwined" (Calhoun, 1997, p. 74). As the nation came to be more closely associated with justifiable political rule nationalists emerged asserting that this was the only legitimate form of political rule. The result was the emergence of a form of nationalism, described by Gellner as "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" (Gellner, 1983, p. 1).

It is important to note however, that this emergence was distinct from that of the state:

> *"nations and states are not the same contingency. Nationalism holds that they were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy....[but] their emergence was independent and contingent. The state has certainly emerged without the help of the nation. Some nations have certainly emerged without the blessings of their own state."*
> *(Gellner, 1983, p. 6)*

As Smith reminds us, despite the need for states to be legitimated by the nation in modern times, the focus and content of the two remain quite distinct (A. Smith, 1991, p. 5).

But as nationalism became "a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones" (Gellner, 1983, p. 1), the nation became the means by which the people could claim the right of self-determination and government in their interests (Calhoun, 1997, p. 75). To Calhoun, "a crucial thread in the development of nationalism was the idea— and eventually the taken-for-granted, gut level conviction— that political power could only be legitimate when it reflected the will, or at least served the interests, of the peoples subject to it" (p. 69). Thus the classic usage of the term nation no longer applied and "changed from designating a pre-political

entity to something that was supposed to play a constitutive role in defining the political identity of the citizen within a democratic polity" (Habermas, 1992, p. 3).

Identification with the nation has thus become a primary mode of identification used to legitimate government. This national identity politically appears to act as the base for the state and its institutions (A. Smith, 1991, p. 16). Smith argues that "the most salient political function of national identity is its legitimation of the common legal rights and duties of legal institutions, which define the peculiar values and character of the nation[66] ... .The appeal to national identity has become the main legitimation for social order and solidarity today" (p. 16). As stated by Obradovic, a nation will thus support a government "when the government process displays a commitment to and actively guarantees values that are part of the particular national identity, i.e. of the general political culture of the people" (Obradovic, 1996, p. 195).

For the European Union, the problems of legitimacy that have been exposed throughout this thesis may benefit from the existence of a European 'national' identity. It has been asserted throughout this thesis that democratic legitimacy requires the consent of the people, and it has been shown above that this has traditionally arisen through identification with a nation. Hence, it has been recognised by some authors that a European identity could aid the legitimation of the authority of the European Union. Llobera explicitly argues that "the success of The European Union will require the development of European identity" (Llobera, 1993, p. 78). Deflem and Pampel explain that some view "the growth of postnational identity as reducing national self-interest in determining views of European unification" (Deflem and Pampel, 1996, p. 120-121). Also, Habermas argues that a European identity is necessary for successful integration because this may enable national interests to be overcome by creating a sense of obligation to the Union. (Habermas, 1992, p.8-9)

---

[66] These values and characteristics of the nation will remain undefined at present. Discussion of varying views of the nation, which take these elements into account will be discussed below.

## The idea of a European nation

The reduction of national self-interest as described above is key to the concept of European unification. It is well documented that the creation of the ECSC was, in part, reaction to the perceived terrors of nationalism Federalists, such as Monnet, who had significant influence on the initial shape of integration, were strong opponents of the negative power of the nation. Nationalism was identified as the cause of the World Wars and considered to be an ongoing threat to peace (Holland, 1993, p. 6). Monnet himself equated nationalism with a 'spirit of domination' (p. 9). Some argued that by creating a new centre of loyalty the damaging effects of nationalism could be overridden. Under the original functionalist theory "individuals are gradually weaned away from their allegedly irrational nationalistic impulses toward a self-reinforcing ethos of co-operation" (Pentland cited in Holland, 1993, p. 6). The extension of this 'ethos of co-operation' becomes the basis of a homogenous European collective[67]. Arguably, through the categorisation as a 'European' above all else, the nations of Europe could unite as one and eradicate nationalism as a threat to peace.

To formulate an idea of a European nation to replace the nations and nationalism that brought war to the continent during the Twentieth Century requires some understanding of what constitutes a nation. However, a literal understanding of 'the nation' is not reached easily and without debate. For example, Seton-Watson was "driven to the conclusion that no 'scientific definition' of the nation can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists" (Seton-Watson, 1977 ,p. 5). Thus, such an intellectual debate will not be undertaken here as this would detract from the initial purpose of discussing the nation. Rather, various interpretations of the components of a nation will be presented as foundations for the concept of a European nation.

[67]This should not be taken to mean that functionalist theorists by definition would argue for the creation of a European nation. Rather, the functionalist argument was a catalyst for early pioneers who argued for supranational identity.

To some authors ethnicity is a key component of a nation. Walker Connor argues that many uses of the term nation are incorrect because nation should refer solely to "a kinship group" with "shared blood" and not a shared state[68] (Connor, 1978, p. 380). Ethnicity, Connor argues, is thus ultimately important to nationhood; a nation is a self-aware ethnic group in his view (p.388). Smith also presents an argument regarding the relationship between ethnicity and nation, although differing from Connor. In Smith's view, an *ethnie* precedes the nation and it is the various processes that the *ethnie* goes through that ultimately leads to the development of the nation. Processes such as politicisation of the *ethnie*, the secularisation of society, autarchy and territorialisation, mobilisation and inclusion, and the manner in which the nation is imagined contribute to this development. (A. Smith, 1986, p. 153-173). Therefore, while ethnicity is important to the creation of nation, an *ethnie* does not automatically constitute a nation. Further, a nation stems from factors other than just ethnicity. Smith hence argues that ideas of a nation are fundamentally cultural and social. This identity refers to cultural and political bonds that united the community, a community of shared myths, memories, symbols and traditions (A. Smith, 1992, p. 62).

Calhoun also attributes the creation of a nation to many things[69]. He states that "nations are made by internal processes of struggle, communication, political participation, road building, education, history writing and economic development as well as by campaigns against external enemies" (Calhoun, 1997, p. 75).

One of the other elements of a nation discussed in literature is the type of community. The concept of nations as imagined communities arises in Smith's discussion but originates in the work of Benedict Anderson. Anderson argues that the nation is "an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson, 1991, p. 6). The term imagined stems from the fact that even

[68] for example he argues that Inter*national* Relations should in fact be Inter*state* Relation, etc
[69] although this should not be taken to mean that Calhoun agrees with Smith

the "smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (p. 6). This community is limited because even the largest nation will have a finite, although at times elastic, boundary, beyond which other nations lie (p. 6). A nation is a community because "regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (p. 7).

Culture is also discussed in nationalism literature as a vital component of the nation. Gellner specifically states that "two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture". (Gellner, 1983, p. 7). He elaborates upon this argument when he states that nationalism is a "consequence of a new form of social organisation, based on deeply internalised education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state" (48). He argues that the cultural roots of a nation stem from the general imposition of a high culture on society. This "local high (literate, specialist transmitted) culture" will have some links to the "earlier local folk styles and dialects" with symbolism "drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the peasants" (p. 57). Consequently, the nationalist belief that nationalism "conquers in the name of putative folk culture" can be perpetuated (p. 57).

Clearly, nationalism literature, of which the above is only a selection, has encompassed many different arguments about what constitutes a nation. For the purposes of this discussion a 'nation' is understood as a 'synthesis' of a number of perspectives "incorporat[ing] political and cultural dimensions" (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994, p. 4).

The existence of a European nation based upon such theoretical ideas leads to the picture of a community of Europeans which would be the basis for overcoming individual nations within Europe. Such a nation thus would ultimately be built upon a shared culture, an imagined European community (which would implore a distinctively

European folklore, etc), and a belief in some ethnic commonality[70]. Smith presents three questions in order to assess the potential foundation for a European nation:

1. *"Is Europe merely the sum total of its various national identities and communities?*
2. *If Europe is more than a sum total, "what exactly are those characteristics and qualities that distinguish Europe from anything or anyone else?"*
3. *"Can we find in the history and cultures of this continent something or things that are not replicated elsewhere, and that shaped what might be called specifically 'European experiences?"*

*A. Smith, 1992, p. 67-68*

Smith argues that there are some shared traditions amongst the cultures of Europe which can act as a basis for this European nation. These shared traditions include Roman Law, political democracy, the Judaeo-Christian ethic, and cultural heritages (such as Renaissance humanism, rationalism, and empiricism as well as romanticism and classicism); "together they constitute... a 'family of cultures' made up of a syndrome of partially shared historical traditions and cultural heritages" (A. Smith, 1992, p. 70).

Smith notes however, that a 'European nation' appears to still be lacking the ritual and ceremony of collective identity held by individual nations in such observances as Bastille or Armistice Day (p. 73). Still, as Laffan et al argue "Since the 1980's political actors and Union institutions have sought to lever traditional nation-building strategies, in the form of a European flag [see figure 5.1], passport, driving licence, a European anthem and European sporting events to create deliberately a sense of identification with the European project" (Laffan et al, 2000, p. 97).

[70] Ethnicity is perhaps the most contentious element of such a European nation. Clearly Europe encompasses many different ethnic groups. However, it can be argued that, in much the same way that a common culture is imagined, some ethnic link may be imagined amongst the people of Europe.

**Figure 5.1: The European Flag**



All these images are symbolic of the common values and ideas encompassed in integration. Arguably they could be used for the construction of a European nation.

## Problems with a European nation

The image of a 'European' encompassed in this 'family of cultures' has undoubtedly in the twentieth century been built upon the area of Western Europe. The Cold War precluded an inclusion of Eastern Europe in defining what a 'European' is within the scope of integration. Wolff argues that this self-categorisational divide in fact predates the Cold War (Wolff, 1994, p.3). Psychologically, according to Wolff, a divide has existed for many centuries amongst the continent's nations. Through attempts to define themselves as civilised, intellectual elites in north-west Europe externalised an 'other' for comparison. The result of this comparison was a regionalisation of those in the east of Europe (previously not labelled together). The need to define against the 'opposite' led to the classification of 'the East' (both European and Asian) as barbaric in order to construct a 'civilised' Western Europe. (Wolff 1994). Borneman and Fowler in their anthropological study of *Europeanisation* also noted this historical tendency of creating negative identities of 'other' to achieve a 'European self-consciousness' (Borneman and Fowler, 1997, p. 489). They note that "European coherence has always been tied to some externality, some hypothesised other, for example the infidel, the orient, or the east" (p. 490). Today, the cultural, economic, and political definitions coincide even less

with geographical Europe. 'Europe' and 'European' have come to include the EU member states as in-group and exclude peripheral nations as other (Garcia, 1993, p. 2-3).

The emergence of a homogenous European identity dependent upon an externalisation of a negative other has potentially destructive effects for the 'ethos of co-operation' upon which integration is built. In recent years a notable increase of racism in Europe has been identified (McDonogh, 1993, p. 144). Such xenophobia, while reinforcing an image of a dangerous other as part of social identity, contributes to the rise of a fascist leaning right[71] (McDonogh, 1993, p. 144; *The Economist*, 15.10.94, p. 67-68). 'White, Judaeo-Christian' Europeans have come to overlook distinctions amongst the 'colours' of Europe with reports that third generation 'coloured' Europeans are becoming victims of racial crimes despite the fact that they themselves identify as European (McDonogh, 1993, 147).

An example of the rise of right wing parties can be seen in the Austrian elections of 1999. The October 3rd elections saw Joerg Haider's Freedom Party gain 27.2% of the vote— second to the Austrian Social Democratic Party (Rippert and Alder, 1999, p.1). On February 1 2000, it was announced that the Freedom Party would form part of the Government coalition (ADL, 2000, p. 1). The Freedom Party has been described as a political party that "openly advocates racism and xenophobia" (Rippert and Alder, 1999, p. 1). Criticism has also been aimed at Haider; the Anti-Defamation League, for example, cites critics who have called Haider a "yuppie fascist" and "Austrian David Duke"[72] (ADL, 2000, p.1).

[71]However, it has also been suggested by many theorists that this racism is in fact a reaction to globalisation and in particular Europeanisation which is a perceived threat to nations. This argument will be mentioned in greater detail below

Despite these negative effects, the idea of a European nation relies upon the basic tenets of the in-group/out-group dichotomy. Heater argues that no "project for voluntary political integration would be at all credible unless the putative member states shared some cultural and political traditions and values" (Heater, 1992, p. 180). As part of this he argues that in-groups and out-groups are necessary. The inward looking identity needs to recognise common characteristics amongst member states, while when looking outward must recognise a distinctiveness and incompatibility of those outside the Union (p. 180). However, Garcia argues that it is "difficult to define a model of 'European society' into which all national societies in Europe fit while those outside do not" (Garcia, 1993, p. 10). Kaplinski highlights that historical attempts at 'nation-building' demonstrate the negative effects of such moves. He argues that there are three methods used to achieve cultural homogeneity: assimilation, deportation, and genocide (Kaplinski, 1993, p. 113). The nations that exist within Europe at the moment have been created "at the cost of weaker nations who were assimilated or exterminated"[73] (p. 113). Clearly, the duplication of such methods in the attempt of creating a European identity is undesirable to both the nations of Europe and the European Union.

Another predominant and potentially negative effect of creating a European nation is the perceived threat to existing nations. Llobera argues that the "process of the European Union generates a real fear of losing territory, personality, and the power to control one's own affairs; in a word, there arises a crisis of identity which expresses itself in a reactive nationalism, often accompanied by chauvinistic and jingoistic manifestations" (Llobera, 1993, p. 77). It is clear that in the 1990's the world has witnessed the growth of a new kind of national (and ethnic) spirit within European countries (Iivonen, 1993, p. 6). Furthermore, this is strongly racist and directed against

---

[72] A reference to the Klu Klux Klan member who entered politics in the US during the 1990's

[73] He notes that the ethnic cleansing that has taken place in Yugoslavia are the steps that Western Europe took several centuries ago; examples include the Jews and Moors in Spain as well as the Celtics and Basques (Kaplinski 1993: 113).

foreigners (p. 6). It is highly probable that this is a reaction to the idea of a homogenous European nation. Kaplinski argues that the desire for a homogenous Europe is indeed a real threat to nations, although not explicitly. He foresees that the creation of a supra-nation-state, with its own European nationalism, would result in the formal preservation and even EU support of local languages and cultures, but their basis would be seriously weakened by the standardisation required for a European nation (Kaplinski, 1993, p. 115). Hence, while it is "not at all improbable that the national cultures will survive in a united Europe", this is most likely to be as "something secondary, as decoration" if Europe is to "become more and more homogenous" (p. 115).

It has become readily accepted as a result of these negative effects that the idea of a European nation must be curbed to a less destructive and threatening identity that is still able to legitimate the European Union. The EU itself has recognised this need with the emphasis on 'unity in diversity' as the slogan that represents the 'ethos of co-operation'.

## Unity in Diversity

Many authors, realising that attempts at creating a European nation were futile in the face of persistent nationalism, have explored notions of a distinct European identity. Rather than basing the legitimating identity on the model of the nation presented above, is there another collective identity that would recognise the authority of the European Union sufficiently[74]? Most European citizens identify with a number of culturally defined groups and do not appear to feel that these identities are incompatible (Wilson, 1993, p. 17). Therefore, is it possible that the addition of a strong European identity could easily

[74] This argument is built upon the common understanding of multiple identities apparent in recent identity literature. For example, Augoustinos and Walker argue that an individual has a vast number of social identifications and only some of these are "primed or activated or salient at any one time" allowing for the co-existence of these identities and that these are selected to suit the social context the individual finds themselves in (Augoustinos and Walker, 1995, p. 109).

be included in these multiple layers of identification without threatening present identities but also create the loyalty require to legitimate EU government?

Weiler in particular has explored this idea extensively. He argues that "Europe is not meant to be about nation-building, or a melting pot" in that the creation of a truly European 'demos' would seem to negate the objectives[75] of integration (Weiler, 1997, p. 117). He argues that instead it is possible to define the European polity in civic non-organic-cultural terms (p. 118) The basis of a collective identity should be a "coming together on the basis not of shared ethnos and/or organic culture, but a coming together on the basis of shared values, a shared understanding of rights and society duties and shared rational intellectual culture which transcend organic-national culture (p. 118). Habermas presents a similar argument in that the potential for the 'European experience' stems from "a common political culture and the branching of national traditions of art and literature, historiography, philosophy, etc" (Habermas, 1992, p. 12). He continues on to say that the cultural elite and the mass media play an important role in fostering the focus on these shared traditions and that ultimately a European constitutional patriotism will need to grow out of "interpretations of the same universalist rights and constitutional principles which are marked by the context of different national histories" (p. 12). Fells and Niznik argue that the common history required for social identity can be interpreted in the broader sense allowing for the inclusion of values which are minimally threatening to individual nations (Fells and Niznik, 1992, p. 206). The

common values in the artistic, political, and social sense are again pointed to in order to fill this role. Primarily, values such as civil liberties, democracy, and tolerance, which are

[75] notably, the objective of *intergovernmental* co-operation for peace

considered amongst the most important achievements of Europe, contribute to a European identity separate from individual European nations (p. 206).

However is this 'civic' identity[76] sufficient for the purposes of legitimating the EU? In theory these common values have been present for generations, yet Europe has repeatedly engaged in war within the continent. Furthermore, since the beginning of the integration process these common values and traditions have appeared to remain secondary to the nation on several occasions; notable examples include the Luxembourg Compromise. Smith argues that to date each member state has consistently placed perceived national interests and self-images above a concerted European policy based on a single presumed European interest and self-image (A. Smith, 1992, p. 56).

The true nature of such a civic identity though pre-empts further investigation of such debate. For example, an interesting point that results from the arguments of these authors is the similarity between this civic identity and Smith's European 'family of cultures'. The above identity encompasses many of the examples that Smith cites in his family of cultures such as Roman law and the Judaeo-Christian ethic. Many would argue, however, that there is a theoretical distinction between the two views, namely, the ability for the civic identity to co-exist with present national identities. The focus would remain on those ideals that brought the countries of Europe together in integration, rather than replacing individual nations. However this 'distinction' ignores many aspects that undermine the argument for a civic identity.

[76] As described by Weiler 1997

Firstly, returning to Habermas' claim that such an identity is based on rational intellectual culture, the distinction between the basis for this identity and that of a European nation is problematic. The civic values and ideas can, as exemplified throughout the quotes used above, be described as 'culture'. The 'distinction' merely stems from one's definition of culture. It could be argued that the intellectual ideas encompassed in the civic identity in fact are the imposition of high culture in accordance with Gellner's argument described above.

The result of this is that it is plausible to argue that this civic identity is does not differ greatly from the concept of the European nation discussed above. Both are based to some extent on cultural homogeneity and thus essentially one in the same. If this argument is accepted, then it can be further argued that this does eliminate the problems that a civic identity is meant to rectify. However, if the argument of definitions of cultures is overlooked there are still further problems with the concept of this identity.

A second, and perhaps more important, problems is that there are many authors that would argue that this is not a civic 'identity', but rather a *different form* of the nation. The difference is much the same as the argument that Habermas uses to argue against a European nation—a divide between the rational, intellectual, and the organic. Hutchinson argues that this is ultimately a difference between a cultural and political nationalism. The nation described above would be classified as cultural. Alternatively, to the political nationalist the "ideal is a civic polity of educated citizens united by common laws and mores"—reminiscent of the European 'civic' identity proposed above (Hutchinson, 1994, p. 122). To Hutchinson this view is of a "nation that looks forward ultimately to a common humanity transcending cultural differences" (p. 122). Kohn also identifies a divide between political and cultural nationalism. However, to Kohn this is

also a divide between Western and Eastern nationalism. Kohn sees that in the West the creation of a nation was in the political reality and struggles of the time[77]. It was therefore, at its origin, less concerned with cultural definitions and "connected with the concepts of individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism current in the eighteenth century" and was thus the product of rational societal conception— again reminiscent of a European 'civic' identity (Kohn, 1945, p. 330).

Hobsbawm in fact argues that the cultural and ethnic nationalism that arose from 1880 was preceded by a 'radical-democratic' approach to the nation. Hobsbawm argues that "the primary meaning of 'nation'... was political" whereas it "equated 'the people' and the state in the manner of the American and French revolutions" (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 18). Therefore, defining a nation in ethnic and cultural terms (as is the case with organic nationalism) is incorrect in the initial sense of the word because "if 'the nation' had anything in common from the popular-revolutionary point of view, it was not in any fundamental sense, ethnicity, language and the like" (p. 20). Rather, a nation was based upon mass participation and choice and the desire to be under the same government (p. 19). For example, "it was not the native use of the French language that made a person French... but the willingness to acquire this, among the other liberties, laws and common characteristics of the free people of France" (p. 21). Hence, the idea of a European civic identity could fit within the idea of a 'radical-democratic' approach to the nation as this civic identity is based on the choice, acceptance, and desire to embrace the common characteristics of a 'European'.

Consequently, it is apparent that while the concept of a European civic identity may be distinct from the concept of a European nation in organic sense, is can be still be

[77] Which could be viewed as an instance of the pattern Wolff describes in *Inventing Eastern Europe*

seen to fit within other concepts of the nation. Therefore, it can justifiably be argued within such terms that this concept is not simply an identity but rather a variation on the idea of the 'liberal/political' nation. Hence, similar problems arise as with the European nation described above. While the problems of racism may not be as apparent under this national identity, problems of in-group/out-group formation can still arise. Rather than ethnicity being the basis of this, the 'rational intellectual culture' of shared values and traditions becomes the basis for believing in the superiority of Europeans.

Ultimately it is difficult to escape the conclusion that however a 'European identity' is theoretically discussed it will to some extent be modelled on the nation as this is remains the modern link between the state and the people. While this can clearly be seen to be problematic, as discussed above, it cannot be disregarded purely due to its negative effects. Whatever the effects, an European identity is still held to be a means by which the European Union may address problems of legitimacy.

## Evidence of a European Identity

Although the theoretical discussion of a European identity introduced many negative aspects of this identity, the need to further explore the idea must not be forgotten. Wilson explains that the issue has arisen because integration is transforming aspects of society and culture at every level (Wilson, 1993, p. 3). As integration as become more extensive it has resulted in a need for the European public to question "basic tenets of their socio-political lives" (p. 3). McDonogh argues that "the dismantling of Europe's economic and cultural internal boundaries raises questions about the definition of identity and exclusion" (McDonogh, 1993, p. 145). Hence it is necessary to understand whether any form of a European collective that was theoretically explored exists in relativity.

Fells and Niznik state that there can be little doubt that a European identity does in fact exist, it is simply difficult to define (Fells and Niznik, 1992, p. 205-206)[78]. As Wintle describes, "attempts to isolate and define European identity...make it clear that it is elusive and equivocal" (Wintle, 1996, p. 1). However, the true test of the existence of a European identity comes with the belief of the general public. The *Eurobarometre*, identifying the increasing focus on the need for a European identity, asked citizens about their identification with Europe. Hewstone included this aspect in his *Eurobarometre* analysis in 1986.

*Hewstone on identity*

Based on two questions from the *Eurobarometre* in the 1980's, worded slightly differently than those of the 1990's, Hewstone recognised that few people identified strongly with 'Europe'. A large number 'sometimes' thought of themselves as European, but an almost equally large group 'never' thought of themselves as European. The conclusion that Hewstone reaches is that "the emergence of a cosmopolitan European identity within the Community... cannot yet be hailed" and that if "a nation can be defined as a body of people who feel they are a nation, then there is little support for the idea of a European nation in the psychological sense" (Hewstone, 1986, p.33). Further he argues that such results "give only limited support to the functionalist notion of a shift in public loyalties from national to supra-national institutions" (p. 33).

[78] this conclusion was reached through their attempts at defining Europe in their paper "*Conclusion: What is Europe*"

*The Eurobarometre after Hewstone*

Beginning in December 1994, the *Eurobarometre* again explored the concept of identity[79]. When asked whether they see themselves as their nation, nation plus European, European plus nation, or European only in the near future, there was a fairly close divide amongst the respondents between nation and nation plus European (see graph 5.1).

**Graph 5.1: Identification with nation and/or Europe amongst all member states**




The most interesting trend to note is the decline (and then slight increase) in those who identify with their nation then Europe and the consequent increase (and then slight decrease) in those who identified with their nation only. By the end of 1998 these responses were equal. Also there was a gradual decline in those who saw themselves as European only, which was accompanied by an overall decrease in those who consider themselves European and then national. Hence, in the European Union overall there would appear to be a resurgence in the identification with the nation. Although this resurgence isn't stark, all trends appear to support a stronger identification with the nation than with Europe.

Not surprisingly, the United Kingdom and Denmark are amongst the countries that appear to possess the highest level of identification with the nation. What is surprising is the high level of identification with only the nation in Greece, a country which appears as one of this countries with the strong support for integration. In fact, the United Kingdom possesses a larger number of people who identify as "European only" than in Greece[80]—again a statistic that seems contrary to the findings of Chapter Four.

Those who possess the strongest identification with Europe are found in Luxembourg, Italy, and France (see graph 5.2 and 5.3).

**Graph 5.2: A comparison between levels of identification in France and Greece**




[79] With the understanding of multiple identities as discussed by Augoustinos and Walker (1995).

[80] Although the difference between the two is not very large—around 3-5% greater in Greece than in the United Kingdom.

**Graph 5.3: A comparison between levels of identification in Luxembourg and France**




While Luxembourg and Italy are traditionally pan-European in most of their responses to the *Eurobarometre* and even their policy action in the EU, France's identification is unexpected. The response of the French to *Eurobarometre* questions analysed in Chapter Four were marked by their moderate standing. Further, the actions of French representative in European politics has often been characterised by strong nationalist policies; de Gaulle was a notable example of letting French nationalism influence EU politics. This is perhaps a strong example of elite action not entirely reflecting the standing of the public[81]. Or perhaps it can otherwise be concluded that France has successfully dominated the EU to the extent that identifying with the EU is not a threat to national identity.

The available data therefore paints a dark picture for the European identity. The evidence supports the claims of a resurgence of nationalism. Identification with the nation is still prevalent and appears in fact to be gaining strength. Overall, the consistency between these findings and those of Hewstone demonstrates that the evidence to support the growth of a strong European identity is minimal. The only

[81] Although it is also accepted that the view of the French public may have changed from nationalist standings to a more pan-European view in the time since de Gaulle represented France.

promising evidence for Europe is the high number of people who identify themselves as European at some level. It appears though that this will remain primarily secondary to the nation.

## Implications for Integration and Legitimacy

### *Identity and Integration*

Taking theoretical literature and public opinion into account, the presence of a European identity is troubling in many regards. Firstly, many negative undesirable effects can be associated with the presence of a European nation. In response to in-group/out-group formations, or perhaps threats to the nation, increased racism poses serious challenges to the EU's 'ethos of co-operation'. Further, the often violent and turbulent environments created by asserted nationalism undermine the desire for peace that has strongly influenced the process of integration throughout the century. The belief that this is undesirable can be seen in the reaction (to cease bi-lateral relations with Austria) by European Union member states to the rise of the extreme right wing Freedom Party in Austria. This belief has thus led to a revised concept of a European identity.

This revised concept, however is also problematic. Firstly it could be argued that this great resembles a nation as well, which again would bring with it negative effects. Secondly, it can be argued that the notion of 'unity in diversity' is an elite concept. The public response of strengthening nationalism refutes attempts at embracing unity by re-emphasising diversity. Scholars and elite may recognise the similar cultural and historical traditions for a common social identity, whether or not it is accepted that this is distinct from a nation, but a large part of European society appears to prefer to recognise individual differences. The result is that 'unity in diversity' will at present remain a

phrase coined by the European Union rather than the description of a European collective.

Future widening of the EU stands out as one further problem with the concept of a European identity. A European identity undoubtedly requires definitions of European and other. For this identity to legitimate the authority of the EU this definition of European should undoubtedly coincide with Union borders to a large degree. However as Borneman and Fowler argue, "Europe's peripheral nations test the ability to integrate marginal peoples into the EU. This integration process displays not only the limitations on the resolve to unify Europe but also the willingness of nations to Europeanise" (Borneman and Fowler, 1997, p. 496). Such limitations are significantly called into question with an increased number of candidate member states, particularly with the inclusion of states such as Turkey— a country lacking in the common traditions stated above.

*Legitimacy*

The problematic nature of European identity has several consequences for the legitimacy of the European Union. Chapter Four highlighted problems in the area of popular legitimacy which ultimately led to the conclusion that the Union needs to focus on finding a means of capturing the loyalty and consent of the European public. This brought the examination to identity. The link between identity and legitimacy was described above and it was explained that the nation has been the primary social group used for social and political legitimation of government in the modern era. Yet, the brief exploration of the notion of a European nation demonstrated that this is undesirable due primarily to the negative effects of such nationalism. This however, presents the problem of finding a new social identity that still is able to convey the loyalty of the people to any given government.

The concept of 'Unity in Diversity' acts as the foundations of the desired social identification and an identity that is acceptable within the ideology of peace and co-operation inherent in integration. Yet, as already summarised above, the dominance of the nation stunts the potential for diversity to be truly embraced in order to unify the European public. As Beetham and Lord conclude, any development of a "European identity and loyalty is embryonic at best among the European electorate" (Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 29). Therefore, with a lack of strong European identity it is highly probable that any further deepening of the Union[82] will result in a further heightening of nationalism in European member states. As long as the integration process is a threat to the individual nations this reaction is inevitable. The integration process will remain a threat as long as there is an element of neo-functionalist thought involved in the integration process. The consequence is that the Union is at a cross-roads with the issue of an identity which would aide the legitimation of federated political power. Methods of strengthening the attachment to 'Europe' are encompassed in the deepening of the Union[83]. Yet, any future deepening of the Union may cause even further reactive nationalism to grow, which ultimately undermines attempts at creating a European identity. Consequently, the Union elite are again left to find alternative solutions to the problems of popular legitimacy in the EU.

[82] According to the neo-functionalist model

[83] Previous measures such as symbols (flag, anthem, etc), citizenship, and representation of people as Europeans rather than nationals have all been carried out through deepening

# *Chapter Six*
## Conclusion

Throughout the course of this thesis the legitimacy of the European Union has been examined within a neo-functionalist framework. Within this neo-functionalist framework the primary question of whether the EU lacks legitimacy was addressed. The focus upon a neo-functionalist framework was necessary due to the differing nature of theories of legitimacy between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism.

According to the intergovernmental framework, EU claims to legitimate authority are valid. The exploration of Union legitimacy within an international relations paradigm demonstrated how the Union can be considered legitimate to intergovernmentalists. However, neo-functional elements of the European Union challenge the use of international relations as the EU becomes a more state-like actor. This also consequently challenges claims to legitimacy. As a result it became necessary to examine legitimacy according to a neo-functional framework based upon the state model as argued by Hix[84].

This opposition between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism remains the backdrop for all studies of the European Union. However, this problem is not confined to just theoretical discussions. The integration process itself has experienced the conflict between these competing frameworks, as was evident in the contentious drafting and consequent ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The intergovernmental pillars alongside the Community are evidence of the struggle between the intergovernmentalists, such as the British government, who "fought for these as a way of heading off a federal

Europe" and the federalists, who "accepted them only with reluctance" (Pryce, 1994, p. 3). As Pryce describes, the Maastricht Treaty can be described as an "uneasy truce between the two sides" (p. 3). The consequence is that the path of integration is paved with uncertainty. Theoretical literature, including in this thesis, is therefore limited by the same uncertainty.

Further constraints were imposed upon this thesis by the use of the *Eurobarometre*. Although this was the most appropriate and valuable research tool accessible at the time, it presented several problems. The questions it used were generally broad and vague in their content. Survey questions that were more detailed and pertained directly to the issues examined within the thesis would have provided more insightful results and thus allowed for more affirmative conclusions. Consequently, conclusions drawn from this *Eurobarometre* research are made tentatively and with the understanding that different interpretations are inevitably possible.

Hewstone also addressed the broad nature of the *Eurobarometre*. He discusses that even the authors of *Eurobarometre 15* identified the tendency for some questions to measure "a sentiment as vague as it is diffuse" (as cited in Hewstone, 1986, p. 24). Unfortunately in order to adequately attain time-series statistical trends these questions can not be altered. In order to address this problem, and support the findings of the *Eurobarometre*, Hewstone conducted his own survey of four member states. Supplementary surveys thus prove to be beneficial in interpreting the responses to *Eurobarometre* questions. Due to obvious resource and access limitations, this was not feasible within this thesis. However, it serves to highlight that limitations of the *Eurobarometre* questions can be overcome.

---

[84] See Chapter One for this argument.

However, despite these constraints the *Eurobarometre* was still able to provide insights into European public opinion that can influence the social legitimation of the European Union. Resource and accessibility limitations also meant that alternative research tools were not feasible. Without the *Eurobarometre*, it would not have been possible to reach important conclusions regarding the legitimacy of the EU.

Despite difficulties in method and constraints of theoretical frameworks, a comprehensive investigation of the legitimacy of the European Union has been carried out. This was done on two different levels by first examining the legitimacy of the EU according to the state model constructed in Chapter Two, and secondly by then questioning the relevance of this state model.

## Legitimacy in the EU according to the state model

The theoretical discussion in Chapter Two culminated with the presentation of a theoretical model that was used for the discussion of legitimacy as it pertained to the European Union. As part of this model it was argued that a democratic government can be considered rightfully legitimate when:

- it acquires and exercises political power through legal means,
- the actions of government are congruent with the values and beliefs of society, and
- there is evidence of consent through action for the authority/power structure by the ruled (public).

This comprehensive framework provided a basis from which the examination of legitimacy in the EU could commence. Chapter Three utilised this model to concentrate on the over all concept of legitimacy within the integration process. The foundation for

this was the construction of an ideal model of legitimacy for the European Union (presented below) which stipulated the conditions necessary for the Union to be legitimate in accordance with the state model.

**Figure 6.1: IDEAL MODEL OF EU LEGITIMACY**




During the course of this construction several issues were presented that posed problems for the legitimation process of the European Union. It was concluded that the first factor of legitimacy, termed legal legitimacy for the purpose of this thesis, was largely met. Clearly, the European Union as an institution was legally sound. The area of popular legitimacy was shown to be more problematic. These problems of legitimacy that the European Union is facing were examined through further exploration of the ideal model.

The ideal model of legitimacy for the European Union included the democratic elements of authorisation, accountability, and representation as part of the second and third factors of legitimacy. During the examination of the presence of the ideal model these elements were shown to be problematic. One source of these problems is the

democratic deficit that has been readily described in the European Union. The representation and accountability deficit was described in detail with particular reference to limitation of powers of the European Parliament. Chapter Four explored the public opinion surrounding such issues. With questions regarding democracy and the European Parliament the public appeared to voice opinions that support the idea of the democratic deficit. There was clearly dissatisfaction with democracy in the European Union. Combined with this was the desire to see a larger role for the European Parliament. Hence, it was concluded that a possible means of acting in accordance to the beliefs of the European public was to be more responsive to these opinions.

The logical solution to this problem resides in an increase to the power of the EP and limits to the power of the Commission and Council. However, this 'logical' answer is fraught with danger. One key objection to increased parliamentary powers is the continued struggle between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. Although such measures would partially rectify the democratic deficit, this would also severely limit the role of the Council in the policy process. This would be a welcomed move by the neo-functionalists; to the intergovernmentalist this would be largely unacceptable. The Council is the main forum for intergovernmental co-operation. Limitation of this forum, in the eyes of the intergovernmentalist, would bestow too much power upon the Union institutions by removing far too much power from the member states.

Some authors have discussed other problems associated with an increase in the role of the Parliament in order decrease the democratic deficit. Beetham and Lord argue that the extension of parliamentary powers raises several issues. Firstly, an extension of power would be needed to address the accountability deficit (Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 27). One of the first problems that would arise would be addressing which form of

representation is most appropriate. At present methods of election and representation vary according to the frameworks within individual member states. A more representative Parliament, though, to be just, would need a level of uniformity that ensured fair representation across the whole Union (p. 28). Secondly, the low levels of voter participation, and the second-order characteristics of these elections, raises questions as to the level of support needed to legitimate a more empowered Parliament (p. 27-28). Dehousse argues that such measures would in fact be counter-productive; "strengthening of the European Parliament and of European parties, far from solving the current legitimacy crisis, as if often alleged, might in some respects aggravate it" (Dehousse, 1995, p. 119). The reason for this aggravation, according to Dehousse, is that negative features of majoritarian parliamentary systems are likely to be accentuated in a divided power system such as the Union (p. 119). With particular relevance to addressing the accountability deficit, *The Economist* argues that "giving the parliament the power to sack individual commissioners would make it more the master of the Commission than the Commission president" and that the Parliament is not ready for this role (*The Economist*, 30.01.99, p. 50).

Beetham and Lord also argue that the authorisation deficit may be rectified in part, and at least, through the election rather than appointment of the Commission president. They assert that through either direct elections, or election by the Parliament, an elected president would counter-act the national appointments of the Council and Commission (Beetham and Lord, 1998, p. 26). However, this would again incite disagreement amongst neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists, as this would remove the role of member state governments in the selection of the Commission president. This role is arguably important to intergovernmentalists in order to try and prevent appointment of a president who holds strong views of a federated Europe.

It was also noted in the discussion of the ideal model that this model will never be completely attainable. As it is an ideal, there will always be those that disagree with the majority. It was therefore concluded that the European Union could be considered rightfully legitimate if this opposition remains a small minority. During the course of the empirical research opposition became apparent. It also became apparent that this opposition was highly concentrated amongst a few member states. Such concentration of opposition can not be considered insignificant and therefore does effect the legitimation of the European Union. It was concluded that the European elite must understand why some member states strongly support integration and others are so significantly opposed. This led to the discussion of identity.

Many authors have acknowledged the role of identity in legitimating authority. It was hypothesised that if a common identity was found and proven to be strong enough this could be the means by which this opposition could be transformed. However, two problems arose with the discussion of a European identity. Firstly, the modern identity used for the purpose of legitimating government is the nation, yet the idea of a European nation was shown to be undesirable and contrary to the goals of integration. This leaves the Union with the task for finding an identity that could still legitimate government yet be less emotive than the nation. The result was the highly discussed idea of a civic identity based on common traditions of philosophy and values (such as human rights, civil liberties, etc). However, it was also argued that this can be viewed as an alternative form of the nation. Upon further examination of identity, another problem arose. While civic values may indeed provide a basis of collectivity for the European people, despite the negative aspects, any presence was shown to be minimal; as expressed by Beetham and Lord a European identity is embryonic at present. The empirical evidence appeared

to support this in the respect that the nation is still clearly the dominant form of identification and many member states have large numbers of citizens that refuse to identify as European.

The final factor of legitimacy, evidence of consent, was also examined extensively within this thesis. In modern democratic states, voting for government is taken to be an adequate measure and evidence of consent. In the case of the European Union, elections for Members of the European Parliament have been held since 1979. Since this time voter turnout has declined each year. Yet, the empirical evidence shows that voting in member states is sometimes contrary to public opinion regarding integration. For this reason the qualitative research that suggests that voting is in fact dominated by national issues and political parties can not be ignored. The resulting conclusion was that voting appears to be an inaccurate measure of consent in the European Union. Consequently, alternative evidence of consent must be found in order for the European Union to sufficiently meet this factor of legitimacy. However, throughout the theoretical literature alternatives do not appear to be given within the confines of a democratic state. Mere obedience and lack of voiced dissent can not substitute as satisfactory evidence as these actions may be motivated out of apathy or fear.

The final conclusions regarding the state of legitimacy in the European that may be drawn from this exploration are not promising. Many problematic areas were highlighted throughout the thesis. Possible solutions were presented which could rectify the legitimacy deficit. Yet, these are not also without problems. Consequently, one is left to conclude that within a neo-functionalist framework the European Union has a legitimacy *problem*. However, this does not affirm the hypothesis that the European Union has a legitimacy crisis. Although many authors have argued that a crisis does in

fact exist, this has been overstated. While there are areas that are indeed impoverished, many elements that contribute to the legitimation of the EU can be found. This does not rule out a legitimacy crisis in future. If the current difficulties that exist are not addressed, any further deepening or widening of the Union could exacerbate the present legitimacy problems.

Figure 6.2: CONCLUDING MODEL OF PROBLEMS OF LEGITIMACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION



The question that must be asked as a result of such findings focuses on the relevance of the state-model. There are apparent problems with the legitimation of the European Union according to the ideal model. Furthermore, the solutions put forth are also problematic. Yet it must be examined whether this is truly reflective of the state of legitimacy in the European Union or rather whether this is evidence of limitations of the ideal model, particularly when proposed solutions are also problematic.

## Relevance of the state model to the European Union

The use of the state model constructed in Chapter Two allowed this thesis to examine the legitimacy of the European Union within a democratic theoretical model. It has also, however, allowed this thesis to address a question which surrounds various neo-functionalist examinations of the European Union: is the state model appropriate for the study of the EU or rather does the state model provide limitations that cannot be placed upon EU studies?

The state model was used for several reasons. Firstly, as the European Union takes on more state-like attributes political theories of the state must be tested in this new context. More importantly, as integration progresses the Union is evolving into a truly unique institution which defies classification in contemporary political frameworks. Still, a study of the EU must have a conceptual starting point. It was demonstrated that for various reasons, but namely the increasing scope of Union policy and law, that an international relations paradigm was too narrow. Of the competing frameworks, the state-model was taken, for the purpose of this thesis, to be the most appropriate for a study of legitimacy.

Several aspects of the examination that has been carried out through the course of this thesis indicate that perhaps the state-model limits the study of the European Union. Although, it remained the most appropriate theory, a state-centric focus excludes the aspects of the European Union which remain characteristic of an international institution; the continuing struggle between integration theories ultimately affects frameworks as well. The use of the state framework in this thesis exemplifies this. While, it was the most appropriate of existing frameworks, there are still several examples of this limitations of its use.

The most prevalent of these points is the third factor of legitimacy. For the Union to be legitimate according to the state model evidence of consent is required. Yet, voter turnout is not sufficient. However, when elections such as those of the EP are of minimal consequence to the policy process of the whole institution, votes are an inadequate measure of consent overall. EP votes are for one element of one pillar of the EU. They can hardly be taken to be consent for the Union as a whole. The state model though, provides few alternatives that could apply to the structure of the Union— a clear example of an inappropriate application of the state model. An international relations framework does not provide alternatives either, as consent of national government would be taken to mean consent for the EU. However, the Union has the ability to override national law and create policy that affects citizens directly; these powers extend beyond that of an average international institution and consequently require direct consent to be legitimate.

Another point that illustrates the limitations brought upon the study of the European Union is the proposed solution of increased power for the European Parliament. While in a state context this would address a democratic deficit, the

complicated structure of the European Union prevents this measure from being adequate. Again, one reason for this is the struggle between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, as described above. But a further problem is the legislative process itself. The Parliament is not the primary body for the creation and ratification of legislation. To increase Parliamentary powers so they are more representative would require restructuring of the legislative procedure to a state-model. Although, this is undoubtedly assumed by many who argue for a more powerful Parliament, the repercussion of such an action have not been adequately addressed by these proponents. Restructuring would remove elements of the legislative procedure tailored to the unique situation of European Law. Yet, the state model would require such action in order for the EU to be considered rightfully legitimate within this context. So again, the state model cannot account for the unique procedures that European integration necessitates.

This ultimately leads to the conclusions that there are indeed instances where the state model has placed limitations of the study of the European Union. Banchoff and Smith argue that present conceptual frameworks limit explorations of legitimacy. They identified that analysis driven from "the experience of the nation-state" does not "capture the dynamics of recognition and representation in the EU" (Banchoff and Smith, 1999, p. 2). In an effort to "conceptualise the legitimacy issue in terms that better fit the reality of the EU as a contested and evolving polity" (p. 3), Banchoff and Smith present an alternative framework for analysis from a multi-level approach. They argue that this approach redirects attention "to new patterns of political activity that contribute to legitimacy" (p. 12). This is but one example of a model that could be used to examine legitimacy in the future.

This conclusion is not to say that all analysis within this framework is null and void. The conclusions reached by this thesis are beneficial to the study of the EU. It is evident that there are in fact problems in the area of democracy and direct public affiliation with 'Europe'. These points, within a state framework, lead to the conclusion that there is legitimacy problem in the European Union. When examined after a critique of the state framework these points are still beneficial. Although a state framework is at present inappropriate for EU studies, it provides insight into the areas that will ultimately need to addressed if the Union moves towards a true federation. Also, discovery of problems within present frameworks ultimately contributes towards the creation of a new framework, such as the one presented by Banchoff and Smith, in which the questions and problems explored in this thesis may one day be more thoroughly analysed. Although the scope of this thesis does not allow the construction of this new framework, it is a starting point for future analysis. With increased literature and discussion surrounding new frameworks, more conclusive examinations of legitimacy will be enabled.

# *Bibliography*


**Anti Defamation League (ADL)** *Joerg Haider: The rise of an Austrian Extreme Rightist* Anti Defamation League Backgrounder, http://www.adl.org/backgrounders/joerg_haider.html, posted: February 2000, accessed: March 15, 2000.

**Anderson, Benedict** Imagined communities : reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism Verso, London, 1991.

**Augoustinos, Martha and Iain Walker** Social Cognition: An Integrated Introduction Sage Publications Ltd, London, 1995.

**Banchoff, Thomas and Mitchell P. Smith** *Introduction: Conceptualising legitimacy in a contested polity* Legitimacy and the European Union ed Thomas Banchoff and Mitchell P. Smith, Routledge, London, 1999., p. 1-26.

**Beetham, David** Legitimation of Power Macmillan Education Ltd, Hong Kong, 1991.

**Beetham, David and Christopher Lord** Legitimacy and the European Union Addison Wesley Longman Ltd, New York, 1998.

**Borneman, John and Nick Fowler** *Europeanisation* Annual Review of Anthropology vol 26, 1997, p. 487-514.

**Calhoun, Craig** Nationalism University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1997

**Cardus, Salvador and Joan Estruch** *Politcally Correct Anti-nationalism* International Social Science Journal no 144, June 1995, p 347-352.

**Corbett, Richard** The Treaty of Maastricht, from conception to ratification: a comprehensive reference guide Longman Group Ltd, Exeter, 1993

**Connor, Walker** *"A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a... "* Ethnic and Racial Studies vol 1 no 4, 1978, p. 379-388.

**Dahl, Robert A.** Modern Political Analysis Prentice Hall Inc, New Jersey, 1965.

**Deflem, Mathieu and Fred C Pampel** *The Myth of Postnational Identity: Popular Support for European Unification* Social Forces vol 75 no 1, 1996, p. 119-143.

**Dehousse, Renaud** *Constitutional Reform in the European Community: Are there Alternatives to the Majoritarian Avenue?* West European Politics vol 18 no3, 1995, p. 118-136.

**Down, William** *Federalism Achieved: the Belgian Election of May 1995* West European Politics vol 19 no 1, 1996, p. 168-175

**Duff, Andrew** *Ratification* Maastricht and Beyond: Building the European Union ed. Andrew Duff, John Pinder, and Roy Pryce, Routledge, London, 1994.

**Economist, The** *Western Europe's nationalists: the rise of the outside right* vol 333, October 15, 1994, p. 66-68.

**Economist, The** *Germany and the Euro: Not quite a done deal yet?* vol. 345, December 13, 1997, p. 51-52.

**Economist, The** *German fears about EMU* vol 342, January 25, 1997, p. 45-46.

**Economist, The** *Codes of misconduct* vol 350, January 9, 1999, p. 48.

**Economist, The** *Parliament versus Commission* vol 350, January 16, 1999, p. 49-50

**Economist, The** *Recommissioning Europe* vol 350, January 30, 1999, p. 49-50.

**Economist, The** *Europe's next commissioners* vol 350, March 27, 1999, p. 64.

**Economist, The** *Europe's voters stay at home* vol 351, June 19, 1999, p. 53-56.

**European Commission,** Eurobarometre: public opinion in the European Union: Trends 1974-1993 Directorate General Information, Communication, Culture, Audiovisual, Brussels, May 1994.

**European Commission,** Eurobarometre: public opinion in the European Union no 41 Directorate General Information, Communication, Culture, Audiovisual, Brussels, July 1994.

**European Commission,** Eurobarometre: public opinion in the European Union no 42 Directorate General X, Survey Research Unit, Brussels, Spring 1995.

**European Commission,** Eurobarometre: public opinion in the European Union no 43 Directorate General X, Survey Research Unit, Brussels, Autumn 1995.

**European Commission,** Eurobarometre: public opinion in the European Union no 44 Directorate General X, Survey Research Unit, Brussels, April 1996.

**European Commission,** Eurobarometre: public opinion in the European Union no 45 Directorate General X, Survey Research Unit, Brussels, December 1996.

**European Commission,** Eurobarometre: public opinion in the European Union no 46 Directorate General X, Survey Research Unit, Brussels, May 1997.

**European Commission,** Eurobarometre: public opinion in the European Union no 47 Directorate General X, Survey Research Unit, Brussels, October 1997

**European Commission,** Eurobarometre: public opinion in the European Union no 48 Directorate General X, Survey Research Unit, Brussels, March 1998.

**European Commission,** Eurobarometre: public opinion in the European Union no 49 Directorate General X, Survey Research Unit, Brussels, September 1998.

**European Commission,** Eurobarometre: public opinion in the European Union no 50 Directorate General X, Survey Research Unit, Brussels, March 1999.

**European Commission,** Eurobarometre: public opinion in the European Union no 51 Directorate General X, Survey Research Unit, Brussels, July 1999.

**European Parliament: United Kingdom Office** European Elections Facts and Figures, http://www.europarl.eu.int/uk/elections/main.html, no posting date, accessed: September 21, 1999.

**Fells, John and Jozef Niznik** *Conclusion: What is Europe* International Journal of Sociology vol 22 no 1-2, 1992, p. 201-206

**Friedrich, Carl Joachim** Man and His Government: an empirical theory of politics

McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., United States, 1963

**Franklin, Van Der Eijk, Marsh** *Referendum Outcomes and Trust in Government: support for European in the wake of Maastricht* West European Politics vol 18 no 3, 1995, p. 101-117.

**Garcia, Soledad** *Europe's Fragmented Identities and the Frontiers of citizenship* Europen Identity and the Search for Legitimacy ed. Soledad Garcia, Pinter, London, 1993, p. 1-29.

**Gellner, Ernest** Nations and Nationalism Blackwell, Oxford, 1983.

**George, Stephen** Politics and Policy in the European Community (second edition) Oxford University Press, London, 1991.

**Grafstein, Robert** *The Failure of Webr's Conception of Legitimacy: its causes and implications* Journal of Politics vol 43, 1981a, p. 456-472.

**Grafstein, Robert** *The Legitimacy of Political Institutions* Polity vol 14 no 1, 1981b, p. 51-69.

**Habermas, Jurgen** Communication and the Evolution of Society Beacon Press, Boston, 1979

**Habermas, Jurgen** *Citizenship and National Identity: SomeReflections on the Future of Europe* Praxis International vol 12 no 1, April 1992, p. 1-19.

**Handley, D.H.** *Public opinion and European integration: the crisis of the 1970's* European Journal of Political Research vol 9, 1981, p. 335-64

**Heater, Derek** The Idea of European Unity Leicester University Press, London, 1992.

**Hewstone, Miles** Understanding attitudes to the European Community Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986.

**Hix, Simon** *The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics* West European Politics vol 17 no 1, 1994, p. 1-30

**Hobsbawm, Eric** Nations and nationalism since 1780 : programme, myth, reality Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.

**Holland, Martin** European Community Integration Pinter Publishers, London, 1993.

**Holland, Martin** *EU Agenda: Beware the Ides of March* New Zealand International Review vol 24 no 3, May/June 1999, p. 24-25.

**Hutchinson, John and Anthony Smith** *Introduction* Nationalism ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994.

**Hutchinson, John** The dynamics of cultural nationalism : the Gaelic revival and the creation of the Irish nation state Allen & Unwin, London, 1987

**Iivonen, Jyrki** *Introduction: Nation States in Europe* The Future of the Nation State in Europe ed. Jyrki Iivonen, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Aldershot, 1993, p. 3-9.

**Jacobs, Francis and Richard Corbett** The European Parliament Westview Press, Boulder, 1990.

**Journal of Electoral Studies** *National Elections (Belgium)* vol 5 no 1, 1986, p. 95-97.

**Journal of Electoral Studies** *National Elections (Belgium)* vol 8 no 2, 1989, p. 199-202.

**Journal of Electoral Studies** *National Elections (Belgium)* vol 11 no2, 1992, p. 184-185.

**Journal of Electoral Studies** *National Elections (Belgium)* vol 14 no 3, 1995, p. 349-351.

**Journal of Electoral Studies** *National Elections (The Netherlands)* vol 2 no 1, 1983, p. 94-96.

**Journal of Electoral Studies** *National Elections (The Netherlands)* vol 5 no 3, 1986, p. 313-315.

**Journal of Electoral Studies** *National Elections (The Netherlands)* vol 9 no 3, 1990, p. 269-272.

**Journal of Electoral Studies** *National Elections (The Netherlands)* vol 14 no 1, 1995, p. 111-115.

**Journal of Electoral Studies** *National Elections (United Kingdom)* vol 2 no 3, 1983, p. 295-296.

**Journal of Electoral Studies** *National Elections (United Kingdom)* vol 11 no 4, 1992, p. 377-381.

**Journal of Electoral Studies** *National Elections(United Kingdom)* vol 18 no 1, 1999, p. 150-151.

**Judge, D.** *The failure of national parliaments?* West European Politics vol 18 no 3, 1995, p. 79-100

**Kaltenthaler, Karl** *The sources of Policy Dynamics: Variation in German and French Policy Towards European Monetary Co-operation* West European Politics vol 20 no 3, p. 91-110.

**Kaplinksi, Jaan** *The Future of National Cultures in Europe* The Future of the Nation State in Europe ed. Jyrki Iivonen, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, Aldershot, 1993, p. 107-116.

**Klabbers, Jan** The Concept of Treaty in International Law Luwer Law International, The Hague, 1996.

**Kohler, B.** *The parliamentarians and their electorate* The European Parliament on the Eve of the Second Direct Election: balance sheet and prospects De Tempel, Bruges, 1984.

**Kohn, Hans** The idea of nationalism: a study in its origins and background Macmillan, New York, 1945.

**Laffan, Brian, Rory O'Donnell, and Michael Smith** Europe's experimental Union: rethinking integration Routledge, London, 2000.

**Laursen, Finn and Sophie Vanhoonacker** The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: Issues, Debates, and Future Implications Martinus Mijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1994.

**Lipset, Seymour Martin** Political Man— The Social Bases of Politics Doubleday and Co, Inc, New York, 1960.

**Lipset, Seymour Martin** *Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy* American Political Science Review vol 53, 1959, p. 69-105.

**Lllobera, Josep** *The Role of the State and the Nation in Europe* European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy ed. Soledad Garcia, Pinter, London, 1993, p. 64-80.

**Lord, Christopher** Democracy in the European Union Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield, 1998.

**Merelman, Richard M.** *Learning and Legitimacy* American Political Science Review vol 60, 1966, p. 548-561.

**McDonough, Gary W.** *The Face Behind the Door: European Integration, Immigration, and Identity* Cultural Change and the New Europe: Perspective on the European Community ed Thomas M. Wilson and M. Estellie Smith, Westview Press, Boulder, 1993, p. 143-165.

**Mommsen, Wolfganag J.** The Age of Bureaucracy: persepctives on the political sociology of Max Weber Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974.

**Moravcsik, Andrew** *Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach* Journal of Common Market Studies vol 31 no 4, 1993, p. 473-524

**Nugent, Neill** The Government and Politics of the European Union (fourth edition) Duke University Press, Durham, 1999.

**Obradovic, Daniela** *Policy Legitimacy and the European Union* Journal of Common Market Studies vol 34 no 2, 1996, p. 191-221

**Perry, Peter** *EU Agenda: Is the European Commission corrupt?* New Zealand International Review vol 24 no 5, September/October 1999, p. 28-34.

**Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel** Wittgenstein and Justice: on the significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for social and political thought University of California Press,

Berkeley, 1972.

**Pryce, Roy** *The Maastricht Treaty and the New Europe* Maastricht and Beyond: Building the European Union ed. Andrew Duff, John Pinder, and Roy Pryce, Routledge, London, 1994.

**Reif, Karlheinz and Hermann Schmitt** *Nine Second-order National Elections— A conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results* European Journal of Political Research vol 8, 1980, p. 3-44.

**Reif, Karlheinz and Ronald Inglehart** *Analyzing Trends in west European Opinion: the Role of the Eurobarometer Surveys* Eurobarometer: The Dynamics of European Public Opinion ed. Karlheinz Reif and Ronald Inglehart, Macmillan, London, 1991.

**Richardson, J. J.** European Union: power and policy-making Routledge, London, 1996.

**Rippert, Ulrich and Lukas Adler** *Ultra-right Freedom Party takes second place in Austrain parliamentary elections* World Socialist Web Site October 7, 1999, http://www.socialequality.com/articles/1999/oct1999/aus-07o1.shtml

**Seton Watson, Hugh** Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism Westview Press, Boulder, 1977.

**Schaar, John H** *Legitimacy in the Modern State* Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science ed. Philip Green and Sanford Levinson, Random House, United States, 1970, p. 276-327.

**Smith, Anthony** The ethnic origins of nations Blackwell, Oxford, 1986

**Smith, Anthony** National identity Penguin Books, London, 1991

**Smith, Anthony** *National Idenitty and the Idea of Eruopean Unity* International Affairs vol 68 no 1, 1992, p.55-76

**Smith, Julie** *How European are European elections?* Political Parties and the European Union ed. John Gaffney Routledge, London, 1996

**Vanhoonacker, Sophie** *From Maastricht to Karlsruhe: the long road to ratification* ed. Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker The Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty:

Issues, Debates, and Future Implications Martinus Mijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1994.

**Vulliamy, Ed** *Bosnia: crime of appeasement* International Affairs vol 74 no 1, January 1998, p. 73-92.

**Wallace, W. and J. Smith** *Democracy or technocracy? European integraton and the problem of popular consent* West European Politics vol 18 no 3, p. 137-157.

**Weber, Max** The theory of Social and Economic Organisation translated by AR Henderson and Talcott Parsons, revised and edited by Talcott Parsons, William Hodge and Co Ltd, Great Britain, 1947.

**Weiler, J.H.H.** *The Reformation of European Constitutionalism* Journal of Common Market Studies vol 35 no 1, 1997, p. 97-131

**Wilson, Thomas** *An Anthropology of the European Community* Cultural Change and the New Europe: Perspective on the European Community ed. Thomas Wilson and M. Estellie Smith, Westview Press, Boulder, 1993, p. 1-23.

**Wintle, Michael** *Introduction: Cultural Diversity and Identity in Europe* Culture and Identity in Europe ed. Micheal Wintle, Averbury, Vermont, 1996.

**Wolff, Larry** Inventing Eatern Europe: the Map of Civilzation on the Mind of the Enlightenment, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1994.

# *Appendix One*

## *Eurobarometre* Data* ** ***

**Question one:** In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If for, are you very much for or to some extent for? If against, are you very much against or to some extent against?

a. very much for
b. to some extent for
c. to some extent against
d. very much against
e. no reply

**Belgium**

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Apr-79** | 27 | 44 | 6 | 1 | 22 |
| **Nov-79** | 23 | 46 | 6 | 2 | 23 |
| **Apr-80** | 20 | 47 | 5 | 2 | 26 |
| **Oct-80** | 25 | 40 | 8 | 2 | 25 |
| **Apr-81** | 18 | 42 | 6 | 3 | 31 |
| **Oct-81** | 27 | 43 | 5 | 2 | 23 |
| **Mar-82** | 20 | 49 | 8 | 2 | 21 |
| **Oct-82** | 17 | 43 | 8 | 2 | 30 |
| **Apr-83** | 27 | 41 | 6 | 1 | 25 |
| **Oct-83** | 23 | 48 | 7 | 3 | 19 |
| **Apr-84** | 20 | 47 | 9 | 3 | 21 |
| **Oct-84** | 29 | 51 | 6 | 1 | 13 |
| **Apr-85** | 30 | 54 | 4 | 1 | 11 |
| **Oct-85** | 19 | 59 | 6 | 2 | 14 |
| **Mar-86** | 27 | 47 | 6 | 2 | 18 |
| **Oct-86** | 29 | 51 | 7 | 1 | 12 |
| **Apr-87** | 32 | 48 | 7 | 1 | 12 |
| **Oct-87** | 29 | 46 | 5 | 1 | 19 |
| **Apr-88** | 25 | 48 | 6 | 1 | 20 |
| **Oct-88** | 25 | 58 | 8 | 2 | 7 |
| **Apr-89** | 31 | 55 | 3 | 1 | 10 |
| **Jul-89** | 17 | 52 | 8 | 2 | 21 |
| **Oct-89** | 31 | 54 | 6 | 1 | 8 |
| **Apr-90** | 29 | 54 | 6 | 3 | 8 |
| **Oct-90** | 23 | 57 | 8 | 2 | 10 |
| **Apr-91** | 25 | 57 | 8 | 1 | 9 |
| **Oct-91** | 26 | 55 | 8 | 1 | 10 |
| **Apr-92** | 23 | 57 | 10 | 2 | 8 |
| **Sep-92** | 22 | 53 | 13 | 3 | 9 |
| **Nov-92** | 17 | 53 | 16 | 4 | 10 |
| **Apr-93** | 20 | 58 | 13 | 2 | 7 |
| **Oct-93** | 19 | 55 | 15 | 3 | 8 |
| **Dec-94** | 18 | 59 | 12 | 4 | 6 |
| **Apr-95** | 19 | 60 | 10 | 2 | 8 |
| **Sep-95** | 18 | 53 | 14 | 7 | 9 |
| **Apr-96** | 15 | 53 | 19 | 6 | 6 |

## Denmark

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 14 | 35 | 18 | 13 | 20 |
| Nov-79 | 13 | 33 | 18 | 20 | 16 |
| Apr-80 | 12 | 27 | 19 | 21 | 21 |
| Oct-80 | 16 | 31 | 19 | 14 | 20 |
| Apr-81 | 17 | 29 | 16 | 18 | 20 |
| Oct-81 | 12 | 32 | 22 | 17 | 18 |
| Mar-82 | 13 | 29 | 22 | 20 | 16 |
| Oct-82 | 12 | 28 | 19 | 18 | 23 |
| Apr-83 | 13 | 32 | 19 | 18 | 18 |
| Oct-83 | 11 | 27 | 20 | 23 | 19 |
| Apr-84 | 11 | 25 | 20 | 23 | 21 |
| Oct-84 | 8 | 30 | 23 | 20 | 19 |
| Apr-85 | 9 | 25 | 21 | 23 | 22 |
| Oct-85 | 13 | 24 | 19 | 28 | 16 |
| Mar-86 | 15 | 35 | 17 | 22 | 13 |
| Oct-86 | 13 | 32 | 19 | 20 | 16 |
| Apr-87 | 12 | 27 | 20 | 27 | 14 |
| Oct-87 | 14 | 34 | 22 | 21 | 9 |
| Apr-88 | 9 | 34 | 24 | 24 | 9 |
| Oct-88 | 15 | 37 | 20 | 23 | 5 |
| Apr-89 | 19 | 37 | 18 | 17 | 9 |
| Jul-89 | 17 | 33 | 15 | 14 | 21 |
| Oct-89 | 24 | 36 | 19 | 14 | 7 |
| Apr-90 | 25 | 38 | 19 | 12 | 6 |
| Oct-90 | 23 | 42 | 17 | 12 | 6 |
| Apr-91 | 22 | 43 | 20 | 10 | 5 |
| Oct-91 | 22 | 44 | 20 | 10 | 4 |
| Apr-92 | 23 | 38 | 21 | 14 | 4 |
| Sep-92 | 28 | 37 | 17 | 15 | 3 |
| Nov-92 | 26 | 39 | 17 | 15 | 3 |
| Apr-93 | 24 | 40 | 19 | 14 | 3 |
| Oct-93 | 24 | 38 | 19 | 16 | 3 |
| Dec-94 | 21 | 37 | 22 | 17 | 3 |
| Apr-95 | 21 | 40 | 21 | 15 | 3 |
| Sep-95 | 21 | 41 | 18 | 16 | 4 |
| Apr-96 | 20 | 44 | 19 | 14 | 3 |

## France

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 25 | 47 | 8 | 2 | 18 |
| Nov-79 | 24 | 51 | 7 | 3 | 15 |
| Apr-80 | 19 | 56 | 9 | 2 | 14 |
| Oct-80 | 17 | 52 | 9 | 2 | 20 |
| Apr-81 | 16 | 56 | 9 | 3 | 16 |
| Oct-81 | 26 | 54 | 6 | 1 | 13 |
| Mar-82 | 24 | 54 | 8 | 2 | 12 |
| Oct-82 | 28 | 54 | 7 | 1 | 10 |
| Apr-83 | 25 | 50 | 5 | 1 | 19 |
| Oct-83 | 29 | 50 | 7 | 2 | 12 |
| Apr-84 | 29 | 52 | 6 | 2 | 11 |
| Oct-84 | 28 | 52 | 6 | 1 | 13 |
| Apr-85 | 38 | 47 | 5 | 1 | 9 |
| Oct-85 | 28 | 55 | 7 | 1 | 9 |
| Mar-86 | 31 | 51 | 7 | 1 | 10 |
| Oct-86 | 36 | 50 | 5 | 1 | 8 |
| Apr-87 | 39 | 46 | 5 | 2 | 8 |
| Oct-87 | 34 | 50 | 4 | 1 | 11 |
| Apr-88 | 29 | 56 | 6 | 1 | 8 |
| Oct-88 | 34 | 52 | 6 | 2 | 6 |
| Apr-89 | 32 | 54 | 7 | 1 | 6 |
| Jul-89 | 28 | 54 | 7 | 2 | 9 |
| Oct-89 | 29 | 50 | 7 | 2 | 12 |
| Apr-90 | 27 | 53 | 8 | 3 | 9 |
| Oct-90 | 24 | 56 | 9 | 2 | 9 |
| Apr-91 | 24 | 55 | 7 | 3 | 11 |
| Oct-91 | 24 | 55 | 9 | 3 | 9 |
| Apr-92 | 19 | 56 | 10 | 6 | 9 |
| Sep-92 | 24 | 49 | 14 | 6 | 7 |
| Nov-92 | 23 | 47 | 15 | 6 | 9 |
| Apr-93 | 20 | 52 | 14 | 6 | 8 |
| Oct-93 | 20 | 53 | 15 | 3 | 9 |
| Dec-94 | 19 | 53 | 14 | 5 | 9 |
| Apr-95 | 19 | 52 | 16 | 6 | 8 |
| Sep-95 | 21 | 52 | 13 | 6 | 9 |
| Apr-96 | 18 | 52 | 15 | 7 | 8 |

Germany

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 36 | 46 | 6 | 1 | 11 |
| Nov-79 | 37 | 44 | 6 | 1 | 12 |
| Apr-80 | 36 | 44 | 6 | 1 | 13 |
| Oct-80 | 38 | 40 | 7 | 2 | 13 |
| Apr-81 | 31 | 39 | 9 | 4 | 17 |
| Oct-81 | 38 | 37 | 11 | 1 | 13 |
| Mar-82 | 33 | 45 | 7 | 3 | 12 |
| Oct-82 | 28 | 42 | 11 | 5 | 14 |
| Apr-83 | 36 | 49 | 5 | 1 | 9 |
| Oct-83 | 34 | 42 | 6 | 2 | 16 |
| Apr-84 | 27 | 45 | 10 | 3 | 15 |
| Oct-84 | 36 | 44 | 9 | 2 | 9 |
| Apr-85 | 37 | 40 | 6 | 3 | 14 |
| Oct-85 | 32 | 42 | 13 | 3 | 10 |
| Mar-86 | 41 | 41 | 7 | 1 | 10 |
| Oct-86 | 43 | 39 | 7 | 2 | 9 |
| Apr-87 | 38 | 37 | 10 | 3 | 12 |
| Oct-87 | 28 | 49 | 10 | 3 | 10 |
| Apr-88 | 27 | 43 | 14 | 3 | 13 |
| Oct-88 | 27 | 51 | 10 | 4 | 8 |
| Apr-89 | 26 | 49 | 12 | 5 | 8 |
| Jul-89 | 27 | 45 | 13 | 4 | 11 |
| Oct-89 | 42 | 37 | 8 | 2 | 10 |
| Apr-90 | 37 | 43 | 10 | 2 | 8 |
| Oct-90 | 37 | 45 | 8 | 2 | 8 |
| Apr-91 | 35 | 46 | 10 | 3 | 6 |
| Oct-91 | 32 | 48 | 11 | 2 | 7 |
| Apr-92 | 29 | 44 | 15 | 6 | 6 |
| Sep-92 | 26 | 45 | 15 | 8 | 6 |
| Nov-92 | 23 | 44 | 18 | 9 | 6 |
| Apr-93 | 25 | 48 | 15 | 5 | 7 |
| Oct-93 | 23 | 48 | 15 | 8 | 6 |
| Dec-94 | 26 | 44 | 15 | 6 | 8 |
| Apr-95 | 27 | 45 | 14 | 7 | 7 |
| Sep-95 | 22 | 45 | 17 | 8 | 7 |
| Apr-96 | 18 | 43 | 21 | 10 | 7 |

Greece

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct-80 | 33 | 26 | 12 | 11 | 18 |
| Apr-81 | 30 | 30 | 12 | 13 | 15 |
| Oct-81 | 36 | 29 | 7 | 8 | 20 |
| Mar-82 | 29 | 29 | 10 | 7 | 25 |
| Oct-82 | 36 | 27 | 8 | 7 | 22 |
| Apr-83 | 31 | 30 | 6 | 6 | 27 |
| Oct-83 | 40 | 29 | 5 | 5 | 21 |
| Apr-84 | 28 | 29 | 11 | 9 | 23 |
| Oct-84 | 32 | 35 | 9 | 7 | 17 |
| Apr-85 | 34 | 28 | 9 | 6 | 23 |
| Oct-85 | 27 | 26 | 15 | 8 | 24 |
| Mar-86 | 35 | 21 | 14 | 4 | 26 |
| Oct-86 | 38 | 33 | 11 | 3 | 15 |
| Apr-87 | 35 | 29 | 14 | 6 | 16 |
| Oct-87 | 37 | 32 | 9 | 5 | 17 |
| Apr-88 | 33 | 32 | 9 | 5 | 21 |
| Oct-88 | 44 | 34 | 6 | 2 | 14 |
| Apr-89 | 40 | 38 | 8 | 2 | 12 |
| Jul-89 | 44 | 31 | 5 | 2 | 18 |
| Oct-89 | 54 | 28 | 3 | 3 | 12 |
| Apr-90 | 57 | 24 | 5 | 3 | 11 |
| Oct-90 | 48 | 32 | 5 | 3 | 12 |
| Apr-91 | 42 | 37 | 7 | 3 | 11 |
| Oct-91 | 47 | 35 | 5 | 2 | 11 |
| Apr-92 | 48 | 36 | 6 | 2 | 8 |
| Sep-92 | 42 | 39 | 6 | 5 | 8 |
| Nov-92 | 44 | 36 | 7 | 4 | 9 |
| Apr-93 | 41 | 38 | 7 | 5 | 9 |
| Oct-93 | 49 | 36 | 4 | 3 | 8 |
| Dec-94 | 36 | 45 | 7 | 3 | 8 |
| Apr-95 | 34 | 40 | 11 | 5 | 10 |
| Sep-95 | 32 | 43 | 10 | 7 | 9 |
| Apr-96 | 29 | 49 | 10 | 6 | 6 |

## Ireland

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 19 | 45 | 9 | 2 | 25 |
| Nov-79 | 25 | 43 | 9 | 5 | 18 |
| Apr-80 | 19 | 41 | 10 | 2 | 28 |
| Oct-80 | 19 | 39 | 10 | 7 | 25 |
| Apr-81 | 20 | 39 | 15 | 8 | 18 |
| Oct-81 | 21 | 41 | 11 | 5 | 22 |
| Mar-82 | 15 | 40 | 12 | 5 | 28 |
| Oct-82 | 16 | 41 | 12 | 5 | 26 |
| Apr-83 | 16 | 39 | 9 | 4 | 32 |
| Oct-83 | 21 | 41 | 7 | 4 | 27 |
| Apr-84 | 17 | 41 | 9 | 4 | 29 |
| Oct-84 | 18 | 42 | 8 | 5 | 27 |
| Apr-85 | 24 | 37 | 9 | 6 | 24 |
| Oct-85 | 18 | 41 | 11 | 4 | 26 |
| Mar-86 | 20 | 41 | 9 | 4 | 26 |
| Oct-86 | 22 | 44 | 11 | 3 | 20 |
| Apr-87 | 26 | 36 | 8 | 4 | 26 |
| Oct-87 | 22 | 39 | 10 | 3 | 26 |
| Apr-88 | 21 | 42 | 11 | 4 | 22 |
| Oct-88 | 24 | 51 | 7 | 4 | 14 |
| Apr-89 | 26 | 48 | 6 | 2 | 18 |
| Jul-89 | 24 | 45 | 4 | 1 | 26 |
| Oct-89 | 38 | 33 | 4 | 3 | 22 |
| Apr-90 | 39 | 36 | 5 | 3 | 17 |
| Oct-90 | 37 | 45 | 5 | 1 | 12 |
| Apr-91 | 41 | 37 | 7 | 2 | 13 |
| Oct-91 | 44 | 35 | 5 | 4 | 12 |
| Apr-92 | 36 | 45 | 5 | 2 | 12 |
| Sep-92 | 33 | 41 | 9 | 4 | 13 |
| Nov-92 | 36 | 39 | 7 | 4 | 14 |
| Apr-93 | 31 | 45 | 7 | 3 | 14 |
| Oct-93 | 30 | 46 | 8 | 3 | 13 |
| Dec-94 | 27 | 50 | 7 | 3 | 13 |
| Apr-95 | 36 | 44 | 5 | 3 | 12 |
| Sep-95 | 36 | 42 | 6 | 2 | 14 |
| Apr-96 | 32 | 49 | 6 | 2 | 11 |

## Italy

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 39 | 48 | 3 | 1 | 9 |
| Nov-79 | 40 | 45 | 4 | 1 | 10 |
| Apr-80 | 35 | 48 | 4 | 1 | 12 |
| Oct-80 | 39 | 42 | 6 | 1 | 12 |
| Apr-81 | 36 | 46 | 8 | 3 | 7 |
| Oct-81 | 40 | 42 | 5 | 2 | 11 |
| Mar-82 | 32 | 47 | 6 | 1 | 14 |
| Oct-82 | 28 | 47 | 6 | 2 | 17 |
| Apr-83 | 36 | 44 | 5 | 1 | 14 |
| Oct-83 | 35 | 45 | 5 | 2 | 13 |
| Apr-84 | 28 | 49 | 7 | 1 | 15 |
| Oct-84 | 32 | 53 | 5 | 1 | 9 |
| Apr-85 | 39 | 45 | 4 | 1 | 11 |
| Oct-85 | 32 | 52 | 4 | 1 | 11 |
| Mar-86 | 31 | 51 | 3 | 1 | 14 |
| Oct-86 | 43 | 48 | 4 | 0 | 5 |
| Apr-87 | 47 | 38 | 4 | 1 | 10 |
| Oct-87 | 41 | 45 | 4 | 1 | 9 |
| Apr-88 | 32 | 51 | 5 | 1 | 10 |
| Oct-88 | 37 | 53 | 3 | 1 | 6 |
| Apr-89 | 37 | 52 | 3 | 0 | 8 |
| Jul-89 | 38 | 50 | 4 | 1 | 7 |
| Oct-89 | 44 | 42 | 4 | 1 | 9 |
| Apr-90 | 47 | 42 | 3 | 1 | 7 |
| Oct-90 | 43 | 44 | 4 | 1 | 8 |
| Apr-91 | 43 | 45 | 4 | 1 | 7 |
| Oct-91 | 42 | 46 | 4 | 1 | 7 |
| Apr-92 | 41 | 46 | 6 | 2 | 5 |
| Sep-92 | 31 | 52 | 8 | 2 | 7 |
| Nov-92 | 34 | 48 | 7 | 3 | 8 |
| Apr-93 | 32 | 52 | 6 | 2 | 8 |
| Oct-93 | 37 | 47 | 6 | 2 | 8 |
| Dec-94 | 31 | 54 | 4 | 2 | 9 |
| Apr-95 | 34 | 51 | 5 | 2 | 7 |
| Sep-95 | 34 | 52 | 4 | 2 | 8 |
| Apr-96 | 31 | 54 | 6 | 2 | 7 |

## Luxembourg

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 47 | 42 | 5 | 2 | 4 |
| Nov-79 | 48 | 40 | 7 | 1 | 4 |
| Apr-80 | 48 | 38 | 6 | 3 | 5 |
| Oct-80 | 46 | 39 | 9 | 1 | 5 |
| Apr-81 | 45 | 42 | 6 | 1 | 6 |
| Oct-81 | 45 | 38 | 11 | 3 | 3 |
| Mar-82 | 40 | 42 | 5 | 3 | 10 |
| Oct-82 | 37 | 41 | 9 | 2 | 11 |
| Apr-83 | 39 | 39 | 8 | 3 | 11 |
| Oct-83 | 47 | 32 | 9 | 3 | 9 |
| Apr-84 | 43 | 39 | 6 | 2 | 10 |
| Oct-84 | 44 | 38 | 9 | 4 | 5 |
| Apr-85 | 56 | 31 | 4 | 2 | 7 |
| Oct-85 | 41 | 35 | 11 | 3 | 10 |
| Mar-86 | 47 | 37 | 5 | 3 | 8 |
| Oct-86 | 46 | 35 | 8 | 5 | 6 |
| Apr-87 | 40 | 37 | 10 | 4 | 9 |
| Oct-87 | 43 | 39 | 6 | 2 | 10 |
| Apr-88 | 34 | 42 | 10 | 3 | 11 |
| Oct-88 | 32 | 46 | 10 | 3 | 9 |
| Apr-89 | 25 | 48 | 14 | 1 | 12 |
| Jul-89 | 18 | 51 | 15 | 3 | 13 |
| Oct-89 | 32 | 42 | 14 | 4 | 8 |
| Apr-90 | 29 | 40 | 14 | 5 | 12 |
| Oct-90 | 34 | 43 | 10 | 3 | 10 |
| Apr-91 | 28 | 43 | 14 | 4 | 11 |
| Oct-91 | 26 | 48 | 13 | 5 | 8 |
| Apr-92 | 24 | 49 | 15 | 3 | 9 |
| Sep-92 | 29 | 50 | 11 | 5 | 5 |
| Nov-92 | 33 | 41 | 14 | 5 | 7 |
| Apr-93 | 25 | 50 | 14 | 5 | 6 |
| Oct-93 | 30 | 40 | 17 | 6 | 7 |
| Dec-94 | 38 | 39 | 14 | 2 | 7 |
| Apr-95 | 47 | 32 | 14 | 4 | 3 |
| Sep-95 | 36 | 44 | 11 | 3 | 6 |
| Apr-96 | 32 | 50 | 10 | 3 | 5 |

## The Netherlands

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 37 | 47 | 5 | 3 | 8 |
| Nov-79 | 34 | 48 | 8 | 3 | 7 |
| Apr-80 | 28 | 48 | 10 | 4 | 10 |
| Oct-80 | 35 | 44 | 3 | 3 | 10 |
| Apr-81 | 30 | 50 | 8 | 5 | 7 |
| Oct-81 | 28 | 46 | 10 | 7 | 9 |
| Mar-82 | 24 | 52 | 9 | 4 | 11 |
| Oct-82 | 27 | 48 | 9 | 6 | 10 |
| Apr-83 | 29 | 46 | 10 | 5 | 10 |
| Oct-83 | 33 | 39 | 9 | 6 | 13 |
| Apr-84 | 30 | 51 | 7 | 3 | 9 |
| Oct-84 | 30 | 52 | 7 | 3 | 8 |
| Apr-85 | 33 | 46 | 6 | 4 | 11 |
| Oct-85 | 28 | 48 | 9 | 5 | 10 |
| Mar-86 | 35 | 45 | 7 | 4 | 9 |
| Oct-86 | 30 | 45 | 12 | 5 | 8 |
| Apr-87 | 36 | 44 | 8 | 4 | 8 |
| Oct-87 | 32 | 46 | 8 | 3 | 11 |
| Apr-88 | 26 | 50 | 10 | 4 | 10 |
| Oct-88 | 27 | 53 | 8 | 4 | 8 |
| Apr-89 | 27 | 53 | 10 | 4 | 6 |
| Jul-89 | 22 | 54 | 11 | 5 | 8 |
| Oct-89 | 26 | 50 | 11 | 5 | 8 |
| Apr-90 | 26 | 52 | 11 | 3 | 8 |
| Oct-90 | 24 | 53 | 11 | 4 | 8 |
| Apr-91 | 24 | 53 | 13 | 4 | 6 |
| Oct-91 | 23 | 53 | 12 | 6 | 6 |
| Apr-92 | 22 | 55 | 13 | 4 | 6 |
| Sep-92 | 24 | 52 | 13 | 6 | 5 |
| Nov-92 | 20 | 52 | 15 | 7 | 6 |
| Apr-93 | 19 | 55 | 16 | 5 | 5 |
| Oct-93 | 22 | 53 | 11 | 7 | 7 |
| Dec-94 | 18 | 58 | 12 | 5 | 7 |
| Apr-95 | 22 | 53 | 15 | 4 | 6 |
| Sep-95 | 24 | 53 | 13 | 4 | 7 |
| Apr-96 | 21 | 56 | 14 | 5 | 4 |

## United Kingdom

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 21 | 40 | 14 | 6 | 19 |
| Nov-79 | 20 | 41 | 15 | 8 | 16 |
| Apr-80 | 21 | 38 | 16 | 10 | 15 |
| Oct-80 | 23 | 40 | 14 | 8 | 15 |
| Apr-81 | 17 | 35 | 14 | 15 | 19 |
| Oct-81 | 20 | 44 | 13 | 8 | 15 |
| Mar-82 | 17 | 39 | 19 | 12 | 13 |
| Oct-82 | 21 | 40 | 15 | 6 | 18 |
| Apr-83 | 20 | 40 | 15 | 5 | 20 |
| Oct-83 | 29 | 41 | 9 | 5 | 16 |
| Apr-84 | 17 | 45 | 16 | 7 | 15 |
| Oct-84 | 25 | 44 | 11 | 4 | 16 |
| Apr-85 | 30 | 38 | 11 | 4 | 17 |
| Oct-85 | 24 | 43 | 12 | 7 | 14 |
| Mar-86 | 22 | 45 | 11 | 5 | 17 |
| Oct-86 | 26 | 43 | 13 | 6 | 12 |
| Apr-87 | 29 | 42 | 10 | 6 | 13 |
| Oct-87 | 24 | 45 | 11 | 7 | 13 |
| Apr-88 | 20 | 40 | 18 | 7 | 15 |
| Oct-88 | 16 | 45 | 15 | 12 | 12 |
| Apr-89 | 21 | 49 | 13 | 5 | 12 |
| Jul-89 | 24 | 43 | 12 | 4 | 17 |
| Oct-89 | 27 | 42 | 12 | 5 | 14 |
| Apr-90 | 27 | 44 | 11 | 6 | 12 |
| Oct-90 | 26 | 48 | 10 | 5 | 11 |
| Apr-91 | 27 | 46 | 14 | 5 | 8 |
| Oct-91 | 27 | 41 | 12 | 9 | 11 |
| Apr-92 | 24 | 46 | 13 | 6 | 11 |
| Sep-92 | 17 | 40 | 19 | 13 | 11 |
| Nov-92 | 16 | 43 | 18 | 12 | 11 |
| Apr-93 | 19 | 43 | 19 | 10 | 9 |
| Oct-93 | 17 | 42 | 18 | 12 | 11 |
| Dec-94 | 16 | 44 | 18 | 11 | 12 |
| Apr-95 | 14 | 42 | 19 | 15 | 10 |
| Sep-95 | 16 | 41 | 18 | 14 | 12 |
| Apr-96 | 14 | 41 | 21 | 14 | 10 |

## European Union

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 30 | 45 | 6 | 4 | 15 |
| Nov-79 | 30 | 45 | 8 | 4 | 13 |
| Apr-80 | 27 | 46 | 9 | 4 | 14 |
| Oct-80 | 29 | 43 | 9 | 4 | 15 |
| Apr-81 | 26 | 43 | 10 | 6 | 15 |
| Oct-81 | 31 | 43 | 9 | 4 | 13 |
| Mar-82 | 26 | 45 | 10 | 5 | 14 |
| Oct-82 | 26 | 44 | 10 | 4 | 16 |
| Apr-83 | 29 | 45 | 8 | 3 | 15 |
| Oct-83 | 31 | 44 | 7 | 3 | 15 |
| Apr-84 | 25 | 46 | 10 | 4 | 15 |
| Oct-84 | 30 | 47 | 8 | 3 | 12 |
| Apr-85 | 35 | 42 | 7 | 3 | 13 |
| Oct-85 | 29 | 45 | 9 | 3 | 14 |
| Mar-86 | 33 | 44 | 7 | 2 | 14 |
| Oct-86 | 37 | 42 | 7 | 3 | 11 |
| Apr-87 | 38 | 39 | 7 | 3 | 13 |
| Oct-87 | 33 | 44 | 7 | 3 | 13 |
| Apr-88 | 28 | 45 | 10 | 4 | 13 |
| Oct-88 | 29 | 49 | 8 | 4 | 10 |
| Apr-89 | 30 | 50 | 8 | 3 | 9 |
| Jul-89 | 29 | 46 | 8 | 3 | 14 |
| Oct-89 | 37 | 41 | 7 | 3 | 12 |
| Apr-90 | 36 | 44 | 8 | 3 | 9 |
| Oct-90 | 34 | 47 | 8 | 2 | 9 |
| Apr-91 | 34 | 47 | 8 | 3 | 8 |
| Oct-91 | 33 | 46 | 9 | 3 | 9 |
| Apr-92 | 30 | 46 | 11 | 5 | 8 |
| Sep-92 | 27 | 46 | 13 | 6 | 8 |
| Nov-92 | 26 | 45 | 13 | 7 | 9 |
| Apr-93 | 26 | 48 | 13 | 5 | 8 |
| Oct-93 | 26 | 47 | 12 | 6 | 9 |
| Dec-94 | 24 | 49 | 12 | 6 | 9 |
| Apr-95 | 23 | 47 | 14 | 7 | 9 |
| Sep-95 | 23 | 47 | 13 | 8 | 10 |
| Apr-96 | 21 | 48 | 16 | 8 | 8 |

**Question Two:** Generally speaking, do you think (your country's) membership of the European Community is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?

a. good thing
b. bad thing
c. neither good nor bad
d. no reply

**Belgium**

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 65 | 2 | 20 | 13 |
| Nov-79 | 56 | 3 | 25 | 16 |
| Apr-80 | 57 | 2 | 25 | 16 |
| Oct-80 | 54 | 4 | 24 | 18 |
| Apr-81 | 49 | 6 | 27 | 18 |
| Oct-81 | 55 | 5 | 26 | 14 |
| Mar-82 | 57 | 6 | 23 | 13 |
| Oct-82 | 41 | 9 | 30 | 20 |
| Apr-83 | 62 | 3 | 19 | 16 |
| Oct-83 | 62 | 5 | 19 | 14 |
| Apr-84 | 59 | 7 | 25 | 9 |
| Oct-84 | 65 | 5 | 25 | 5 |
| Apr-85 | 64 | 6 | 24 | 6 |
| Oct-85 | 64 | 4 | 27 | 5 |
| Mar-86 | 64 | 3 | 22 | 11 |
| Oct-86 | 70 | 4 | 23 | 3 |
| Apr-87 | 69 | 4 | 19 | 8 |
| Oct-87 | 70 | 4 | 19 | 7 |
| Apr-88 | 64 | 5 | 22 | 9 |
| Oct-88 | 70 | 4 | 23 | 3 |
| Apr-89 | 73 | 3 | 18 | 6 |
| Jul-89 | 53 | 7 | 25 | 15 |
| Oct-89 | 71 | 6 | 17 | 6 |
| Apr-90 | 69 | 5 | 20 | 6 |
| Oct-90 | 73 | 4 | 17 | 6 |
| Apr-91 | 75 | 4 | 17 | 4 |
| Oct-91 | 70 | 4 | 21 | 5 |
| Apr-92 | 69 | 6 | 22 | 3 |
| Sep-92 | 63 | 7 | 25 | 5 |
| Nov-92 | 59 | 9 | 27 | 5 |
| Apr-93 | 64 | 7 | 24 | 5 |
| Oct-93 | 59 | 9 | 26 | 6 |
| Apr-94 | 56 | 10 | 30 | 4 |
| Dec-94 | 61 | 7 | 28 | 3 |
| Apr-95 | 67 | 9 | 22 | 3 |
| Sep-95 | 57 | 14 | 25 | 4 |
| Apr-96 | 54 | 15 | 29 | 3 |
| Oct-96 | 45 | 15 | 31 | 9 |
| Apr-97 | 41 | 19 | 30 | 9 |
| Oct-97 | 42 | 18 | 31 | 9 |
| Apr-98 | 45 | 12 | 33 | 10 |
| Oct-98 | 47 | 9 | 36 | 7 |
| Apr-99 | 47 | 8 | 35 | 10 |

Denmark

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 37 | 25 | 26 | 12 |
| Nov-79 | 39 | 27 | 24 | 10 |
| Apr-80 | 33 | 29 | 28 | 10 |
| Oct-80 | 32 | 29 | 30 | 9 |
| Apr-81 | 30 | 31 | 30 | 9 |
| Oct-81 | 31 | 29 | 29 | 11 |
| Mar-82 | 33 | 30 | 27 | 10 |
| Oct-82 | 35 | 28 | 28 | 9 |
| Apr-83 | 35 | 24 | 30 | 11 |
| Oct-83 | 35 | 26 | 28 | 11 |
| Apr-84 | 31 | 29 | 30 | 10 |
| Oct-84 | 33 | 28 | 29 | 10 |
| Apr-85 | 29 | 31 | 27 | 13 |
| Oct-85 | 35 | 27 | 27 | 11 |
| Mar-86 | 51 | 21 | 20 | 8 |
| Oct-86 | 39 | 23 | 28 | 10 |
| Apr-87 | 37 | 29 | 26 | 8 |
| Oct-87 | 39 | 29 | 28 | 4 |
| Apr-88 | 37 | 29 | 28 | 6 |
| Oct-88 | 47 | 24 | 25 | 4 |
| Apr-89 | 42 | 23 | 29 | 6 |
| Jul-89 | 46 | 24 | 24 | 6 |
| Oct-89 | 42 | 28 | 26 | 4 |
| Apr-90 | 49 | 25 | 23 | 3 |
| Oct-90 | 59 | 19 | 20 | 3 |
| Apr-91 | 61 | 18 | 19 | 2 |
| Oct-91 | 61 | 20 | 16 | 3 |
| Apr-92 | 56 | 21 | 19 | 4 |
| Sep-92 | 68 | 14 | 16 | 2 |
| Nov-92 | 65 | 18 | 16 | 1 |
| Apr-93 | 61 | 17 | 20 | 2 |
| Oct-93 | 58 | 23 | 17 | 2 |
| Apr-94 | 53 | 26 | 18 | 3 |
| Dec-94 | 53 | 22 | 23 | 2 |
| Apr-95 | 54 | 21 | 23 | 2 |
| Sep-95 | 52 | 23 | 23 | 3 |
| Apr-96 | 53 | 21 | 23 | 3 |
| Oct-96 | 44 | 31 | 22 | 4 |
| Apr-97 | 50 | 25 | 23 | 3 |
| Oct-97 | 53 | 22 | 21 | 4 |
| Apr-98 | 53 | 19 | 24 | 5 |
| Oct-98 | 56 | 20 | 22 | 3 |
| Apr-99 | 51 | 23 | 22 | 4 |

France

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 56 | 8 | 28 | 8 |
| Nov-79 | 58 | 6 | 26 | 10 |
| Apr-80 | 51 | 9 | 32 | 8 |
| Oct-80 | 48 | 10 | 31 | 11 |
| Apr-81 | 50 | 11 | 32 | 7 |
| Oct-81 | 53 | 7 | 33 | 7 |
| Mar-82 | 55 | 7 | 30 | 8 |
| Oct-82 | 57 | 9 | 29 | 5 |
| Apr-83 | 53 | 7 | 30 | 10 |
| Oct-83 | 55 | 9 | 29 | 7 |
| Apr-84 | 62 | 4 | 27 | 7 |
| Oct-84 | 63 | 5 | 27 | 5 |
| Apr-85 | 68 | 6 | 21 | 5 |
| Oct-85 | 66 | 7 | 24 | 3 |
| Mar-86 | 69 | 5 | 21 | 5 |
| Oct-86 | 66 | 6 | 24 | 0 |
| Apr-87 | 72 | 7 | 16 | 0 |
| Oct-87 | 74 | 4 | 19 | 0 |
| Apr-88 | 67 | 7 | 23 | 0 |
| Oct-88 | 69 | 5 | 22 | 4 |
| Apr-89 | 68 | 5 | 23 | 4 |
| Jul-89 | 63 | 6 | 26 | 5 |
| Oct-89 | 66 | 7 | 23 | 4 |
| Apr-90 | 63 | 7 | 25 | 5 |
| Oct-90 | 66 | 7 | 23 | 4 |
| Apr-91 | 70 | 7 | 19 | 4 |
| Oct-91 | 63 | 9 | 24 | 4 |
| Apr-92 | 59 | 12 | 25 | 4 |
| Sep-92 | 57 | 12 | 27 | 4 |
| Nov-92 | 55 | 14 | 27 | 4 |
| Apr-93 | 56 | 13 | 27 | 4 |
| Oct-93 | 55 | 14 | 26 | 5 |
| Apr-94 | 50 | 13 | 33 | 5 |
| Dec-94 | 58 | 12 | 27 | 3 |
| Apr-95 | 53 | 12 | 30 | 4 |
| Sep-95 | 56 | 15 | 25 | 4 |
| Apr-96 | 53 | 13 | 29 | 5 |
| Oct-96 | 46 | 19 | 31 | 4 |
| Apr-97 | 47 | 13 | 37 | 4 |
| Oct-97 | 48 | 14 | 33 | 5 |
| Apr-98 | 50 | 13 | 30 | 7 |
| Oct-98 | 52 | 12 | 30 | 6 |
| Apr-99 | 47 | 14 | 31 | 9 |

## Germany

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 66 | 5 | 20 | 9 |
| Nov-79 | 64 | 3 | 25 | 8 |
| Apr-80 | 65 | 6 | 18 | 11 |
| Oct-80 | 62 | 6 | 22 | 10 |
| Apr-81 | 49 | 9 | 28 | 14 |
| Oct-81 | 59 | 6 | 26 | 10 |
| Mar-82 | 54 | 8 | 31 | 7 |
| Oct-82 | 51 | 9 | 34 | 6 |
| Apr-83 | 61 | 5 | 26 | 8 |
| Oct-83 | 57 | 9 | 24 | 10 |
| Apr-84 | 53 | 5 | 31 | 11 |
| Oct-84 | 57 | 5 | 33 | 5 |
| Apr-85 | 54 | 7 | 30 | 9 |
| Oct-85 | 61 | 8 | 24 | 7 |
| Mar-86 | 64 | 6 | 22 | 8 |
| Oct-86 | 58 | 7 | 28 | 7 |
| Apr-87 | 51 | 12 | 28 | 9 |
| Oct-87 | 62 | 5 | 24 | 9 |
| Apr-88 | 49 | 11 | 33 | 7 |
| Oct-88 | 59 | 9 | 26 | 6 |
| Apr-89 | 55 | 9 | 30 | 6 |
| Jul-89 | 58 | 8 | 26 | 8 |
| Oct-89 | 63 | 7 | 22 | 8 |
| Apr-90 | 62 | 7 | 25 | 6 |
| Oct-90 | 73 | 5 | 17 | 5 |
| Apr-91 | 71 | 6 | 17 | 6 |
| Oct-91 | 69 | 6 | 18 | 7 |
| Apr-92 | 63 | 11 | 21 | 5 |
| Sep-92 | 60 | 10 | 24 | 6 |
| Nov-92 | 57 | 13 | 25 | 5 |
| Apr-93 | 59 | 10 | 26 | 5 |
| Oct-93 | 53 | 12 | 30 | 5 |
| Apr-94 | 50 | 12 | 33 | 5 |
| Dec-94 | 61 | 10 | 25 | 5 |
| Apr-95 | 57 | 11 | 25 | 7 |
| Sep-95 | 51 | 10 | 32 | 7 |
| Apr-96 | 46 | 13 | 35 | 7 |
| Oct-96 | 39 | 16 | 37 | 8 |
| Apr-97 | 36 | 15 | 38 | 11 |
| Oct-97 | 38 | 15 | 37 | 10 |
| Apr-98 | 41 | 13 | 36 | 10 |
| Oct-98 | 48 | 11 | 30 | 10 |
| Apr-99 | 44 | 11 | 31 | 14 |

## Greece

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-81 | 42 | 22 | 26 | 10 |
| Oct-81 | 38 | 21 | 26 | 15 |
| Mar-82 | 33 | 15 | 37 | 15 |
| Oct-82 | 45 | 13 | 30 | 12 |
| Apr-83 | 42 | 12 | 29 | 17 |
| Oct-83 | 47 | 12 | 30 | 11 |
| Apr-84 | 38 | 18 | 35 | 9 |
| Oct-84 | 45 | 16 | 29 | 10 |
| Apr-85 | 45 | 17 | 26 | 12 |
| Oct-85 | 39 | 23 | 26 | 12 |
| Mar-86 | 44 | 16 | 26 | 14 |
| Oct-86 | 51 | 11 | 28 | 10 |
| Apr-87 | 48 | 14 | 27 | 11 |
| Oct-87 | 58 | 12 | 21 | 9 |
| Apr-88 | 51 | 11 | 24 | 14 |
| Oct-88 | 66 | 8 | 17 | 9 |
| Apr-89 | 67 | 6 | 18 | 9 |
| Jul-89 | 70 | 5 | 10 | 15 |
| Oct-89 | 74 | 6 | 12 | 8 |
| Apr-90 | 75 | 5 | 14 | 6 |
| Oct-90 | 75 | 6 | 13 | 6 |
| Apr-91 | 76 | 6 | 12 | 6 |
| Oct-91 | 73 | 6 | 15 | 6 |
| Apr-92 | 74 | 6 | 14 | 6 |
| Sep-92 | 71 | 8 | 14 | 7 |
| Nov-92 | 71 | 6 | 17 | 6 |
| Apr-93 | 68 | 8 | 18 | 6 |
| Oct-93 | 73 | 4 | 15 | 8 |
| Apr-94 | 64 | 9 | 20 | 7 |
| Dec-94 | 65 | 8 | 22 | 5 |
| Apr-95 | 63 | 9 | 24 | 5 |
| Sep-95 | 57 | 13 | 25 | 5 |
| Apr-96 | 58 | 8 | 30 | 3 |
| Oct-96 | 57 | 11 | 26 | 7 |
| Apr-97 | 61 | 8 | 24 | 7 |
| Oct-97 | 60 | 8 | 27 | 5 |
| Apr-98 | 59 | 9 | 25 | 7 |
| Oct-98 | 67 | 9 | 23 | 2 |
| Apr-99 | 54 | 11 | 29 | 6 |

## Ireland

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 54 | 14 | 24 | 8 |
| Nov-79 | 58 | 12 | 25 | 5 |
| Apr-80 | 52 | 19 | 22 | 7 |
| Oct-80 | 47 | 26 | 21 | 6 |
| Apr-81 | 46 | 22 | 27 | 5 |
| Oct-81 | 49 | 19 | 27 | 5 |
| Mar-82 | 44 | 18 | 29 | 9 |
| Oct-82 | 47 | 21 | 27 | 5 |
| Apr-83 | 45 | 20 | 28 | 7 |
| Oct-83 | 42 | 25 | 26 | 7 |
| Apr-84 | 43 | 23 | 27 | 7 |
| Oct-84 | 47 | 20 | 27 | 6 |
| Apr-85 | 53 | 20 | 21 | 6 |
| Oct-85 | 55 | 18 | 22 | 5 |
| Mar-86 | 59 | 16 | 18 | 7 |
| Oct-86 | 58 | 14 | 21 | 7 |
| Apr-87 | 55 | 13 | 22 | 10 |
| Oct-87 | 64 | 9 | 21 | 6 |
| Apr-88 | 63 | 11 | 20 | 6 |
| Oct-88 | 72 | 8 | 17 | 3 |
| Apr-89 | 76 | 5 | 12 | 7 |
| Jul-89 | 70 | 6 | 14 | 10 |
| Oct-89 | 69 | 7 | 14 | 10 |
| Apr-90 | 74 | 8 | 12 | 6 |
| Oct-90 | 76 | 7 | 14 | 3 |
| Apr-91 | 78 | 5 | 13 | 4 |
| Oct-91 | 76 | 7 | 13 | 4 |
| Apr-92 | 75 | 6 | 14 | 5 |
| Sep-92 | 70 | 9 | 16 | 5 |
| Nov-92 | 73 | 10 | 13 | 4 |
| Apr-93 | 75 | 7 | 13 | 5 |
| Oct-93 | 73 | 8 | 15 | 4 |
| Apr-94 | 72 | 7 | 16 | 5 |
| Dec-94 | 82 | 5 | 10 | 3 |
| Apr-95 | 79 | 5 | 11 | 5 |
| Sep-95 | 77 | 6 | 13 | 5 |
| Apr-96 | 77 | 4 | 14 | 5 |
| Oct-96 | 76 | 5 | 11 | 8 |
| Apr-97 | 80 | 3 | 10 | 7 |
| Oct-97 | 83 | 3 | 8 | 6 |
| Apr-98 | 80 | 4 | 10 | 6 |
| Oct-98 | 79 | 4 | 10 | 7 |
| Apr-99 | 78 | 3 | 12 | 8 |

## Italy

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 78 | 2 | 14 | 6 |
| Nov-79 | 75 | 2 | 17 | 6 |
| Apr-80 | 74 | 3 | 16 | 7 |
| Oct-80 | 71 | 5 | 17 | 7 |
| Apr-81 | 73 | 5 | 19 | 3 |
| Oct-81 | 70 | 5 | 20 | 5 |
| Mar-82 | 68 | 3 | 20 | 9 |
| Oct-82 | 64 | 5 | 21 | 10 |
| Apr-83 | 70 | 4 | 18 | 8 |
| Oct-83 | 70 | 6 | 16 | 8 |
| Apr-84 | 70 | 3 | 20 | 7 |
| Oct-84 | 72 | 2 | 20 | 6 |
| Apr-85 | 72 | 4 | 18 | 6 |
| Oct-85 | 78 | 3 | 15 | 4 |
| Mar-86 | 74 | 3 | 16 | 7 |
| Oct-86 | 79 | 2 | 16 | 3 |
| Apr-87 | 73 | 3 | 18 | 6 |
| Oct-87 | 79 | 3 | 15 | 3 |
| Apr-88 | 73 | 4 | 20 | 3 |
| Oct-88 | 83 | 2 | 12 | 3 |
| Apr-89 | 79 | 2 | 14 | 5 |
| Jul-89 | 79 | 2 | 14 | 5 |
| Oct-89 | 75 | 4 | 13 | 8 |
| Apr-90 | 75 | 3 | 13 | 9 |
| Oct-90 | 77 | 3 | 14 | 6 |
| Apr-91 | 79 | 2 | 13 | 6 |
| Oct-91 | 79 | 4 | 12 | 5 |
| Apr-92 | 77 | 5 | 13 | 5 |
| Sep-92 | 71 | 7 | 16 | 6 |
| Nov-92 | 69 | 7 | 16 | 8 |
| Apr-93 | 71 | 6 | 16 | 7 |
| Oct-93 | 68 | 7 | 18 | 7 |
| Apr-94 | 68 | 5 | 20 | 7 |
| Dec-94 | 70 | 5 | 17 | 8 |
| Apr-95 | 73 | 6 | 15 | 7 |
| Sep-95 | 69 | 6 | 16 | 9 |
| Apr-96 | 69 | 6 | 17 | 8 |
| Oct-96 | 68 | 8 | 18 | 7 |
| Apr-97 | 62 | 8 | 21 | 9 |
| Oct-97 | 69 | 6 | 19 | 7 |
| Apr-98 | 69 | 5 | 18 | 9 |
| Oct-98 | 68 | 5 | 17 | 9 |
| Apr-99 | 62 | 5 | 22 | 12 |

## Luxembourg

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 83 | 3 | 12 | 2 |
| Nov-79 | 86 | 3 | 10 | 1 |
| Apr-80 | 84 | 3 | 10 | 3 |
| Oct-80 | 73 | 3 | 22 | 2 |
| Apr-81 | 79 | 3 | 15 | 3 |
| Oct-81 | 76 | 5 | 17 | 2 |
| Mar-82 | 73 | 2 | 19 | 6 |
| Oct-82 | 72 | 4 | 21 | 3 |
| Apr-83 | 72 | 5 | 18 | 5 |
| Oct-83 | 76 | 5 | 17 | 2 |
| Apr-84 | 80 | 3 | 14 | 3 |
| Oct-84 | 80 | 4 | 15 | 1 |
| Apr-85 | 84 | 2 | 10 | 4 |
| Oct-85 | 80 | 3 | 14 | 3 |
| Mar-86 | 81 | 2 | 14 | 3 |
| Oct-86 | 81 | 2 | 16 | 1 |
| Apr-87 | 76 | 2 | 18 | 4 |
| Oct-87 | 87 | 1 | 9 | 3 |
| Apr-88 | 78 | 7 | 10 | 5 |
| Oct-88 | 79 | 3 | 15 | 3 |
| Apr-89 | 77 | 5 | 16 | 2 |
| Jul-89 | 66 | 5 | 23 | 6 |
| Oct-89 | 78 | 5 | 13 | 4 |
| Apr-90 | 72 | 8 | 16 | 4 |
| Oct-90 | 76 | 3 | 18 | 3 |
| Apr-91 | 83 | 4 | 10 | 3 |
| Oct-91 | 79 | 3 | 15 | 3 |
| Apr-92 | 78 | 5 | 16 | 1 |
| Sep-92 | 78 | 5 | 14 | 3 |
| Nov-92 | 76 | 6 | 15 | 3 |
| Apr-93 | 76 | 5 | 16 | 3 |
| Oct-93 | 72 | 6 | 19 | 3 |
| Apr-94 | 71 | 9 | 17 | 3 |
| Dec-94 | 80 | 5 | 13 | 2 |
| Apr-95 | 80 | 5 | 13 | 3 |
| Sep-95 | 74 | 5 | 18 | 3 |
| Apr-96 | 73 | 7 | 18 | 2 |
| Oct-96 | 73 | 7 | 16 | 3 |
| Apr-97 | 77 | 6 | 15 | 2 |
| Oct-97 | 71 | 10 | 16 | 3 |
| Apr-98 | 71 | 6 | 19 | 4 |
| Oct-98 | 77 | 6 | 15 | 3 |
| Apr-99 | 77 | 3 | 17 | 3 |

## The Netherlands

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 84 | 2 | 10 | 4 |
| Nov-79 | 78 | 3 | 15 | 4 |
| Apr-80 | 75 | 3 | 16 | 6 |
| Oct-80 | 75 | 5 | 14 | 6 |
| Apr-81 | 76 | 6 | 14 | 4 |
| Oct-81 | 75 | 3 | 15 | 7 |
| Mar-82 | 74 | 4 | 16 | 6 |
| Oct-82 | 74 | 5 | 15 | 6 |
| Apr-83 | 77 | 4 | 15 | 4 |
| Oct-83 | 80 | 4 | 10 | 6 |
| Apr-84 | 80 | 3 | 13 | 4 |
| Oct-84 | 79 | 4 | 13 | 4 |
| Apr-85 | 77 | 5 | 11 | 7 |
| Oct-85 | 84 | 3 | 10 | 3 |
| Mar-86 | 83 | 2 | 11 | 4 |
| Oct-86 | 77 | 2 | 14 | 7 |
| Apr-87 | 82 | 3 | 12 | 3 |
| Oct-87 | 83 | 3 | 10 | 4 |
| Apr-88 | 77 | 3 | 16 | 4 |
| Oct-88 | 79 | 3 | 12 | 6 |
| Apr-89 | 84 | 2 | 11 | 3 |
| Jul-89 | 79 | 4 | 13 | 4 |
| Oct-89 | 82 | 3 | 10 | 5 |
| Apr-90 | 82 | 3 | 10 | 5 |
| Oct-90 | 82 | 3 | 11 | 4 |
| Apr-91 | 89 | 2 | 7 | 2 |
| Oct-91 | 88 | 3 | 7 | 2 |
| Apr-92 | 85 | 4 | 8 | 3 |
| Sep-92 | 85 | 3 | 9 | 3 |
| Nov-92 | 82 | 4 | 11 | 3 |
| Apr-93 | 83 | 3 | 11 | 3 |
| Oct-93 | 80 | 5 | 12 | 3 |
| Apr-94 | 77 | 5 | 16 | 2 |
| Dec-94 | 77 | 4 | 15 | 4 |
| Apr-95 | 79 | 6 | 12 | 3 |
| Sep-95 | 80 | 5 | 13 | 3 |
| Apr-96 | 78 | 6 | 14 | 3 |
| Oct-96 | 74 | 5 | 15 | 5 |
| Apr-97 | 72 | 6 | 16 | 6 |
| Oct-97 | 76 | 9 | 12 | 3 |
| Apr-98 | 77 | 5 | 14 | 5 |
| Oct-98 | 75 | 6 | 16 | 3 |
| Apr-99 | 73 | 5 | 18 | 4 |

## United Kingdom

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 33 | 34 | 26 | 7 |
| Nov-79 | 29 | 41 | 25 | 5 |
| Apr-80 | 23 | 49 | 22 | 6 |
| Oct-80 | 24 | 49 | 24 | 3 |
| Apr-81 | 24 | 48 | 24 | 4 |
| Oct-81 | 27 | 41 | 27 | 5 |
| Mar-82 | 27 | 43 | 24 | 6 |
| Oct-82 | 29 | 40 | 26 | 5 |
| Apr-83 | 28 | 36 | 29 | 7 |
| Oct-83 | 36 | 28 | 30 | 6 |
| Apr-84 | 34 | 30 | 30 | 6 |
| Oct-84 | 38 | 33 | 25 | 4 |
| Apr-85 | 37 | 30 | 28 | 5 |
| Oct-85 | 38 | 30 | 28 | 4 |
| Mar-86 | 37 | 29 | 28 | 6 |
| Oct-86 | 42 | 27 | 26 | 5 |
| Apr-87 | 43 | 26 | 25 | 6 |
| Oct-87 | 46 | 24 | 25 | 5 |
| Apr-88 | 37 | 29 | 29 | 5 |
| Oct-88 | 48 | 21 | 27 | 4 |
| Apr-89 | 48 | 21 | 26 | 5 |
| Jul-89 | 53 | 14 | 23 | 10 |
| Oct-89 | 52 | 17 | 25 | 6 |
| Apr-90 | 52 | 19 | 24 | 5 |
| Oct-90 | 53 | 16 | 24 | 7 |
| Apr-91 | 57 | 13 | 26 | 4 |
| Oct-91 | 57 | 16 | 21 | 6 |
| Apr-92 | 54 | 13 | 25 | 8 |
| Sep-92 | 43 | 25 | 24 | 8 |
| Nov-92 | 44 | 23 | 26 | 7 |
| Apr-93 | 48 | 22 | 25 | 5 |
| Oct-93 | 43 | 22 | 30 | 5 |
| Apr-94 | 43 | 22 | 29 | 7 |
| Dec-94 | 43 | 22 | 28 | 7 |
| Apr-95 | 43 | 24 | 26 | 7 |
| Sep-95 | 42 | 24 | 29 | 6 |
| Apr-96 | 41 | 21 | 30 | 8 |
| Oct-96 | 36 | 28 | 26 | 11 |
| Apr-97 | 36 | 26 | 27 | 12 |
| Oct-97 | 36 | 23 | 29 | 13 |
| Apr-98 | 41 | 19 | 30 | 11 |
| Oct-98 | 37 | 22 | 29 | 12 |
| Apr-99 | 31 | 23 | 26 | 20 |

## European Union

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 59 | 12 | 21 | 8 |
| Nov-79 | 58 | 12 | 23 | 7 |
| Apr-80 | 55 | 15 | 22 | 8 |
| Oct-80 | 53 | 16 | 23 | 8 |
| Apr-81 | 50 | 17 | 25 | 8 |
| Oct-81 | 53 | 14 | 26 | 7 |
| Mar-82 | 53 | 14 | 26 | 8 |
| Oct-82 | 51 | 15 | 27 | 7 |
| Apr-83 | 54 | 13 | 25 | 8 |
| Oct-83 | 55 | 13 | 24 | 8 |
| Apr-84 | 55 | 11 | 27 | 7 |
| Oct-84 | 58 | 11 | 26 | 5 |
| Apr-85 | 57 | 12 | 24 | 7 |
| Oct-85 | 60 | 11 | 22 | 7 |
| Apr-86 | 62 | 9 | 20 | 9 |
| Oct-86 | 62 | 9 | 22 | 7 |
| Apr-87 | 60 | 11 | 21 | 8 |
| Oct-87 | 65 | 8 | 20 | 7 |
| Apr-88 | 58 | 11 | 25 | 6 |
| Oct-88 | 66 | 8 | 21 | 5 |
| Apr-89 | 65 | 8 | 21 | 6 |
| Jul-89 | 63 | 7 | 21 | 9 |
| Oct-89 | 65 | 8 | 20 | 7 |
| Apr-90 | 65 | 8 | 21 | 6 |
| Oct-90 | 69 | 7 | 18 | 6 |
| Apr-91 | 72 | 6 | 17 | 5 |
| Oct-91 | 69 | 8 | 17 | 6 |
| Apr-92 | 65 | 10 | 19 | 6 |
| Sep-92 | 60 | 12 | 23 | 5 |
| Nov-92 | 58 | 13 | 24 | 5 |
| Apr-93 | 60 | 12 | 23 | 5 |
| Oct-93 | 57 | 13 | 25 | 5 |
| Apr-94 | 54 | 13 | 27 | 5 |
| Dec-94 | 59 | 12 | 24 | 5 |
| Apr-95 | 56 | 14 | 24 | 6 |
| Sep-95 | 54 | 14 | 26 | 6 |
| Apr-96 | 53 | 14 | 28 | 6 |
| Oct-96 | 48 | 17 | 28 | 8 |
| Apr-97 | 46 | 15 | 30 | 9 |
| Oct-97 | 49 | 14 | 28 | 9 |
| Apr-98 | 51 | 12 | 28 | 9 |
| Oct-98 | 54 | 12 | 26 | 8 |
| Apr-99 | 49 | 12 | 27 | 12 |

**Question Three:** Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community?

a. benefited
b. not benefited
c. no reply

**Belgium**

| | a. | b. | c. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 59 | 6 | 35 |
| Apr-84 | 49 | 22 | 29 |
| Oct-84 | 48 | 28 | 24 |
| Apr-85 | 52 | 24 | 24 |
| Oct-85 | 56 | 23 | 21 |
| Mar-86 | 55 | 17 | 28 |
| Oct-86 | 70 | 15 | 15 |
| Apr-87 | 65 | 15 | 20 |
| Oct-87 | 64 | 17 | 19 |
| Apr-88 | 58 | 14 | 28 |
| Oct-88 | 64 | 18 | 18 |
| Apr-89 | 67 | 11 | 22 |
| Jul-89 | 53 | 15 | 32 |
| Oct-89 | 70 | 15 | 15 |
| Apr-90 | 67 | 14 | 19 |
| Oct-90 | 69 | 13 | 18 |
| Apr-91 | 68 | 13 | 19 |
| Oct-91 | 63 | 15 | 22 |
| Apr-92 | 61 | 16 | 23 |
| Sep-92 | 57 | 19 | 24 |
| Nov-92 | 56 | 24 | 20 |
| Apr-93 | 58 | 22 | 20 |
| Oct-93 | 48 | 29 | 23 |
| Apr-94 | 49 | 27 | 24 |
| Dec-94 | 51 | 25 | 23 |
| Apr-95 | 57 | 22 | 21 |
| Sep-95 | 45 | 35 | 21 |
| Apr-96 | 41 | 36 | 23 |
| Oct-96 | 40 | 35 | 26 |
| Apr-97 | 36 | 40 | 24 |
| Oct-97 | 36 | 41 | 23 |
| Apr-98 | 44 | 32 | 24 |
| Oct-98 | 44 | 32 | 24 |
| Apr-99 | 44 | 32 | 24 |

**Denmark**

| | a. | b. | c. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 51 | 31 | 18 |
| Apr-84 | 42 | 34 | 24 |
| Oct-84 | 44 | 34 | 22 |
| Apr-85 | 44 | 34 | 22 |
| Oct-85 | 49 | 29 | 22 |
| Mar-86 | 61 | 22 | 17 |
| Oct-86 | 56 | 27 | 17 |
| Apr-87 | 54 | 29 | 17 |
| Oct-87 | 53 | 29 | 18 |
| Apr-88 | 51 | 32 | 17 |
| Oct-88 | 54 | 32 | 14 |
| Apr-89 | 52 | 30 | 18 |
| Jul-89 | 53 | 29 | 18 |
| Oct-89 | 53 | 33 | 14 |
| Apr-90 | 58 | 28 | 14 |
| Oct-90 | 64 | 25 | 11 |
| Apr-91 | 69 | 21 | 10 |
| Oct-91 | 66 | 24 | 10 |
| Apr-92 | 67 | 21 | 12 |
| Sep-92 | 73 | 16 | 11 |
| Nov-92 | 70 | 21 | 9 |
| Apr-93 | 66 | 24 | 10 |
| Oct-93 | 65 | 25 | 10 |
| Apr-94 | 64 | 26 | 10 |
| Dec-94 | 61 | 27 | 12 |
| Apr-95 | 63 | 26 | 11 |
| Sep-95 | 59 | 29 | 12 |
| Apr-96 | 60 | 26 | 14 |
| Oct-96 | 55 | 32 | 13 |
| Apr-97 | 61 | 26 | 13 |
| Oct-97 | 67 | 22 | 11 |
| Apr-98 | 65 | 19 | 16 |
| Oct-98 | 70 | 20 | 10 |
| Apr-99 | 62 | 23 | 15 |

**France**

| | a. | b. | c. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 54 | 21 | 25 |
| Apr-84 | 50 | 24 | 26 |
| Oct-84 | 47 | 28 | 25 |
| Apr-85 | 53 | 26 | 21 |
| Oct-85 | 53 | 26 | 21 |
| Mar-86 | 50 | 24 | 26 |
| Oct-86 | 53 | 25 | 22 |
| Apr-87 | 60 | 18 | 22 |
| Oct-87 | 59 | 21 | 20 |
| Apr-88 | 56 | 23 | 21 |
| Oct-88 | 58 | 25 | 17 |
| Apr-89 | 59 | 22 | 19 |
| Jul-89 | 50 | 23 | 27 |
| Oct-89 | 58 | 21 | 21 |
| Apr-90 | 57 | 24 | 19 |
| Oct-90 | 57 | 23 | 20 |
| Apr-91 | 57 | 25 | 18 |
| Oct-91 | 51 | 29 | 20 |
| Apr-92 | 49 | 32 | 19 |
| Sep-92 | 48 | 31 | 21 |
| Nov-92 | 45 | 33 | 22 |
| Apr-93 | 45 | 36 | 19 |
| Oct-93 | 40 | 39 | 21 |
| Apr-94 | 39 | 40 | 22 |
| Dec-94 | 42 | 36 | 22 |
| Apr-95 | 44 | 38 | 18 |
| Sep-95 | 39 | 39 | 22 |
| Apr-96 | 41 | 36 | 23 |
| Oct-96 | 44 | 35 | 21 |
| Apr-97 | 44 | 35 | 21 |
| Oct-97 | 44 | 37 | 20 |
| Apr-98 | 46 | 31 | 23 |
| Oct-98 | 53 | 27 | 21 |
| Apr-99 | 44 | 27 | 28 |

Germany

| | a. | b. | c. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 49 | 15 | 36 |
| Apr-84 | 39 | 24 | 37 |
| Oct-84 | 46 | 35 | 19 |
| Apr-85 | 45 | 35 | 18 |
| Oct-85 | 53 | 31 | 16 |
| Mar-86 | 53 | 25 | 22 |
| Oct-86 | 52 | 29 | 19 |
| Apr-87 | 46 | 37 | 17 |
| Oct-87 | 54 | 27 | 19 |
| Apr-88 | 52 | 31 | 17 |
| Oct-88 | 55 | 28 | 17 |
| Apr-89 | 48 | 35 | 17 |
| Jul-89 | 49 | 33 | 18 |
| Oct-89 | 56 | 26 | 18 |
| Apr-90 | 53 | 29 | 18 |
| Oct-90 | 61 | 21 | 18 |
| Apr-91 | 55 | 29 | 16 |
| Oct-91 | 52 | 30 | 18 |
| Apr-92 | 48 | 35 | 17 |
| Sep-92 | 47 | 37 | 16 |
| Nov-92 | 46 | 36 | 18 |
| Apr-93 | 45 | 38 | 17 |
| Oct-93 | 42 | 39 | 19 |
| Apr-94 | 41 | 38 | 21 |
| Dec-94 | 50 | 31 | 20 |
| Apr-95 | 47 | 34 | 19 |
| Sep-95 | 40 | 36 | 25 |
| Apr-96 | 38 | 41 | 21 |
| Oct-96 | 33 | 43 | 24 |
| Apr-97 | 34 | 43 | 23 |
| Oct-97 | 33 | 44 | 22 |
| Apr-98 | 68 | 19 | 13 |
| Oct-98 | 39 | 36 | 25 |
| Apr-99 | 35 | 39 | 26 |

Greece

| | a. | b. | c. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 44 | 25 | 31 |
| Apr-84 | 44 | 35 | 21 |
| Oct-84 | 51 | 28 | 21 |
| Apr-85 | 49 | 26 | 25 |
| Oct-85 | 42 | 34 | 24 |
| Mar-86 | 50 | 23 | 27 |
| Oct-86 | 60 | 20 | 20 |
| Apr-87 | 58 | 29 | 13 |
| Oct-87 | 64 | 19 | 17 |
| Apr-88 | 55 | 20 | 25 |
| Oct-88 | 68 | 15 | 17 |
| Apr-89 | 72 | 11 | 17 |
| Jul-89 | 73 | 8 | 19 |
| Oct-89 | 76 | 10 | 14 |
| Apr-90 | 79 | 10 | 11 |
| Oct-90 | 78 | 9 | 13 |
| Apr-91 | 76 | 12 | 12 |
| Oct-91 | 73 | 14 | 13 |
| Apr-92 | 73 | 13 | 14 |
| Sep-92 | 70 | 17 | 13 |
| Nov-92 | 73 | 15 | 12 |
| Apr-93 | 72 | 17 | 11 |
| Oct-93 | 79 | 9 | 12 |
| Apr-94 | 69 | 18 | 14 |
| Dec-94 | 72 | 17 | 11 |
| Apr-95 | 72 | 19 | 10 |
| Sep-95 | 72 | 18 | 11 |
| Apr-96 | 65 | 24 | 11 |
| Oct-96 | 66 | 21 | 14 |
| Apr-97 | 68 | 19 | 13 |
| Oct-97 | 70 | 17 | 13 |
| Apr-98 | 68 | 19 | 13 |
| Oct-98 | 76 | 17 | 7 |
| Apr-99 | 67 | 18 | 15 |

Ireland

| | a. | b. | c. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 56 | 28 | 16 |
| Apr-84 | 59 | 29 | 12 |
| Oct-84 | 61 | 28 | 11 |
| Apr-85 | 62 | 27 | 11 |
| Oct-85 | 67 | 24 | 9 |
| Mar-86 | 66 | 22 | 12 |
| Oct-86 | 71 | 20 | 9 |
| Apr-87 | 65 | 19 | 16 |
| Oct-87 | 79 | 12 | 9 |
| Apr-88 | 74 | 16 | 10 |
| Oct-88 | 79 | 14 | 7 |
| Apr-89 | 82 | 9 | 9 |
| Jul-89 | 76 | 10 | 14 |
| Oct-89 | 75 | 14 | 11 |
| Apr-90 | 80 | 12 | 8 |
| Oct-90 | 85 | 10 | 5 |
| Apr-91 | 83 | 11 | 6 |
| Oct-91 | 80 | 13 | 7 |
| Apr-92 | 81 | 12 | 7 |
| Sep-92 | 77 | 15 | 8 |
| Nov-92 | 80 | 13 | 7 |
| Apr-93 | 82 | 11 | 7 |
| Oct-93 | 80 | 13 | 7 |
| Apr-94 | 81 | 11 | 8 |
| Dec-94 | 89 | 5 | 5 |
| Apr-95 | 87 | 7 | 7 |
| Sep-95 | 80 | 7 | 13 |
| Apr-96 | 85 | 5 | 9 |
| Oct-96 | 86 | 5 | 9 |
| Apr-97 | 88 | 3 | 9 |
| Oct-97 | 88 | 4 | 8 |
| Apr-98 | 85 | 5 | 10 |
| Oct-98 | 85 | 5 | 10 |
| Apr-99 | 86 | 3 | 11 |

## Italy

| | a. | b. | c. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 69 | 14 | 17 |
| Apr-84 | 58 | 20 | 22 |
| Oct-84 | 63 | 23 | 14 |
| Apr-85 | 65 | 19 | 16 |
| Oct-85 | 70 | 16 | 14 |
| Mar-86 | 63 | 15 | 22 |
| Oct-86 | 69 | 17 | 14 |
| Apr-87 | 64 | 17 | 19 |
| Oct-87 | 72 | 13 | 15 |
| Apr-88 | 73 | 14 | 13 |
| Oct-88 | 75 | 12 | 13 |
| Apr-89 | 72 | 12 | 16 |
| Jul-89 | 68 | 13 | 19 |
| Oct-89 | 67 | 12 | 21 |
| Apr-90 | 69 | 11 | 20 |
| Oct-90 | 65 | 15 | 20 |
| Apr-91 | 64 | 14 | 22 |
| Oct-91 | 60 | 16 | 24 |
| Apr-92 | 61 | 16 | 23 |
| Sep-92 | 54 | 24 | 22 |
| Nov-92 | 56 | 23 | 21 |
| Apr-93 | 53 | 24 | 23 |
| Oct-93 | 52 | 23 | 25 |
| Apr-94 | 55 | 23 | 22 |
| Dec-94 | 54 | 18 | 28 |
| Apr-95 | 52 | 24 | 24 |
| Sep-95 | 52 | 22 | 26 |
| Apr-96 | 49 | 25 | 26 |
| Oct-96 | 51 | 28 | 22 |
| Apr-97 | 41 | 35 | 24 |
| Oct-97 | 54 | 22 | 25 |
| Apr-98 | 57 | 17 | 26 |
| Oct-98 | 51 | 27 | 22 |
| Apr-99 | 51 | 19 | 30 |

## Luxembourg

| | a. | b. | c. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 74 | 12 | 14 |
| Apr-84 | 73 | 14 | 13 |
| Oct-84 | 72 | 16 | 12 |
| Apr-85 | 73 | 13 | 14 |
| Oct-85 | 69 | 15 | 16 |
| Mar-86 | 74 | 10 | 16 |
| Oct-86 | 71 | 18 | 11 |
| Apr-87 | 67 | 17 | 16 |
| Oct-87 | 84 | 6 | 10 |
| Apr-88 | 68 | 15 | 17 |
| Oct-88 | 67 | 16 | 17 |
| Apr-89 | 73 | 14 | 13 |
| Jul-89 | 61 | 20 | 19 |
| Oct-89 | 71 | 15 | 14 |
| Apr-90 | 68 | 19 | 13 |
| Oct-90 | 71 | 16 | 13 |
| Apr-91 | 73 | 12 | 15 |
| Oct-91 | 73 | 16 | 11 |
| Apr-92 | 72 | 14 | 14 |
| Sep-92 | 67 | 18 | 15 |
| Nov-92 | 69 | 17 | 14 |
| Apr-93 | 69 | 19 | 12 |
| Oct-93 | 69 | 22 | 9 |
| Apr-94 | 67 | 19 | 14 |
| Dec-94 | 72 | 18 | 11 |
| Apr-95 | 73 | 16 | 11 |
| Sep-95 | 66 | 19 | 15 |
| Apr-96 | 63 | 18 | 18 |
| Oct-96 | 64 | 21 | 16 |
| Apr-97 | 70 | 16 | 14 |
| Oct-97 | 65 | 19 | 16 |
| Apr-98 | 63 | 23 | 14 |
| Oct-98 | 69 | 14 | 18 |
| Apr-99 | 65 | 15 | 20 |

## The Netherlands

| | a. | b. | c. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 78 | 11 | 11 |
| Apr-84 | 67 | 17 | 16 |
| Oct-84 | 64 | 19 | 17 |
| Apr-85 | 63 | 18 | 19 |
| Oct-85 | 67 | 15 | 18 |
| Mar-86 | 68 | 14 | 18 |
| Oct-86 | 67 | 19 | 14 |
| Apr-87 | 69 | 15 | 16 |
| Oct-87 | 74 | 12 | 14 |
| Apr-88 | 63 | 16 | 21 |
| Oct-88 | 68 | 14 | 18 |
| Apr-89 | 74 | 12 | 14 |
| Jul-89 | 69 | 13 | 18 |
| Oct-89 | 74 | 10 | 16 |
| Apr-90 | 72 | 13 | 15 |
| Oct-90 | 75 | 13 | 12 |
| Apr-91 | 77 | 10 | 13 |
| Oct-91 | 74 | 12 | 14 |
| Apr-92 | 72 | 14 | 14 |
| Sep-92 | 72 | 11 | 17 |
| Nov-92 | 70 | 14 | 16 |
| Apr-93 | 70 | 16 | 14 |
| Oct-93 | 68 | 17 | 15 |
| Apr-94 | 71 | 13 | 17 |
| Dec-94 | 69 | 17 | 14 |
| Apr-95 | 68 | 16 | 16 |
| Sep-95 | 66 | 20 | 15 |
| Apr-96 | 64 | 20 | 16 |
| Oct-96 | 69 | 16 | 15 |
| Apr-97 | 69 | 17 | 15 |
| Oct-97 | 64 | 25 | 11 |
| Apr-98 | 67 | 16 | 17 |
| Oct-98 | 67 | 22 | 12 |
| Apr-99 | 67 | 19 | 14 |

United Kingdom

| | a. | b. | c. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 32 | 57 | 11 |
| Apr-84 | 32 | 56 | 12 |
| Oct-84 | 32 | 57 | 11 |
| Apr-85 | 31 | 55 | 11 |
| Oct-85 | 34 | 53 | 13 |
| Mar-86 | 33 | 50 | 17 |
| Oct-86 | 36 | 48 | 16 |
| Apr-87 | 39 | 46 | 15 |
| Oct-87 | 49 | 42 | 9 |
| Apr-88 | 39 | 47 | 14 |
| Oct-88 | 47 | 40 | 13 |
| Apr-89 | 44 | 42 | 14 |
| Jul-89 | 47 | 34 | 19 |
| Oct-89 | 47 | 38 | 15 |
| Apr-90 | 46 | 38 | 16 |
| Oct-90 | 46 | 36 | 18 |
| Apr-91 | 47 | 37 | 16 |
| Oct-91 | 45 | 38 | 17 |
| Apr-92 | 45 | 37 | 18 |
| Sep-92 | 31 | 52 | 17 |
| Nov-92 | 32 | 53 | 15 |
| Apr-93 | 37 | 50 | 13 |
| Oct-93 | 33 | 49 | 18 |
| Apr-94 | 41 | 43 | 16 |
| Dec-94 | 38 | 45 | 17 |
| Apr-95 | 38 | 44 | 17 |
| Sep-95 | 40 | 43 | 18 |
| Apr-96 | 33 | 46 | 21 |
| Oct-96 | 34 | 47 | 19 |
| Apr-97 | 36 | 42 | 22 |
| Oct-97 | 37 | 43 | 20 |
| Apr-98 | 40 | 39 | 22 |
| Oct-98 | 37 | 42 | 21 |
| Apr-99 | 31 | 37 | 32 |

European Union

| | a. | b. | c. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 52 | 25 | 23 |
| Apr-84 | 46 | 30 | 24 |
| Oct-84 | 48 | 34 | 18 |
| Apr-85 | 50 | 32 | 18 |
| Oct-85 | 53 | 30 | 17 |
| Apr-86 | 46 | 32 | 22 |
| Oct-86 | 51 | 31 | 18 |
| Apr-87 | 49 | 33 | 18 |
| Oct-87 | 56 | 28 | 16 |
| Apr-88 | 52 | 30 | 18 |
| Oct-88 | 56 | 28 | 16 |
| Apr-89 | 55 | 28 | 17 |
| Jul-89 | 52 | 25 | 23 |
| Oct-89 | 59 | 22 | 19 |
| Apr-90 | 59 | 24 | 17 |
| Oct-90 | 59 | 23 | 18 |
| Apr-91 | 59 | 24 | 17 |
| Oct-91 | 56 | 25 | 19 |
| Apr-92 | 53 | 29 | 18 |
| Sep-92 | 49 | 33 | 18 |
| Nov-92 | 49 | 34 | 17 |
| Apr-93 | 48 | 35 | 17 |
| Oct-93 | 45 | 35 | 20 |
| Apr-94 | 47 | 34 | 19 |
| Dec-94 | 48 | 32 | 20 |
| Apr-95 | 46 | 36 | 18 |
| Sep-95 | 44 | 35 | 21 |
| Apr-96 | 43 | 36 | 21 |
| Oct-96 | 42 | 37 | 21 |
| Apr-97 | 41 | 36 | 22 |
| Oct-97 | 44 | 35 | 21 |
| Apr-98 | 46 | 32 | 22 |
| Oct-98 | 49 | 31 | 20 |
| Apr-99 | 44 | 29 | 27 |

**Question Four:** On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union?

a. very satisfied
b. fairly satisfied
c. not very satisfied
d. not at all satisfied
e. no reply

## Belgium

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-93 | 3 | 48 | 30 | 9 | 10 |
| Oct-93 | 2 | 49 | 30 | 10 | 8 |
| Apr-94 | 4 | 48 | 32 | 8 | 9 |
| Dec-94 | 4 | 51 | 24 | 10 | 12 |
| Apr-95 | 5 | 46 | 26 | 10 | 12 |
| Oct-97 | 2 | 28 | 33 | 23 | 14 |
| Apr-98 | 1 | 28 | 34 | 22 | 16 |
| Apr-99 | 7 | 41 | 24 | 12 | 16 |

## Germany

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-93 | 3 | 40 | 38 | 10 | 10 |
| Oct-93 | 3 | 44 | 37 | 9 | 7 |
| Apr-94 | 1 | 40 | 43 | 8 | 8 |
| Dec-94 | 4 | 35 | 41 | 13 | 8 |
| Apr-95 | 6 | 39 | 36 | 11 | 8 |
| Oct-97 | 1 | 27 | 39 | 15 | 18 |
| Apr-98 | 2 | 30 | 37 | 12 | 17 |
| Apr-99 | 6 | 34 | 31 | 11 | 17 |

## Denmark

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-93 | 4 | 45 | 36 | 12 | 3 |
| Oct-93 | 3 | 46 | 36 | 13 | 2 |
| Apr-94 | 3 | 43 | 33 | 13 | 9 |
| Dec-94 | 3 | 38 | 40 | 14 | 6 |
| Apr-95 | 4 | 43 | 34 | 12 | 8 |
| Oct-97 | 3 | 28 | 42 | 16 | 12 |
| Apr-98 | 5 | 35 | 35 | 13 | 12 |
| Apr-99 | 3 | 28 | 44 | 16 | 10 |

## Greece

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-93 | 8 | 37 | 26 | 11 | 18 |
| Oct-93 | 9 | 41 | 28 | 7 | 14 |
| Apr-94 | 3 | 25 | 47 | 10 | 15 |
| Dec-94 | 2 | 31 | 40 | 12 | 15 |
| Apr-95 | 3 | 32 | 34 | 12 | 18 |
| Oct-97 | 5 | 34 | 36 | 12 | 13 |
| Apr-98 | 5 | 34 | 32 | 15 | 13 |
| Apr-99 | 4 | 37 | 31 | 15 | 12 |

## France

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-93 | 2 | 38 | 37 | 13 | 11 |
| Oct-93 | 2 | 45 | 34 | 11 | 8 |
| Apr-94 | 2 | 39 | 38 | 11 | 11 |
| Dec-94 | 2 | 39 | 35 | 13 | 11 |
| Apr-95 | 2 | 37 | 34 | 17 | 9 |
| Oct-97 | 2 | 38 | 33 | 13 | 14 |
| Apr-98 | 3 | 31 | 34 | 17 | 16 |
| Apr-99 | 4 | 39 | 28 | 12 | 17 |

## Ireland

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-93 | 11 | 51 | 14 | 7 | 16 |
| Oct-93 | 7 | 52 | 17 | 5 | 18 |
| Apr-94 | 6 | 58 | 13 | 6 | 17 |
| Dec-94 | 9 | 58 | 13 | 3 | 17 |
| Apr-95 | 6 | 57 | 14 | 4 | 19 |
| Oct-97 | 12 | 51 | 10 | 3 | 24 |
| Apr-98 | 9 | 53 | 10 | 4 | 25 |
| Apr-99 | 15 | 45 | 9 | 3 | 27 |

## Italy

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-93 | 1 | 31 | 39 | 15 | 14 |
| Oct-93 | 2 | 32 | 38 | 12 | 16 |
| Apr-94 | 2 | 31 | 42 | 11 | 14 |
| Dec-94 | 2 | 39 | 33 | 10 | 15 |
| Apr-95 | 2 | 36 | 35 | 12 | 16 |
| Oct-97 | 4 | 32 | 31 | 8 | 25 |
| Apr-98 | 2 | 33 | 26 | 9 | 30 |
| Apr-99 | 3 | 40 | 24 | 8 | 25 |

## Luxembourg

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-93 | 4 | 55 | 24 | 3 | 15 |
| Oct-93 | 5 | 55 | 28 | 6 | 5 |
| Apr-94 | 7 | 52 | 24 | 5 | 12 |
| Dec-94 | 8 | 52 | 24 | 5 | 11 |
| Apr-95 | 7 | 52 | 24 | 6 | 11 |
| Oct-97 | 5 | 45 | 30 | 7 | 14 |
| Apr-98 | 19 | 45 | 24 | 5 | 8 |
| Apr-99 | 11 | 49 | 21 | 4 | 15 |

## The Netherlands

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-93 | 1 | 48 | 37 | 6 | 8 |
| Oct-93 | 2 | 48 | 37 | 9 | 4 |
| Apr-94 | 1 | 45 | 40 | 7 | 7 |
| Dec-94 | 1 | 38 | 41 | 12 | 8 |
| Apr-95 | 2 | 43 | 36 | 10 | 9 |
| Oct-97 | 2 | 34 | 39 | 11 | 15 |
| Apr-98 | 2 | 40 | 35 | 8 | 15 |
| Apr-99 | 4 | 39 | 33 | 8 | 16 |

## United Kingdom

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-93 | 2 | 36 | 32 | 15 | 15 |
| Oct-93 | 2 | 40 | 27 | 9 | 22 |
| Apr-94 | 2 | 38 | 27 | 12 | 22 |
| Dec-94 | 1 | 28 | 33 | 15 | 24 |
| Apr-95 | 1 | 29 | 32 | 15 | 23 |
| Oct-97 | 3 | 31 | 24 | 12 | 29 |
| Apr-98 | 4 | 29 | 23 | 15 | 24 |
| Apr-99 | 5 | 27 | 20 | 17 | 31 |

## European Union

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-93 | 3 | 38 | 35 | 12 | 12 |
| Oct-93 | 3 | 42 | 34 | 9 | 12 |
| Apr-94 | 2 | 38 | 37 | 10 | 13 |
| Dec-94 | 3 | 37 | 35 | 12 | 14 |
| Apr-95 | 3 | 35 | 34 | 14 | 14 |
| Oct-97 | 3 | 32 | 32 | 12 | 21 |
| Apr-98 | 3 | 32 | 31 | 12 | 21 |
| Apr-99 | 6 | 36 | 27 | 11 | 20 |

**Question Five:** On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not al all satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country)?

a. very satisfied
b. fairly satisfied
c. not very satisfied
d. not at all satisfied
e. no reply

**Belgium**

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 4 | 39 | 29 | 14 | 14 |
| Nov-79 | 8 | 39 | 25 | 12 | 16 |
| Oct-80 | 4 | 30 | 32 | 19 | 15 |
| Oct-81 | 7 | 28 | 31 | 18 | 16 |
| Mar-82 | 7 | 37 | 32 | 17 | 11 |
| Oct-82 | 4 | 40 | 29 | 14 | 13 |
| Apr-83 | 4 | 39 | 27 | 17 | 13 |
| Oct-83 | 5 | 48 | 27 | 11 | 9 |
| Apr-84 | 6 | 38 | 34 | 17 | 5 |
| Oct-84 | 4 | 43 | 33 | 15 | 5 |
| Apr-85 | 5 | 47 | 27 | 14 | 7 |
| Oct-85 | 7 | 51 | 24 | 12 | 6 |
| Mar-86 | 7 | 43 | 25 | 18 | 7 |
| Oct-86 | 3 | 45 | 33 | 14 | 5 |
| Apr-87 | 8 | 45 | 27 | 13 | 7 |
| Oct-87 | 6 | 39 | 30 | 17 | 8 |
| Apr-88 | 9 | 46 | 27 | 11 | 7 |
| Oct-88 | 5 | 43 | 41 | 8 | 3 |
| Apr-89 | 9 | 49 | 23 | 12 | 7 |
| Jul-89 | 8 | 45 | 22 | 7 | 18 |
| Oct-89 | 8 | 55 | 25 | 9 | 3 |
| Apr-90 | 11 | 55 | 20 | 10 | 4 |
| Oct-90 | 5 | 51 | 26 | 12 | 6 |
| Apr-91 | 11 | 54 | 23 | 8 | 4 |
| Oct-91 | 7 | 46 | 30 | 12 | 5 |
| Apr-92 | 6 | 50 | 26 | 12 | 6 |
| Sep-92 | 6 | 47 | 28 | 14 | 5 |
| Apr-93 | 4 | 46 | 32 | 14 | 4 |
| Oct-93 | 4 | 44 | 31 | 17 | 4 |
| Apr-94 | 4 | 49 | 30 | 13 | 4 |
| Dec-94 | 6 | 53 | 26 | 11 | 3 |
| Apr-95 | 8 | 47 | 30 | 11 | 4 |
| Oct-97 | 2 | 26 | 34 | 32 | 5 |
| Apr-98 | 1 | 28 | 37 | 30 | 5 |
| Apr-99 | 9 | 40 | 32 | 14 | 5 |

## Denmark

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 9 | 53 | 24 | 8 | 6 |
| Apr-80 | 17 | 54 | 18 | 6 | 5 |
| Apr-81 | 13 | 47 | 27 | 8 | 5 |
| Oct-81 | 17 | 50 | 22 | 7 | 4 |
| Mar-82 | 11 | 50 | 27 | 8 | 4 |
| Oct-82 | 12 | 45 | 29 | 8 | 6 |
| Apr-83 | 16 | 54 | 20 | 4 | 6 |
| Oct-83 | 21 | 50 | 19 | 3 | 7 |
| Apr-84 | 20 | 48 | 21 | 6 | 5 |
| Oct-84 | 20 | 50 | 19 | 5 | 6 |
| Apr-85 | 19 | 49 | 21 | 7 | 4 |
| Oct-85 | 23 | 49 | 17 | 4 | 7 |
| Mar-86 | 28 | 46 | 17 | 5 | 4 |
| Oct-86 | 18 | 48 | 21 | 1 | 6 |
| Apr-87 | 22 | 48 | 20 | 6 | 4 |
| Oct-87 | 16 | 53 | 24 | 5 | 2 |
| Apr-88 | 17 | 57 | 21 | 3 | 2 |
| Oct-88 | 13 | 40 | 37 | 8 | 2 |
| Apr-89 | 14 | 56 | 22 | 6 | 2 |
| Jul-89 | 13 | 54 | 25 | 5 | 3 |
| Oct-89 | 12 | 49 | 30 | 7 | 2 |
| Apr-90 | 21 | 54 | 18 | 7 | 0 |
| Oct-90 | 15 | 55 | 22 | 7 | 1 |
| Apr-91 | 22 | 60 | 13 | 4 | 1 |
| Oct-91 | 17 | 56 | 20 | 6 | 1 |
| Apr-92 | 22 | 56 | 17 | 5 | 0 |
| Nov-92 | 22 | 58 | 16 | 3 | 1 |
| Apr-93 | 21 | 60 | 14 | 4 | 1 |
| Oct-93 | 19 | 59 | 19 | 3 | 0 |
| Apr-94 | 17 | 61 | 16 | 5 | 2 |
| Dec-94 | 18 | 64 | 15 | 2 | 0 |
| Apr-97 | 19 | 64 | 14 | 2 | 1 |
| Oct-97 | 15 | 62 | 19 | 3 | 1 |
| Oct-98 | 27 | 57 | 14 | 2 | 1 |
| Apr-99 | 22 | 59 | 15 | 3 | 1 |

## France

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 4 | 37 | 30 | 17 | 12 |
| Nov-79 | 3 | 38 | 32 | 15 | 12 |
| Oct-80 | 3 | 33 | 32 | 18 | 12 |
| Oct-81 | 5 | 48 | 27 | 7 | 13 |
| Mar-82 | 2 | 42 | 30 | 12 | 14 |
| Oct-82 | 5 | 40 | 32 | 14 | 9 |
| Apr-83 | 3 | 33 | 37 | 17 | 10 |
| Oct-83 | 7 | 39 | 30 | 13 | 11 |
| Apr-84 | 4 | 36 | 34 | 18 | 8 |
| Oct-84 | 4 | 34 | 38 | 14 | 10 |
| Apr-85 | 5 | 39 | 35 | 13 | 8 |
| Oct-85 | 3 | 36 | 33 | 18 | 10 |
| Mar-86 | 4 | 45 | 28 | 11 | 12 |
| Oct-86 | 6 | 44 | 28 | 10 | 12 |
| Apr-87 | 4 | 48 | 31 | 10 | 7 |
| Oct-87 | 3 | 39 | 34 | 15 | 9 |
| Apr-88 | 5 | 46 | 32 | 10 | 7 |
| Oct-88 | 8 | 34 | 43 | 10 | 5 |
| Apr-89 | 4 | 50 | 33 | 9 | 4 |
| Jul-89 | 7 | 49 | 29 | 9 | 6 |
| Oct-89 | 5 | 49 | 28 | 12 | 6 |
| Apr-90 | 5 | 48 | 28 | 12 | 7 |
| Oct-90 | 5 | 37 | 31 | 19 | 8 |
| Apr-91 | 7 | 54 | 22 | 12 | 5 |
| Oct-91 | 3 | 40 | 36 | 17 | 4 |
| Apr-92 | 2 | 38 | 34 | 21 | 5 |
| Sep-92 | 4 | 43 | 32 | 17 | 4 |
| Apr-93 | 3 | 38 | 36 | 20 | 3 |
| Oct-93 | 4 | 42 | 35 | 15 | 4 |
| Apr-94 | 4 | 43 | 33 | 16 | 4 |
| Dec-94 | 4 | 54 | 28 | 12 | 2 |
| Apr-95 | 4 | 44 | 36 | 15 | 2 |
| Oct-97 | 3 | 45 | 35 | 14 | 3 |
| Apr-98 | 4 | 35 | 39 | 17 | 4 |
| Apr-99 | 7 | 52 | 27 | 10 | 4 |

Germany

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 10 | 70 | 13 | 2 | 5 |
| Nov-79 | 12 | 68 | 12 | 2 | 6 |
| Oct-80 | 9 | 64 | 17 | 4 | 6 |
| Oct-81 | 11 | 59 | 18 | 5 | 7 |
| Mar-82 | 12 | 56 | 21 | 7 | 4 |
| Oct-82 | 8 | 59 | 22 | 4 | 7 |
| Apr-83 | 12 | 59 | 18 | 4 | 7 |
| Oct-83 | 7 | 59 | 21 | 3 | 10 |
| Apr-84 | 12 | 59 | 19 | 3 | 7 |
| Oct-84 | 11 | 62 | 21 | 5 | 1 |
| Apr-85 | 13 | 60 | 19 | 5 | 3 |
| Oct-85 | 10 | 59 | 22 | 4 | 5 |
| Mar-86 | 11 | 69 | 15 | 2 | 3 |
| Oct-86 | 12 | 59 | 22 | 4 | 3 |
| Apr-87 | 10 | 65 | 19 | 2 | 4 |
| Oct-87 | 6 | 62 | 25 | 4 | 3 |
| Apr-88 | 13 | 64 | 18 | 2 | 3 |
| Oct-88 | 18 | 50 | 28 | 2 | 2 |
| Apr-89 | 10 | 66 | 18 | 4 | 2 |
| Jul-89 | 13 | 65 | 15 | 4 | 3 |
| Oct-89 | 13 | 65 | 17 | 3 | 2 |
| Apr-90 | 15 | 66 | 15 | 2 | 2 |
| Oct-90 | 16 | 59 | 17 | 5 | 3 |
| Apr-91 | 11 | 52 | 28 | 8 | 1 |
| Oct-91 | 9 | 52 | 30 | 6 | 3 |
| Apr-92 | 9 | 52 | 31 | 6 | 2 |
| Sep-92 | 7 | 49 | 34 | 8 | 2 |
| Apr-93 | 6 | 45 | 36 | 10 | 3 |
| Oct-93 | 6 | 45 | 36 | 11 | 2 |
| Apr-94 | 6 | 46 | 37 | 9 | 2 |
| Dec-94 | 9 | 51 | 31 | 7 | 2 |
| Apr-95 | 12 | 51 | 28 | 7 | 1 |
| Oct-97 | 5 | 40 | 37 | 15 | 3 |
| Apr-98 | 6 | 44 | 37 | 11 | 2 |
| Apr-99 | 15 | 52 | 24 | 6 | 4 |

Greece

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct-80 | 20 | 33 | 23 | 22 | 2 |
| Oct-81 | 24 | 28 | 18 | 23 | 7 |
| Mar-82 | 19 | 41 | 21 | 11 | 8 |
| Oct-82 | 23 | 35 | 25 | 9 | 8 |
| Apr-83 | 19 | 40 | 21 | 13 | 7 |
| Oct-83 | 24 | 37 | 20 | 11 | 8 |
| Apr-84 | 19 | 41 | 21 | 13 | 6 |
| Oct-84 | 18 | 39 | 24 | 13 | 6 |
| Apr-85 | 19 | 40 | 20 | 13 | 8 |
| Oct-85 | 19 | 32 | 26 | 16 | 7 |
| Mar-86 | 18 | 38 | 17 | 20 | 7 |
| Oct-86 | 23 | 34 | 22 | 17 | 4 |
| Apr-87 | 20 | 41 | 20 | 15 | 4 |
| Oct-87 | 11 | 38 | 23 | 21 | 7 |
| Apr-88 | 14 | 37 | 20 | 24 | 5 |
| Oct-88 | 16 | 36 | 32 | 10 | 6 |
| Apr-89 | 17 | 35 | 20 | 22 | 6 |
| Jul-89 | 23 | 30 | 19 | 20 | 8 |
| Oct-89 | 11 | 37 | 25 | 23 | 4 |
| Apr-90 | 7 | 27 | 25 | 38 | 3 |
| Oct-90 | 8 | 36 | 34 | 19 | 3 |
| Apr-91 | 5 | 32 | 35 | 25 | 3 |
| Oct-91 | 5 | 29 | 39 | 23 | 4 |
| Apr-92 | 6 | 30 | 39 | 21 | 4 |
| Sep-92 | 6 | 30 | 41 | 20 | 3 |
| Apr-93 | 6 | 28 | 38 | 27 | 1 |
| Oct-93 | 5 | 34 | 41 | 18 | 2 |
| Apr-94 | 4 | 28 | 49 | 17 | 3 |
| Dec-94 | 3 | 28 | 49 | 18 | 1 |
| Apr-95 | 4 | 26 | 44 | 25 | 1 |
| Oct-97 | 4 | 34 | 45 | 15 | 2 |
| Apr-98 | 5 | 28 | 43 | 22 | 1 |
| Apr-99 | 9 | 53 | 29 | 9 | 0 |

## Ireland

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 5 | 42 | 30 | 13 | 10 |
| Nov-79 | 11 | 46 | 22 | 15 | 6 |
| Oct-80 | 7 | 41 | 30 | 16 | 6 |
| Oct-81 | 13 | 46 | 22 | 9 | 10 |
| Mar-82 | 12 | 44 | 22 | 11 | 11 |
| Oct-82 | 6 | 41 | 28 | 16 | 9 |
| Apr-83 | 6 | 39 | 30 | 19 | 6 |
| Oct-83 | 6 | 37 | 29 | 20 | 8 |
| Apr-84 | 7 | 43 | 27 | 16 | 7 |
| Oct-84 | 6 | 38 | 30 | 20 | 6 |
| Apr-85 | 8 | 41 | 27 | 17 | 6 |
| Oct-85 | 6 | 40 | 27 | 20 | 7 |
| Mar-86 | 10 | 42 | 23 | 18 | 7 |
| Oct-86 | 4 | 40 | 29 | 19 | 8 |
| Apr-87 | 8 | 46 | 24 | 15 | 7 |
| Oct-87 | 6 | 40 | 26 | 22 | 6 |
| Apr-88 | 9 | 46 | 23 | 15 | 7 |
| Oct-88 | 9 | 36 | 38 | 12 | 5 |
| Apr-89 | 10 | 49 | 23 | 12 | 6 |
| Jul-89 | 12 | 45 | 23 | 10 | 10 |
| Oct-89 | 14 | 45 | 18 | 15 | 8 |
| Apr-90 | 16 | 49 | 15 | 12 | 8 |
| Oct-90 | 11 | 48 | 20 | 13 | 8 |
| Apr-91 | 4 | 29 | 43 | 22 | 2 |
| Oct-91 | 13 | 44 | 21 | 16 | 6 |
| Apr-92 | 12 | 49 | 21 | 12 | 6 |
| Sep-92 | 13 | 49 | 19 | 12 | 7 |
| Apr-93 | 15 | 47 | 21 | 11 | 6 |
| Oct-93 | 10 | 50 | 22 | 13 | 5 |
| Apr-94 | 14 | 51 | 18 | 10 | 7 |
| Dec-94 | 12 | 57 | 21 | 6 | 3 |
| Apr-95 | 12 | 58 | 18 | 8 | 5 |
| Oct-97 | 15 | 55 | 16 | 5 | 9 |
| Apr-98 | 14 | 61 | 12 | 5 | 8 |
| Apr-99 | 21 | 53 | 15 | 3 | 8 |

## Italy

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 2 | 14 | 46 | 36 | 2 |
| Nov-79 | 2 | 19 | 41 | 36 | 2 |
| Oct-80 | 3 | 18 | 45 | 32 | 2 |
| Oct-81 | 4 | 16 | 43 | 34 | 3 |
| Mar-82 | 2 | 19 | 44 | 31 | 4 |
| Oct-82 | 3 | 16 | 38 | 39 | 4 |
| Apr-83 | 2 | 15 | 46 | 34 | 3 |
| Oct-83 | 1 | 19 | 46 | 31 | 3 |
| Apr-84 | 1 | 19 | 45 | 31 | 4 |
| Oct-84 | 3 | 25 | 45 | 26 | 1 |
| Apr-85 | 2 | 23 | 45 | 27 | 3 |
| Oct-85 | 3 | 25 | 43 | 26 | 3 |
| Mar-86 | 2 | 28 | 43 | 24 | 3 |
| Oct-86 | 2 | 23 | 46 | 25 | 4 |
| Apr-87 | 2 | 28 | 42 | 25 | 3 |
| Oct-87 | 2 | 24 | 46 | 26 | 2 |
| Apr-88 | 2 | 25 | 46 | 25 | 2 |
| Oct-88 | 5 | 31 | 41 | 21 | 2 |
| Apr-89 | 2 | 25 | 44 | 27 | 2 |
| Jul-89 | 3 | 24 | 46 | 25 | 2 |
| Oct-89 | 4 | 25 | 44 | 23 | 4 |
| Apr-90 | 2 | 27 | 41 | 27 | 3 |
| Oct-90 | 2 | 19 | 43 | 33 | 3 |
| Apr-91 | 4 | 29 | 43 | 22 | 2 |
| Oct-91 | 2 | 18 | 45 | 33 | 2 |
| Apr-92 | 2 | 19 | 45 | 31 | 3 |
| Sep-92 | 1 | 11 | 40 | 44 | 4 |
| Apr-93 | 1 | 11 | 38 | 49 | 1 |
| Oct-93 | 0 | 12 | 40 | 45 | 3 |
| Apr-94 | 2 | 17 | 44 | 33 | 3 |
| Dec-94 | 2 | 24 | 48 | 25 | 1 |
| Apr-95 | 2 | 18 | 50 | 29 | 1 |
| Oct-97 | 2 | 28 | 45 | 21 | 4 |
| Apr-98 | 2 | 26 | 41 | 27 | 4 |
| Apr-99 | 3 | 32 | 41 | 23 | 2 |

## Luxembourg

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 17 | 44 | 29 | 4 | 6 |
| Nov-79 | 23 | 50 | 23 | 2 | 2 |
| Oct-80 | 18 | 59 | 17 | 5 | 1 |
| Oct-81 | 16 | 59 | 18 | 4 | 3 |
| Mar-82 | 14 | 49 | 26 | 9 | 2 |
| Oct-82 | 12 | 47 | 28 | 8 | 5 |
| Apr-83 | 13 | 49 | 23 | 6 | 9 |
| Oct-83 | 11 | 49 | 22 | 10 | 8 |
| Apr-84 | 11 | 53 | 20 | 9 | 7 |
| Oct-84 | 11 | 57 | 24 | 5 | 3 |
| Apr-85 | 15 | 57 | 20 | 2 | 6 |
| Oct-85 | 18 | 49 | 21 | 6 | 6 |
| Mar-86 | 20 | 55 | 17 | 2 | 6 |
| Oct-86 | 18 | 49 | 22 | 4 | 7 |
| Apr-87 | 16 | 61 | 17 | 2 | 4 |
| Oct-87 | 18 | 50 | 19 | 3 | 10 |
| Apr-88 | 14 | 56 | 15 | 4 | 11 |
| Oct-88 | 20 | 44 | 28 | 4 | 4 |
| Apr-89 | 21 | 61 | 16 | 0 | 2 |
| Jul-89 | 21 | 55 | 16 | 2 | 6 |
| Oct-89 | 18 | 59 | 13 | 2 | 8 |
| Apr-90 | 22 | 49 | 12 | 5 | 12 |
| Oct-90 | 20 | 51 | 19 | 4 | 6 |
| Apr-91 | 30 | 46 | 14 | 2 | 8 |
| Oct-91 | 23 | 54 | 15 | 1 | 7 |
| Apr-92 | 14 | 60 | 18 | 3 | 5 |
| Sep-92 | 18 | 52 | 20 | 6 | 4 |
| Apr-93 | 10 | 61 | 21 | 3 | 4 |
| Oct-93 | 15 | 58 | 18 | 3 | 6 |
| Apr-94 | 19 | 53 | 17 | 3 | 8 |
| Dec-94 | 14 | 67 | 12 | 1 | 5 |
| Apr-95 | 17 | 59 | 15 | 4 | 6 |
| Oct-97 | 10 | 60 | 18 | 5 | 8 |
| Apr-98 | 23 | 56 | 14 | 4 | 4 |
| Apr-99 | 21 | 62 | 9 | 3 | 6 |

## The Netherlands

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 9 | 55 | 25 | 6 | 5 |
| Nov-79 | 7 | 54 | 27 | 7 | 5 |
| Oct-80 | 9 | 42 | 34 | 11 | 4 |
| Oct-81 | 6 | 53 | 27 | 9 | 5 |
| Mar-82 | 6 | 49 | 32 | 8 | 5 |
| Oct-82 | 7 | 43 | 33 | 14 | 3 |
| Apr-83 | 7 | 46 | 33 | 10 | 4 |
| Oct-83 | 7 | 47 | 30 | 11 | 5 |
| Apr-84 | 6 | 48 | 33 | 10 | 3 |
| Oct-84 | 7 | 51 | 30 | 9 | 3 |
| Apr-85 | 7 | 49 | 29 | 9 | 6 |
| Oct-85 | 9 | 49 | 28 | 9 | 5 |
| Mar-86 | 10 | 51 | 25 | 5 | 9 |
| Oct-86 | 8 | 52 | 29 | 9 | 3 |
| Apr-87 | 7 | 54 | 28 | 7 | 4 |
| Oct-87 | 8 | 49 | 31 | 7 | 5 |
| Apr-88 | 8 | 53 | 28 | 6 | 5 |
| Oct-88 | 6 | 60 | 24 | 4 | 6 |
| Apr-89 | 11 | 60 | 22 | 5 | 2 |
| Jul-89 | 12 | 62 | 20 | 3 | 3 |
| Oct-89 | 13 | 60 | 20 | 4 | 3 |
| Apr-90 | 11 | 62 | 22 | 3 | 2 |
| Oct-90 | 12 | 55 | 25 | 4 | 4 |
| Apr-91 | 13 | 61 | 21 | 3 | 2 |
| Oct-91 | 8 | 55 | 29 | 5 | 3 |
| Apr-92 | 10 | 60 | 23 | 4 | 3 |
| Sep-92 | 7 | 64 | 22 | 5 | 2 |
| Apr-93 | 9 | 59 | 25 | 5 | 2 |
| Oct-93 | 8 | 59 | 24 | 6 | 3 |
| Apr-94 | 9 | 56 | 27 | 7 | 1 |
| Dec-94 | 4 | 60 | 28 | 6 | 2 |
| Apr-95 | 9 | 60 | 24 | 4 | 3 |
| Oct-97 | 7 | 64 | 23 | 4 | 2 |
| Apr-98 | 11 | 64 | 20 | 3 | 2 |
| Apr-99 | 13 | 65 | 17 | 3 | 2 |

## United Kingdom

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 7 | 46 | 27 | 13 | 7 |
| Nov-79 | 7 | 45 | 28 | 13 | 7 |
| Oct-80 | 9 | 42 | 27 | 16 | 6 |
| Oct-81 | 6 | 42 | 29 | 13 | 10 |
| Mar-82 | 14 | 46 | 25 | 9 | 6 |
| Oct-82 | 13 | 45 | 23 | 12 | 7 |
| Apr-83 | 12 | 52 | 23 | 7 | 6 |
| Oct-83 | 12 | 49 | 20 | 12 | 7 |
| Apr-84 | 11 | 49 | 25 | 9 | 6 |
| Oct-84 | 12 | 48 | 27 | 10 | 3 |
| Apr-85 | 7 | 44 | 30 | 13 | 6 |
| Oct-85 | 9 | 43 | 29 | 15 | 4 |
| Mar-86 | 8 | 43 | 31 | 12 | 6 |
| Oct-86 | 11 | 42 | 29 | 14 | 7 |
| Apr-87 | 9 | 49 | 26 | 11 | 5 |
| Oct-87 | 11 | 45 | 27 | 13 | 4 |
| Apr-88 | 10 | 47 | 27 | 11 | 5 |
| Oct-88 | 10 | 37 | 37 | 13 | 3 |
| Apr-89 | 12 | 45 | 26 | 11 | 6 |
| Jul-89 | 9 | 47 | 26 | 10 | 8 |
| Oct-89 | 9 | 46 | 27 | 13 | 5 |
| Apr-90 | 7 | 42 | 33 | 12 | 6 |
| Oct-90 | 8 | 42 | 30 | 14 | 6 |
| Apr-91 | 9 | 51 | 27 | 9 | 4 |
| Oct-91 | 8 | 52 | 23 | 11 | 6 |
| Apr-92 | 9 | 50 | 27 | 9 | 5 |
| Sep-92 | 6 | 42 | 32 | 15 | 5 |
| Apr-93 | 7 | 42 | 30 | 16 | 5 |
| Oct-93 | 6 | 42 | 32 | 14 | 6 |
| Apr-94 | 6 | 43 | 29 | 16 | 6 |
| Dec-94 | 5 | 46 | 34 | 12 | 3 |
| Apr-95 | 5 | 43 | 36 | 11 | 5 |
| Oct-97 | 8 | 55 | 18 | 7 | 11 |
| Apr-98 | 9 | 52 | 20 | 10 | 9 |
| Apr-99 | 12 | 52 | 18 | 7 | 11 |

## European Union

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 6 | 43 | 28 | 16 | 7 |
| Nov-79 | 7 | 44 | 27 | 15 | 7 |
| Oct-80 | 7 | 40 | 30 | 17 | 6 |
| Oct-81 | 8 | 42 | 28 | 14 | 8 |
| Mar-82 | 8 | 41 | 30 | 14 | 7 |
| Oct-82 | 8 | 41 | 28 | 16 | 7 |
| Apr-83 | 8 | 41 | 30 | 15 | 6 |
| Oct-83 | 8 | 43 | 28 | 14 | 7 |
| Apr-84 | 8 | 42 | 30 | 14 | 6 |
| Oct-84 | 8 | 43 | 32 | 13 | 4 |
| Apr-85 | 8 | 42 | 31 | 14 | 5 |
| Oct-85 | 8 | 41 | 31 | 14 | 6 |
| Apr-86 | 8 | 45 | 28 | 12 | 7 |
| Oct-86 | 10 | 42 | 29 | 12 | 7 |
| Apr-87 | 8 | 46 | 29 | 12 | 5 |
| Oct-87 | 7 | 44 | 31 | 13 | 5 |
| Apr-88 | 8 | 45 | 30 | 12 | 5 |
| Oct-88 | 10 | 39 | 37 | 11 | 3 |
| Apr-89 | 8 | 48 | 28 | 12 | 4 |
| Jul-89 | 9 | 47 | 27 | 11 | 6 |
| Oct-89 | 10 | 47 | 27 | 12 | 4 |
| Apr-90 | 9 | 47 | 28 | 12 | 4 |
| Oct-90 | 9 | 43 | 29 | 14 | 5 |
| Apr-91 | 9 | 48 | 29 | 11 | 3 |
| Oct-91 | 7 | 43 | 32 | 14 | 4 |
| Apr-92 | 7 | 42 | 32 | 15 | 4 |
| Sep-92 | 6 | 39 | 33 | 18 | 4 |
| Apr-93 | 5 | 37 | 34 | 21 | 3 |
| Oct-93 | 5 | 38 | 35 | 19 | 3 |
| Apr-94 | 5 | 39 | 35 | 17 | 4 |
| Dec-94 | 5 | 44 | 35 | 12 | 2 |
| Apr-95 | 6 | 42 | 36 | 14 | 3 |
| Oct-97 | 5 | 43 | 34 | 13 | 5 |
| Apr-98 | 6 | 41 | 34 | 14 | 4 |
| Apr-99 | 11 | 49 | 26 | 9 | 4 |

## Question Six:

**Part One:** Have you in recent times read or heard anything about the Assembly of the European Community, that is to say the European Parliament?

a. yes
b. no
c. no reply

**Belgium**

| | a. | b. | c. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 65 | 32 | 3 |
| Nov-79 | 45 | 46 | 9 |
| Oct-82 | 56 | 31 | 13 |
| Apr-83 | 31 | 58 | 11 |
| Oct-83 | 35 | 52 | 13 |
| Apr-84 | 74 | 26 | 0 |
| Oct-84 | 71 | 22 | 7 |
| Apr-85 | 66 | 30 | 4 |
| Oct-85 | 58 | 36 | 6 |
| Mar-86 | 45 | 47 | 8 |
| Oct-86 | 45 | 50 | 5 |
| Apr-87 | 47 | 47 | 6 |
| Oct-87 | 47 | 42 | 11 |
| Apr-88 | 50 | 38 | 12 |
| Oct-88 | 54 | 38 | 8 |
| Apr-89 | 62 | 34 | 4 |
| Jul-89 | 64 | 30 | 6 |
| Oct-89 | 59 | 34 | 7 |
| Apr-90 | 57 | 38 | 5 |
| Oct-90 | 49 | 46 | 5 |
| Apr-91 | 40 | 49 | 11 |
| Oct-91 | 44 | 45 | 11 |
| Apr-92 | 47 | 44 | 9 |
| Sep-92 | 53 | 39 | 6 |
| Apr-93 | 49 | 43 | 8 |
| Oct-93 | 58 | 33 | 9 |
| Apr-94 | 51 | 41 | 8 |
| Dec-94 | 56 | | |
| Apr-95 | 65 | 31 | 4 |
| Sep-95 | 53 | 43 | |
| Apr-97 | 40 | 52 | 6 |
| Oct-97 | 48 | 47 | 5 |
| Apr-98 | 38 | 55 | 6 |
| Oct-98 | 40 | 54 | 6 |
| Apr-99 | 73 | 24 | 3 |

**Denmark**

| | a. | b. | c. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 76 | 16 | 8 |
| Nov-79 | 65 | 27 | 8 |
| Oct-82 | 42 | 54 | 4 |
| Apr-83 | 31 | 63 | 6 |
| Oct-83 | 62 | 36 | 2 |
| Apr-84 | 74 | 24 | 2 |
| Oct-84 | 59 | 28 | 13 |
| Apr-85 | 60 | 40 | 0 |
| Oct-85 | 56 | 44 | 0 |
| Mar-86 | 66 | 30 | 4 |
| Oct-86 | 41 | 54 | 5 |
| Apr-87 | 44 | 50 | 6 |
| Oct-87 | 59 | 34 | 7 |
| Apr-88 | 51 | 43 | 6 |
| Oct-88 | 62 | 33 | 5 |
| Apr-89 | 54 | 41 | 5 |
| Jul-89 | 86 | 13 | 1 |
| Oct-89 | 54 | 39 | 7 |
| Apr-90 | 50 | 48 | 2 |
| Oct-90 | 45 | 53 | 2 |
| Apr-91 | 42 | 53 | 5 |
| Oct-91 | 48 | 49 | 3 |
| Apr-92 | 55 | 41 | 4 |
| Sep-92 | 59 | 38 | 3 |
| Apr-93 | 55 | 42 | 3 |
| Oct-93 | 60 | 39 | 1 |
| Apr-94 | 63 | 34 | 2 |
| Dec-94 | 60 | | |
| Apr-95 | 72 | 28 | 0 |
| Sep-95 | 80 | 19 | |
| Apr-97 | 66 | 33 | 2 |
| Oct-97 | 51 | 46 | 3 |
| Apr-98 | 49 | 48 | 3 |
| Oct-98 | 55 | 42 | 3 |
| Apr-99 | 82 | 17 | 1 |

**France**

| | a. | b. | c. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 65 | 23 | 12 |
| Nov-79 | 67 | 27 | 6 |
| Oct-82 | 40 | 57 | 3 |
| Apr-83 | 30 | 63 | 7 |
| Oct-83 | 50 | 47 | 3 |
| Apr-84 | 82 | 17 | 1 |
| Oct-84 | 67 | 26 | 7 |
| Apr-85 | 69 | 27 | 4 |
| Oct-85 | 55 | 41 | 4 |
| Mar-86 | 57 | 40 | 3 |
| Oct-86 | 45 | 50 | 5 |
| Apr-87 | 46 | 53 | 1 |
| Oct-87 | 46 | 38 | 6 |
| Apr-88 | 45 | 50 | 5 |
| Oct-88 | 58 | 37 | 5 |
| Apr-89 | 65 | 33 | 2 |
| Jul-89 | 73 | 24 | 3 |
| Oct-89 | 55 | 39 | 6 |
| Apr-90 | 53 | 41 | 6 |
| Oct-90 | 46 | 51 | 3 |
| Apr-91 | 38 | 56 | 6 |
| Oct-91 | 48 | 46 | 6 |
| Apr-92 | 39 | 53 | 8 |
| Sep-92 | 57 | 37 | 6 |
| Apr-93 | 42 | 52 | 6 |
| Oct-93 | 54 | 41 | 5 |
| Apr-94 | 47 | 50 | 3 |
| Dec-94 | 46 | | |
| Apr-95 | 52 | 46 | 2 |
| Sep-95 | 46 | 52 | |
| Apr-97 | 48 | 50 | 3 |
| Oct-97 | 35 | 61 | 4 |
| Apr-98 | 39 | 57 | 4 |
| Oct-98 | 38 | 57 | 5 |
| Apr-99 | 61 | 35 | 4 |

Germany

| | a. | b. | c. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 60 | 27 | 13 |
| Nov-79 | 77 | 13 | 10 |
| Oct-82 | 69 | 26 | 5 |
| Apr-83 | 33 | 66 | 1 |
| Oct-83 | 47 | 39 | 14 |
| Apr-84 | 79 | 20 | 1 |
| Oct-84 | 75 | 18 | 7 |
| Apr-85 | 55 | 36 | 9 |
| Oct-85 | 49 | 40 | 11 |
| Mar-86 | 39 | 46 | 15 |
| Oct-86 | 39 | 46 | 15 |
| Apr-87 | 46 | 43 | 11 |
| Oct-87 | 37 | 51 | 12 |
| Apr-88 | 47 | 39 | 14 |
| Oct-88 | 46 | 43 | 11 |
| Apr-89 | 39 | 52 | 9 |
| Jul-89 | 67 | 28 | 5 |
| Oct-89 | 55 | 33 | 12 |
| Apr-90 | 48 | 41 | 11 |
| Oct-90 | 55 | 37 | 8 |
| Apr-91 | 45 | 43 | 12 |
| Oct-91 | 49 | 39 | 12 |
| Apr-92 | 47 | 41 | 12 |
| Sep-92 | 56 | 34 | 10 |
| Apr-93 | 46 | 43 | 11 |
| Oct-93 | 58 | 32 | 10 |
| Apr-94 | 48 | 43 | 9 |
| Dec-94 | 54 | | |
| Apr-95 | 65 | 28 | 7 |
| Sep-95 | 52 | 40 | |
| Apr-97 | 52 | 34 | 14 |
| Oct-97 | 42 | 40 | 18 |
| Apr-98 | 48 | 39 | 13 |
| Oct-98 | 42 | 43 | 14 |
| Apr-99 | 60 | 26 | 14 |

Greece

| | a. | b. | c. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oct-82 | 57 | 40 | 3 |
| Apr-83 | 37 | 58 | 5 |
| Oct-83 | 51 | 46 | 3 |
| Apr-84 | 67 | 33 | 0 |
| Oct-84 | 43 | 48 | 9 |
| Apr-85 | 53 | 42 | 5 |
| Oct-85 | 45 | 51 | 4 |
| Mar-86 | 37 | 58 | 5 |
| Oct-86 | 40 | 57 | 3 |
| Apr-87 | 36 | 59 | 5 |
| Oct-87 | 40 | 50 | 10 |
| Apr-88 | 51 | 41 | 8 |
| Oct-88 | 52 | 43 | 5 |
| Apr-89 | 50 | 44 | 6 |
| Jul-89 | 56 | 40 | 4 |
| Oct-89 | 67 | 23 | 10 |
| Apr-90 | 68 | 28 | 4 |
| Oct-90 | 52 | 42 | 6 |
| Apr-91 | 45 | 48 | 7 |
| Oct-91 | 51 | 42 | 7 |
| Apr-92 | 49 | 43 | 8 |
| Sep-92 | 57 | 39 | 4 |
| Apr-93 | 54 | 42 | 4 |
| Oct-93 | 57 | 37 | 6 |
| Apr-94 | 75 | 21 | 4 |
| Dec-94 | 56 | | |
| Apr-95 | 74 | 25 | 2 |
| Sep-95 | 50 | 47 | |
| Apr-97 | 57 | 40 | 3 |
| Oct-97 | 55 | 40 | 5 |
| Apr-98 | 50 | 46 | 4 |
| Oct-98 | 50 | 47 | 3 |
| Apr-99 | 66 | 30 | 4 |

Ireland

| | Yes | No | No reply |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 73 | 24 | 3 |
| Nov-79 | 67 | 29 | 4 |
| Oct-82 | 59 | 32 | 10 |
| Apr-83 | 41 | 47 | 12 |
| Oct-83 | 52 | 44 | 4 |
| Apr-84 | 75 | 24 | 1 |
| Oct-84 | 61 | 29 | 10 |
| Apr-85 | 58 | 37 | 5 |
| Oct-85 | 54 | 40 | 6 |
| Mar-86 | 46 | 47 | 7 |
| Oct-86 | 44 | 52 | 4 |
| Apr-87 | 36 | 56 | 8 |
| Oct-87 | 39 | 54 | 7 |
| Apr-88 | 36 | 57 | 7 |
| Oct-88 | 57 | 40 | 3 |
| Apr-89 | 52 | 45 | 3 |
| Jul-89 | 65 | 31 | 4 |
| Oct-89 | 50 | 42 | 8 |
| Apr-90 | 53 | 41 | 6 |
| Oct-90 | 51 | 44 | 5 |
| Apr-91 | 40 | 57 | 3 |
| Oct-91 | 48 | 48 | 4 |
| Apr-92 | 44 | 48 | 8 |
| Sep-92 | 50 | 44 | 6 |
| Apr-93 | 41 | 53 | 6 |
| Oct-93 | 58 | 34 | 8 |
| Apr-94 | 56 | 40 | 4 |
| Dec-94 | 48 | | |
| Apr-95 | 60 | 37 | 3 |
| Sep-95 | 43 | 53 | |
| Apr-97 | 38 | 57 | 6 |
| Oct-97 | 33 | 60 | 6 |
| Apr-98 | 28 | 65 | 7 |
| Oct-98 | 32 | 57 | 11 |
| Apr-99 | 54 | 37 | 10 |

## Italy

| | Yes | No | No reply |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 77 | 15 | 8 |
| Nov-79 | 66 | 31 | 3 |
| Oct-82 | 52 | 45 | 3 |
| Apr-83 | 50 | 46 | 4 |
| Oct-83 | 47 | 47 | 6 |
| Apr-84 | 71 | 29 | 0 |
| Oct-84 | 72 | 25 | 3 |
| Apr-85 | 68 | 29 | 3 |
| Oct-85 | 69 | 28 | 3 |
| Mar-86 | 60 | 34 | 6 |
| Oct-86 | 51 | 45 | 4 |
| Apr-87 | 47 | 48 | 5 |
| Oct-87 | 46 | 49 | 5 |
| Apr-88 | 52 | 43 | 5 |
| Oct-88 | 58 | 36 | 6 |
| Apr-89 | 57 | 40 | 3 |
| Jul-89 | 72 | 26 | 2 |
| Oct-89 | 62 | 32 | 6 |
| Apr-90 | 58 | 37 | 5 |
| Oct-90 | 51 | 44 | 5 |
| Apr-91 | 51 | 40 | 9 |
| Oct-91 | 51 | 42 | 7 |
| Apr-92 | 45 | 47 | 8 |
| Sep-92 | 54 | 39 | 7 |
| Apr-93 | 47 | 46 | 7 |
| Oct-93 | 55 | 39 | 6 |
| Apr-94 | 55 | 39 | 5 |
| Dec-94 | 47 | | |
| Apr-95 | 60 | 36 | 4 |
| Sep-95 | 54 | 42 | |
| Apr-97 | 71 | 26 | 3 |
| Oct-97 | 48 | 45 | 7 |
| Apr-98 | 53 | 41 | 6 |
| Oct-98 | 53 | 40 | 7 |
| Apr-99 | 68 | 27 | 6 |

## Luxembourg

| | Yes | No | No reply |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 76 | 21 | 3 |
| Nov-79 | 76 | 23 | 1 |
| Oct-82 | 61 | 37 | 2 |
| Apr-83 | 53 | 43 | 4 |
| Oct-83 | 67 | 32 | 1 |
| Apr-84 | 81 | 19 | 0 |
| Oct-84 | 84 | 15 | 1 |
| Apr-85 | 79 | 20 | 1 |
| Oct-85 | 74 | 24 | 2 |
| Mar-86 | 69 | 29 | 2 |
| Oct-86 | 65 | 33 | 2 |
| Apr-87 | 66 | 32 | 2 |
| Oct-87 | 60 | 36 | 4 |
| Apr-88 | 65 | 32 | 3 |
| Oct-88 | 67 | 29 | 4 |
| Apr-89 | 81 | 16 | 3 |
| Jul-89 | 75 | 21 | 4 |
| Oct-89 | 69 | 27 | 4 |
| Apr-90 | 64 | 32 | 4 |
| Oct-90 | 59 | 38 | 3 |
| Apr-91 | 69 | 26 | 5 |
| Oct-91 | 65 | 33 | 2 |
| Apr-92 | 67 | 27 | 6 |
| Sep-92 | 65 | 32 | 3 |
| Apr-93 | 59 | 38 | 3 |
| Oct-93 | 63 | 33 | 4 |
| Apr-94 | 69 | 29 | 2 |
| Dec-94 | 64 | | |
| Apr-95 | 66 | 31 | 3 |
| Sep-95 | 68 | 27 | |
| Apr-97 | 78 | 20 | 2 |
| Oct-97 | 64 | 32 | 4 |
| Apr-98 | 66 | 32 | 1 |
| Oct-98 | 59 | 36 | 6 |
| Apr-99 | 83 | 16 | 1 |

## The Netherlands

| | Yes | No | No reply |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 76 | 22 | 2 |
| Nov-79 | 64 | 30 | 6 |
| Oct-82 | 66 | 30 | 4 |
| Apr-83 | 49 | 49 | 2 |
| Oct-83 | 52 | 42 | 6 |
| Apr-84 | 73 | 23 | 4 |
| Oct-84 | 67 | 25 | 8 |
| Apr-85 | 62 | 34 | 4 |
| Oct-85 | 50 | 44 | 6 |
| Mar-86 | 44 | 51 | 5 |
| Oct-86 | 41 | 55 | 4 |
| Apr-87 | 41 | 54 | 5 |
| Oct-87 | 32 | 61 | 7 |
| Apr-88 | 36 | 55 | 9 |
| Oct-88 | 46 | 48 | 6 |
| Apr-89 | 57 | 41 | 2 |
| Jul-89 | 71 | 28 | 1 |
| Oct-89 | 41 | 53 | 6 |
| Apr-90 | 41 | 57 | 2 |
| Oct-90 | 41 | 55 | 4 |
| Apr-91 | 39 | 57 | 4 |
| Oct-91 | 53 | 44 | 3 |
| Apr-92 | 40 | 55 | 5 |
| Sep-92 | 50 | 45 | 5 |
| Apr-93 | 38 | 57 | 5 |
| Oct-93 | 64 | 32 | 4 |
| Apr-94 | 41 | 56 | 4 |
| Dec-94 | 47 | | |
| Apr-95 | 60 | 38 | 3 |
| Sep-95 | 58 | 40 | |
| Apr-97 | 58 | 42 | 1 |
| Oct-97 | 49 | 49 | 3 |
| Apr-98 | 46 | 50 | 4 |
| Oct-98 | 54 | 40 | 7 |
| Apr-99 | 68 | 30 | 2 |

United Kingdom

| | Yes | No | No reply |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 55 | 42 | 3 |
| Nov-79 | 55 | 41 | 4 |
| Oct-82 | 49 | 49 | 2 |
| Apr-83 | 31 | 66 | 3 |
| Oct-83 | 48 | 50 | 2 |
| Apr-84 | 72 | 28 | 0 |
| Oct-84 | 58 | 38 | 4 |
| Apr-85 | 54 | 44 | 2 |
| Oct-85 | 41 | 57 | 2 |
| Mar-86 | 38 | 59 | 3 |
| Oct-86 | 34 | 61 | 5 |
| Apr-87 | 37 | 60 | 3 |
| Oct-87 | 41 | 56 | 3 |
| Apr-88 | 36 | 61 | 3 |
| Oct-88 | 50 | 46 | 4 |
| Apr-89 | 50 | 47 | 3 |
| Jul-89 | 74 | 25 | 1 |
| Oct-89 | 48 | 49 | 3 |
| Apr-90 | 46 | 52 | 2 |
| Oct-90 | 39 | 59 | 2 |
| Apr-91 | 37 | 60 | 3 |
| Oct-91 | 56 | 41 | 3 |
| Apr-92 | 36 | 61 | 3 |
| Sep-92 | 53 | 43 | 4 |
| Apr-93 | 40 | 58 | 2 |
| Oct-93 | 58 | 40 | 2 |
| Apr-94 | 47 | 50 | 3 |
| Dec-94 | 51 | | |
| Apr-95 | 64 | 35 | 1 |
| Sep-95 | 59 | 40 | |
| Apr-97 | 45 | 52 | 4 |
| Oct-97 | 33 | 62 | 5 |
| Apr-98 | 32 | 65 | 4 |
| Oct-98 | 31 | 63 | 6 |
| Apr-99 | 42 | 54 | 5 |

European Union

| | Yes | No | No reply |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-79 | 65 | 27 | 8 |
| Nov-79 | 66 | 28 | 6 |
| Oct-82 | 54 | 42 | 4 |
| Apr-83 | 37 | 59 | 4 |
| Oct-83 | 48 | 45 | 7 |
| Apr-84 | 75 | 24 | 1 |
| Oct-84 | 67 | 27 | 6 |
| Apr-85 | 61 | 34 | 5 |
| Oct-85 | 53 | 42 | 5 |
| Apr-86 | 49 | 43 | 8 |
| Oct-86 | 43 | 50 | 7 |
| Apr-87 | 45 | 50 | 5 |
| Oct-87 | 44 | 49 | 7 |
| Apr-88 | 46 | 46 | 8 |
| Oct-88 | 53 | 40 | 7 |
| Apr-89 | 55 | 41 | 4 |
| Jul-89 | 70 | 27 | 3 |
| Oct-89 | 55 | 38 | 7 |
| Apr-90 | 52 | 42 | 6 |
| Oct-90 | 49 | 46 | 5 |
| Apr-91 | 44 | 49 | 7 |
| Oct-91 | 52 | 41 | 7 |
| Apr-92 | 44 | 48 | 8 |
| Sep-92 | 55 | 38 | 7 |
| Apr-93 | 45 | 48 | 7 |
| Oct-93 | 57 | 37 | 6 |
| Apr-94 | 52 | 43 | 5 |
| Dec-94 | 52 | | |
| Apr-95 | 63 | 33 | 4 |
| Sep-95 | 56 | 41 | |
| Apr-97 | 54 | 40 | 6 |
| Oct-97 | 43 | 48 | 9 |
| Apr-98 | 44 | 50 | 7 |
| Oct-98 | 43 | 49 | 8 |
| Apr-99 | 60 | 33 | 7 |

**Part Two:** If so, has what you read or heard given you a generally favourable or unfavourable impression of the European Parliament?

a. favourable
b. neither favourable nor unfavourable
c. unfavourable
d. no reply

**Belgium**

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct-82 | 20 | 34 | 21 | 25 |
| Apr-83 | 34 | 31 | 21 | 14 |
| Apr-85 | 31 | 34 | 30 | 5 |
| Oct-85 | 37 | 41 | 19 | 3 |
| Mar-86 | 39 | 33 | 23 | 5 |
| Oct-86 | 33 | 44 | 18 | 5 |
| Apr-87 | 33 | 35 | 24 | 8 |
| Oct-87 | 42 | 33 | 20 | 5 |
| Apr-88 | 40 | 42 | 14 | 4 |
| Oct-88 | 49 | 35 | 13 | 3 |
| Apr-89 | 47 | 35 | 13 | 5 |
| Jul-89 | 36 | 44 | 12 | 8 |
| Oct-89 | 48 | 35 | 12 | 5 |
| Apr-90 | 49 | 30 | 14 | 7 |
| Oct-90 | 45 | 30 | 18 | 7 |
| Apr-91 | 47 | 27 | 21 | 5 |
| Oct-91 | 42 | 37 | 16 | 5 |
| Apr-92 | 41 | 31 | 19 | 9 |
| Sep-92 | 43 | 38 | 12 | 7 |
| Apr-93 | 38 | 17 | 41 | 4 |

**Denmark**

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct-82 | 26 | 21 | 40 | 13 |
| Apr-83 | 18 | 25 | 32 | 25 |
| Apr-85 | 13 | 31 | 41 | 15 |
| Oct-85 | 14 | 32 | 42 | 12 |
| Mar-86 | 30 | 32 | 30 | 8 |
| Oct-86 | 17 | 36 | 34 | 13 |
| Apr-87 | 20 | 27 | 41 | 12 |
| Oct-87 | 18 | 39 | 36 | 7 |
| Apr-88 | 19 | 39 | 34 | 8 |
| Oct-88 | 26 | 45 | 22 | 7 |
| Apr-89 | 23 | 49 | 23 | 5 |
| Jul-89 | 24 | 43 | 26 | 7 |
| Oct-89 | 26 | 39 | 31 | 4 |
| Apr-90 | 33 | 29 | 32 | 6 |
| Oct-90 | 35 | 31 | 28 | 6 |
| Apr-91 | 38 | 26 | 28 | 8 |
| Oct-91 | 34 | 24 | 35 | 7 |
| Apr-92 | 34 | 28 | 36 | 2 |
| Sep-92 | 30 | 31 | 34 | 5 |
| Apr-93 | 28 | 32 | 30 | 10 |

France

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct-82 | 27 | 43 | 25 | 5 |
| Apr-83 | 25 | 29 | 27 | 19 |
| Apr-85 | 32 | 40 | 21 | 7 |
| Oct-85 | 42 | 32 | 19 | 17 |
| Mar-86 | 42 | 35 | 16 | 7 |
| Oct-86 | 37 | 36 | 18 | 9 |
| Apr-87 | 40 | 33 | 18 | 9 |
| Oct-87 | 44 | 37 | 15 | 4 |
| Apr-88 | 52 | 28 | 12 | 8 |
| Oct-88 | 50 | 33 | 9 | 8 |
| Apr-89 | 48 | 30 | 16 | 6 |
| Jul-89 | 40 | 31 | 24 | 5 |
| Oct-89 | 46 | 34 | 14 | 6 |
| Apr-90 | 43 | 39 | 12 | 6 |
| Oct-90 | 45 | 36 | 12 | 7 |
| Apr-91 | 53 | 29 | 14 | 4 |
| Oct-91 | 46 | 36 | 14 | 4 |
| Apr-92 | 46 | 32 | 14 | 8 |
| Sep-92 | 41 | 37 | 17 | 5 |
| Apr-93 | 36 | 22 | 39 | 3 |

Germany

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct-82 | 24 | 28 | 29 | 19 |
| Apr-83 | 37 | 32 | 20 | 11 |
| Apr-85 | 20 | 35 | 42 | 3 |
| Oct-85 | 23 | 41 | 35 | 1 |
| Mar-86 | 29 | 36 | 30 | 5 |
| Oct-86 | 22 | 40 | 33 | 5 |
| Apr-87 | 19 | 35 | 44 | 2 |
| Oct-87 | 32 | 40 | 27 | 1 |
| Apr-88 | 30 | 41 | 26 | 3 |
| Oct-88 | 40 | 35 | 21 | 4 |
| Apr-89 | 35 | 38 | 22 | 5 |
| Jul-89 | 43 | 36 | 18 | 3 |
| Oct-89 | 48 | 24 | 21 | 7 |
| Apr-90 | 46 | 27 | 20 | 7 |
| Oct-90 | 48 | 28 | 17 | 7 |
| Apr-91 | 48 | 23 | 22 | 7 |
| Oct-91 | 46 | 28 | 18 | 8 |
| Apr-92 | 48 | 21 | 24 | 7 |
| Sep-92 | 44 | 26 | 24 | 6 |
| Apr-93 | 34 | 25 | 36 | 5 |

Greece

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct-82 | 40 | 34 | 13 | 13 |
| Apr-83 | 33 | 24 | 26 | 17 |
| Apr-85 | 40 | 26 | 25 | 9 |
| Oct-85 | 43 | 31 | 20 | 6 |
| Mar-86 | 42 | 30 | 21 | 7 |
| Oct-86 | 43 | 42 | 9 | 6 |
| Apr-87 | 45 | 36 | 15 | 4 |
| Oct-87 | 59 | 26 | 11 | 4 |
| Apr-88 | 52 | 32 | 10 | 6 |
| Oct-88 | 56 | 33 | 6 | 5 |
| Apr-89 | 60 | 30 | 6 | 4 |
| Jul-89 | 61 | 22 | 6 | 11 |
| Oct-89 | 68 | 21 | 5 | 6 |
| Apr-90 | 70 | 25 | 3 | 2 |
| Oct-90 | 65 | 23 | 5 | 7 |
| Apr-91 | 65 | 25 | 6 | 4 |
| Oct-91 | 69 | 24 | 4 | 3 |
| Apr-92 | 67 | 23 | 7 | 3 |
| Sep-92 | 59 | 28 | 9 | 4 |
| Apr-93 | 56 | 11 | 30 | 3 |

Ireland

| | a. | b. | c. | d |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct-82 | 29 | 25 | 33 | 13 |
| Apr-83 | 36 | 27 | 22 | 15 |
| Apr-85 | 38 | 25 | 31 | 6 |
| Oct-85 | 41 | 19 | 33 | 7 |
| Mar-86 | 54 | 19 | 21 | 6 |
| Oct-86 | 41 | 25 | 27 | 7 |
| Apr-87 | 47 | 24 | 23 | 6 |
| Oct-87 | 62 | 18 | 17 | 3 |
| Apr-88 | 65 | 18 | 13 | 4 |
| Oct-88 | 65 | 16 | 12 | 7 |
| Apr-89 | 69 | 16 | 8 | 7 |
| Jul-89 | 55 | 25 | 12 | 8 |
| Oct-89 | 68 | 14 | 10 | 8 |
| Apr-90 | 76 | 11 | 9 | 4 |
| Oct-90 | 65 | 17 | 13 | 5 |
| Apr-91 | 67 | 17 | 11 | 5 |
| Oct-91 | 68 | 16 | 9 | 7 |
| Apr-92 | 66 | 17 | 11 | 6 |
| Sep-92 | 67 | 14 | 13 | 6 |
| Apr-93 | 66 | 11 | 17 | 6 |

Italy

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct-82 | 44 | 20 | 22 | 14 |
| Apr-83 | 50 | 20 | 20 | 10 |
| Apr-85 | 52 | 24 | 19 | 5 |
| Oct-85 | 55 | 21 | 20 | 4 |
| Mar-86 | 54 | 19 | 21 | 6 |
| Oct-86 | 51 | 25 | 27 | 7 |
| Apr-87 | 50 | 20 | 25 | 5 |
| Oct-87 | 61 | 17 | 17 | 5 |
| Apr-88 | 65 | 21 | 11 | 3 |
| Oct-88 | 68 | 19 | 9 | 4 |
| Apr-89 | 64 | 21 | 11 | 4 |
| Jul-89 | 66 | 20 | 10 | 4 |
| Oct-89 | 72 | 16 | 8 | 4 |
| Apr-90 | 74 | 16 | 6 | 4 |
| Oct-90 | 70 | 17 | 10 | 3 |
| Apr-91 | 67 | 16 | 11 | 6 |
| Oct-91 | 65 | 22 | 7 | 6 |
| Apr-92 | 66 | 22 | 8 | 4 |
| Sep-92 | 63 | 22 | 9 | 6 |
| Apr-93 | 58 | 11 | 25 | 6 |

Luxembourg

| | a. | b. | c. | d |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct-82 | 23 | 25 | 42 | 10 |
| Apr-83 | 15 | 19 | 61 | 5 |
| Apr-85 | 22 | 22 | 49 | 7 |
| Oct-85 | 24 | 37 | 34 | 5 |
| Mar-86 | 27 | 34 | 36 | 3 |
| Oct-86 | 26 | 34 | 36 | 4 |
| Apr-87 | 22 | 37 | 35 | 6 |
| Oct-87 | 27 | 36 | 34 | 3 |
| Apr-88 | 32 | 33 | 27 | 8 |
| Oct-88 | 37 | 46 | 13 | 4 |
| Apr-89 | 31 | 40 | 24 | 5 |
| Jul-89 | 32 | 38 | 21 | 9 |
| Oct-89 | 37 | 33 | 24 | 6 |
| Apr-90 | 35 | 30 | 33 | 2 |
| Oct-90 | 32 | 40 | 23 | 5 |
| Apr-91 | 43 | 33 | 21 | 3 |
| Oct-91 | 37 | 30 | 24 | 9 |
| Apr-92 | 37 | 33 | 25 | 5 |
| Sep-92 | 37 | 36 | 23 | 4 |
| Apr-93 | 35 | 20 | 40 | 5 |

## The Netherlands

| | a. | b. | c. | d |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct-82 | 17 | 19 | 42 | 22 |
| Apr-83 | 24 | 26 | 39 | 11 |
| Apr-85 | 22 | 22 | 49 | 7 |
| Oct-85 | 25 | 24 | 45 | 6 |
| Mar-86 | 28 | 22 | 45 | 5 |
| Oct-86 | 25 | 27 | 37 | 11 |
| Apr-87 | 17 | 26 | 50 | 7 |
| Oct-87 | 31 | 19 | 42 | 8 |
| Apr-88 | 28 | 27 | 35 | 10 |
| Oct-88 | 34 | 26 | 27 | 13 |
| Apr-89 | 37 | 26 | 27 | 10 |
| Jul-89 | 21 | 28 | 42 | 9 |
| Oct-89 | 43 | 20 | 28 | 9 |
| Apr-90 | 43 | 23 | 26 | 8 |
| Oct-90 | 40 | 19 | 30 | 11 |
| Apr-91 | 42 | 23 | 27 | 8 |
| Oct-91 | 41 | 19 | 31 | 9 |
| Apr-92 | 32 | 25 | 33 | 10 |
| Sep-92 | 34 | 22 | 35 | 9 |
| Apr-93 | 38 | 38 | 17 | 7 |

## United Kingdom

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct-82 | 18 | 16 | 59 | 7 |
| Apr-83 | 23 | 15 | 52 | 10 |
| Apr-85 | 20 | 22 | 52 | 6 |
| Oct-85 | 24 | 12 | 58 | 6 |
| Mar-86 | 24 | 17 | 53 | 6 |
| Oct-86 | 22 | 22 | 53 | 3 |
| Apr-87 | 25 | 20 | 52 | 3 |
| Oct-87 | 31 | 20 | 43 | 6 |
| Apr-88 | 27 | 23 | 46 | 4 |
| Oct-88 | 41 | 23 | 32 | 4 |
| Apr-89 | 34 | 23 | 39 | 4 |
| Jul-89 | 38 | 24 | 30 | 8 |
| Oct-89 | 46 | 16 | 33 | 5 |
| Apr-90 | 45 | 23 | 25 | 7 |
| Oct-90 | 44 | 20 | 32 | 4 |
| Apr-91 | 42 | 15 | 36 | 7 |
| Oct-91 | 41 | 17 | 37 | 5 |
| Apr-92 | 43 | 20 | 30 | 7 |
| Sep-92 | 33 | 21 | 41 | 5 |
| Apr-93 | 31 | 47 | 18 | 4 |

European Union

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oct-82 | 28 | 26 | 33 | 13 |
| Apr-83 | 35 | 24 | 29 | 12 |
| Apr-85 | 31 | 30 | 33 | 6 |
| Oct-85 | 37 | 28 | 31 | 4 |
| Apr-86 | 40 | 27 | 25 | 8 |
| Oct-86 | 36 | 31 | 26 | 7 |
| Apr-87 | 34 | 30 | 30 | 6 |
| Oct-87 | 46 | 28 | 22 | 4 |
| Apr-88 | 44 | 31 | 20 | 5 |
| Oct-88 | 50 | 29 | 16 | 5 |
| Apr-89 | 49 | 28 | 18 | 5 |
| Jul-89 | 45 | 29 | 20 | 6 |
| Oct-89 | 54 | 24 | 16 | 6 |
| Apr-90 | 54 | 27 | 14 | 5 |
| Oct-90 | 53 | 26 | 15 | 6 |
| Apr-91 | 53 | 23 | 18 | 6 |
| Oct-91 | 50 | 27 | 17 | 6 |
| Apr-92 | 53 | 24 | 17 | 6 |
| Sep-92 | 46 | 27 | 21 | 6 |
| Apr-93 | 42 | 22 | 31 | 5 |

**Question Seven:** Would you personally like the European Parliament to play a more or less important role than it does now?

a. more important
b. about the same
c. less important
d. no reply

**Belgium**

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 48 | 16 | 6 | 30 |
| Oct-83 | 50 | 16 | 12 | 22 |
| Apr-84 | 53 | 21 | 10 | 16 |
| Oct-84 | 56 | 22 | 11 | 11 |
| Apr-85 | 54 | 20 | 10 | 16 |
| Oct-85 | 57 | 22 | 6 | 15 |
| Mar-86 | 48 | 22 | 4 | 26 |
| Oct-86 | 52 | 26 | 8 | 14 |
| Apr-87 | 51 | 26 | 7 | 16 |
| Oct-87 | 47 | 29 | 7 | 17 |
| Apr-88 | 49 | 21 | 6 | 24 |
| Oct-88 | 43 | 33 | 10 | 14 |
| Apr-89 | 45 | 25 | 8 | 22 |
| Oct-89 | 55 | 22 | 8 | 15 |
| Apr-90 | 49 | 24 | 7 | 20 |
| Oct-90 | 51 | 22 | 8 | 19 |
| Apr-91 | 66 | 17 | 4 | 13 |
| Oct-91 | 64 | 19 | 4 | 13 |
| Apr-92 | 57 | 28 | 4 | 11 |
| Nov-92 | 56 | 27 | 7 | 10 |
| Apr-93 | 50 | 28 | 11 | 11 |
| Apr-94 | 43 | 32 | | 25 |
| Dec-94 | 40 | 30 | 8 | 23 |
| Apr-95 | 53 | 23 | 8 | 16 |
| Sep-95 | 49 | 23 | 11 | 17 |
| Apr-97 | 38 | 26 | 10 | 26 |
| Oct-97 | 38 | 32 | 9 | 22 |
| Apr-98 | 43 | 27 | 8 | 22 |
| Oct-98 | 36 | 37 | 7 | 19 |
| Apr-99 | 45 | 25 | 8 | 23 |

**Denmark**

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 17 | 29 | 16 | 38 |
| Oct-83 | 19 | 30 | 22 | 29 |
| Apr-84 | 15 | 26 | 19 | 40 |
| Oct-84 | 16 | 34 | 20 | 30 |
| Apr-85 | 12 | 26 | 23 | 39 |
| Oct-85 | 13 | 24 | 26 | 37 |
| Mar-86 | 12 | 32 | 27 | 28 |
| Oct-86 | 13 | 30 | 17 | 40 |
| Apr-87 | 12 | 28 | 27 | 33 |
| Oct-87 | 16 | 31 | 25 | 28 |
| Apr-88 | 15 | 31 | 24 | 30 |
| Oct-88 | 14 | 41 | 20 | 25 |
| Apr-89 | 16 | 35 | 19 | 30 |
| Jul-89 | 19 | 33 | 30 | 18 |
| Apr-90 | 24 | 32 | 24 | 20 |
| Oct-90 | 25 | 33 | 20 | 22 |
| Apr-91 | 30 | 30 | 21 | 19 |
| Oct-91 | 29 | 28 | 25 | 18 |
| Apr-92 | 32 | 26 | 26 | 16 |
| Sep-92 | 32 | 31 | 25 | 12 |
| Apr-93 | 31 | 30 | 21 | 18 |
| Apr-94 | 18 | 73 | | 9 |
| Dec-94 | 29 | 38 | 19 | 14 |
| Apr-95 | 31 | 34 | 23 | 12 |
| Sep-95 | 27 | 36 | 27 | 10 |
| Apr-97 | 30 | 24 | 29 | 16 |
| Oct-97 | 31 | 29 | 21 | 19 |
| Apr-98 | 35 | 31 | 20 | 15 |
| Oct-98 | 37 | 33 | 19 | 10 |
| Apr-99 | 37 | 33 | 19 | 12 |

France

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 55 | 16 | 3 | 26 |
| Oct-83 | 60 | 14 | 5 | 21 |
| Apr-84 | 54 | 18 | 4 | 24 |
| Oct-84 | 65 | 14 | 4 | 17 |
| Apr-85 | 69 | 24 | 3 | 4 |
| Oct-85 | 63 | 18 | 5 | 14 |
| Mar-86 | 61 | 17 | 4 | 18 |
| Oct-86 | 54 | 22 | 4 | 20 |
| Apr-87 | 55 | 18 | 6 | 21 |
| Oct-87 | 55 | 24 | 5 | 16 |
| Apr-88 | 53 | 23 | 4 | 20 |
| Oct-88 | 48 | 28 | 4 | 20 |
| Apr-89 | 61 | 17 | 4 | 18 |
| Jul-89 | 51 | 24 | 5 | 20 |
| Apr-90 | 52 | 23 | 6 | 19 |
| Oct-90 | 59 | 14 | 7 | 20 |
| Apr-91 | 65 | 13 | 4 | 18 |
| Oct-91 | 66 | 15 | 4 | 15 |
| Apr-92 | 63 | 14 | 7 | 16 |
| Sep-92 | 58 | 15 | 9 | 18 |
| Apr-93 | 49 | 24 | 9 | 18 |
| Apr-94 | 53 | 27 | | 20 |
| Dec-94 | 52 | 21 | 7 | 20 |
| Apr-95 | 54 | 19 | 9 | 18 |
| Sep-95 | 49 | 25 | 9 | 17 |
| Apr-97 | 53 | 19 | 10 | 19 |
| Oct-97 | 43 | 27 | 6 | 24 |
| Apr-98 | 47 | 21 | 9 | 23 |
| Oct-98 | 47 | 27 | 8 | 18 |
| Apr-99 | 40 | 27 | 10 | 24 |

Germany

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 49 | 17 | 11 | 23 |
| Oct-83 | 57 | 12 | 10 | 21 |
| Apr-84 | 44 | 20 | 10 | 26 |
| Oct-84 | 55 | 18 | 12 | 15 |
| Apr-85 | 49 | 20 | 11 | 20 |
| Oct-85 | 51 | 16 | 14 | 19 |
| Mar-86 | 52 | 16 | 13 | 19 |
| Oct-86 | 46 | 18 | 12 | 24 |
| Apr-87 | 39 | 19 | 15 | 27 |
| Oct-87 | 46 | 20 | 15 | 19 |
| Apr-88 | 42 | 21 | 14 | 23 |
| Oct-88 | 41 | 24 | 16 | 19 |
| Apr-89 | 41 | 23 | 15 | 21 |
| Jul-89 | 49 | 19 | 15 | 17 |
| Apr-90 | 43 | 15 | 19 | 23 |
| Oct-90 | 50 | 12 | 8 | 30 |
| Apr-91 | 66 | 11 | 6 | 17 |
| Oct-91 | 62 | 9 | 7 | 22 |
| Apr-92 | 59 | 14 | 8 | 19 |
| Sep-92 | 55 | 13 | 12 | 20 |
| Apr-93 | 48 | 18 | 12 | 22 |
| Apr-94 | 32 | 41 | | 27 |
| Dec-94 | 44 | 24 | 12 | 20 |
| Apr-95 | 43 | 18 | 17 | 21 |
| Sep-95 | 41 | 25 | 15 | 20 |
| Apr-97 | 37 | 22 | 19 | 21 |
| Oct-97 | 30 | 29 | 15 | 26 |
| Apr-98 | 37 | 27 | 12 | 24 |
| Oct-98 | 39 | 25 | 13 | 23 |
| Apr-99 | 35 | 24 | 16 | 25 |

Greece

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 58 | 6 | 3 | 33 |
| Oct-83 | 70 | 5 | 4 | 21 |
| Apr-84 | 65 | 10 | 4 | 21 |
| Oct-84 | 61 | 11 | 8 | 20 |
| Apr-85 | 60 | 8 | 7 | 25 |
| Oct-85 | 50 | 12 | 8 | 30 |
| Mar-86 | 56 | 9 | 5 | 30 |
| Oct-86 | 59 | 12 | 6 | 23 |
| Apr-87 | 57 | 13 | 9 | 21 |
| Oct-87 | 56 | 14 | 5 | 25 |
| Apr-88 | 54 | 19 | 3 | 24 |
| Oct-88 | 57 | 17 | 2 | 24 |
| Apr-89 | 52 | 19 | 3 | 26 |
| Jul-89 | 65 | 10 | 3 | 22 |
| Apr-90 | 69 | 6 | 4 | 21 |
| Oct-90 | 54 | 14 | 4 | 28 |
| Apr-91 | 62 | 9 | 4 | 25 |
| Oct-91 | 68 | 9 | 4 | 19 |
| Apr-92 | 63 | 13 | 3 | 21 |
| Sep-92 | 61 | 16 | 4 | 19 |
| Apr-93 | 61 | 15 | 4 | 20 |
| Apr-94 | 57 | 16 | | 27 |
| Dec-94 | 65 | 13 | 4 | 19 |
| Apr-95 | 62 | 11 | 5 | 22 |
| Sep-95 | 60 | 15 | 4 | 21 |
| Apr-97 | 67 | 10 | 8 | 15 |
| Oct-97 | 69 | 12 | 5 | 15 |
| Apr-98 | 61 | 12 | 6 | 22 |
| Oct-98 | 72 | 15 | 3 | 10 |
| Apr-99 | 62 | 15 | 4 | 20 |

Ireland

| | a. | b. | c. | d |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 41 | 20 | 10 | 29 |
| Oct-83 | 46 | 18 | 12 | 24 |
| Apr-84 | 40 | 22 | 11 | 27 |
| Oct-84 | 47 | 23 | 10 | 20 |
| Apr-85 | 44 | 22 | 13 | 21 |
| Oct-85 | 45 | 19 | 12 | 24 |
| Mar-86 | 44 | 18 | 10 | 28 |
| Oct-86 | 41 | 26 | 7 | 26 |
| Apr-87 | 33 | 27 | 10 | 30 |
| Oct-87 | 35 | 28 | 10 | 27 |
| Apr-88 | 36 | 29 | 6 | 29 |
| Oct-88 | 41 | 33 | 7 | 19 |
| Apr-89 | 39 | 30 | 4 | 27 |
| Jul-89 | 47 | 20 | 7 | 26 |
| Apr-90 | 48 | 22 | 6 | 24 |
| Oct-90 | 44 | 27 | 9 | 20 |
| Apr-91 | 53 | 20 | 9 | 18 |
| Oct-91 | 50 | 19 | 5 | 26 |
| Apr-92 | 48 | 24 | 4 | 24 |
| Sep-92 | 42 | 26 | 8 | 24 |
| Apr-93 | 41 | 27 | 7 | 5 |
| Apr-94 | 27 | 44 | | 29 |
| Dec-94 | 39 | 33 | 5 | 23 |
| Apr-95 | 39 | 30 | 6 | 26 |
| Sep-95 | 33 | 28 | 5 | 34 |
| Apr-97 | 40 | 24 | 7 | 29 |
| Oct-97 | 31 | 34 | 6 | 30 |
| Apr-98 | 29 | 35 | 5 | 31 |
| Oct-98 | 34 | 27 | 8 | 31 |
| Apr-99 | 36 | 27 | 6 | 32 |

## Italy

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 71 | 10 | 1 | 18 |
| Oct-83 | 76 | 7 | 2 | 15 |
| Apr-84 | 67 | 8 | 2 | 23 |
| Oct-84 | 80 | 8 | 2 | 10 |
| Apr-85 | 72 | 10 | 1 | 17 |
| Oct-85 | 75 | 9 | 2 | 14 |
| Mar-86 | 70 | 11 | 1 | 18 |
| Oct-86 | 74 | 13 | 1 | 12 |
| Apr-87 | 66 | 13 | 3 | 18 |
| Oct-87 | 72 | 11 | 2 | 15 |
| Apr-88 | 72 | 11 | 2 | 15 |
| Oct-88 | 61 | 19 | 1 | 19 |
| Apr-89 | 61 | 15 | 2 | 22 |
| Jul-89 | 70 | 14 | 3 | 13 |
| Apr-90 | 71 | 12 | 2 | 15 |
| Oct-90 | 68 | 15 | 2 | 15 |
| Apr-91 | 72 | 13 | 3 | 12 |
| Oct-91 | 68 | 15 | 2 | 15 |
| Apr-92 | 67 | 13 | 2 | 18 |
| Sep-92 | 64 | 17 | 3 | 16 |
| Apr-93 | 62 | 16 | 4 | 18 |
| Apr-94 | 72 | 7 | | 21 |
| Dec-94 | 60 | 15 | 2 | 23 |
| Apr-95 | 68 | 11 | 3 | 19 |
| Sep-95 | 67 | 15 | 2 | 17 |
| Apr-97 | 66 | 13 | 2 | 19 |
| Oct-97 | 53 | 19 | 3 | 24 |
| Apr-98 | 54 | 15 | 3 | 29 |
| Oct-98 | 61 | 15 | 2 | 22 |
| Apr-99 | 58 | 17 | 3 | 22 |

## Luxembourg

| | a. | b. | c. | d |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 50 | 33 | 6 | 11 |
| Oct-83 | 58 | 20 | 9 | 13 |
| Apr-84 | 57 | 26 | 3 | 14 |
| Oct-84 | 68 | 19 | 5 | 8 |
| Apr-85 | 56 | 25 | 7 | 12 |
| Oct-85 | 64 | 19 | 5 | 12 |
| Mar-86 | 57 | 27 | 9 | 7 |
| Oct-86 | 48 | 34 | 7 | 11 |
| Apr-87 | 52 | 33 | 7 | 8 |
| Oct-87 | 48 | 32 | 5 | 15 |
| Apr-88 | 42 | 29 | 7 | 22 |
| Oct-88 | 36 | 44 | 5 | 15 |
| Apr-89 | 32 | 43 | 8 | 17 |
| Jul-89 | 42 | 34 | 7 | 17 |
| Apr-90 | 34 | 39 | 9 | 18 |
| Oct-90 | 34 | 43 | 8 | 15 |
| Apr-91 | 42 | 33 | 7 | 18 |
| Oct-91 | 37 | 38 | 11 | 14 |
| Apr-92 | 43 | 37 | 11 | 9 |
| Sep-92 | 45 | 34 | 7 | 14 |
| Apr-93 | 38 | 41 | 6 | 15 |
| Apr-94 | 37 | 46 | | 17 |
| Dec-94 | 52 | 30 | 6 | 12 |
| Apr-95 | 48 | 31 | 8 | 12 |
| Sep-95 | 43 | 34 | 9 | 14 |
| Apr-97 | 46 | 29 | 8 | 17 |
| Oct-97 | 32 | 40 | 11 | 17 |
| Apr-98 | 50 | 26 | 13 | 11 |
| Oct-98 | 41 | 35 | 8 | 16 |
| Apr-99 | 36 | 41 | 8 | 15 |

## The Netherlands

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 58 | 20 | 8 | 14 |
| Oct-83 | 56 | 18 | 10 | 16 |
| Apr-84 | 56 | 21 | 8 | 15 |
| Oct-84 | 63 | 16 | 7 | 14 |
| Apr-85 | 54 | 19 | 10 | 17 |
| Oct-85 | 59 | 16 | 9 | 16 |
| Mar-86 | 57 | 21 | 9 | 13 |
| Oct-86 | 53 | 24 | 9 | 14 |
| Apr-87 | 52 | 22 | 11 | 15 |
| Oct-87 | 48 | 23 | 9 | 20 |
| Apr-88 | 46 | 24 | 10 | 20 |
| Oct-88 | 43 | 22 | 12 | 23 |
| Apr-89 | 54 | 20 | 11 | 15 |
| Jul-89 | 58 | 17 | 10 | 15 |
| Apr-90 | 54 | 22 | 11 | 13 |
| Oct-90 | 55 | 19 | 11 | 15 |
| Apr-91 | 66 | 13 | 7 | 14 |
| Oct-91 | 65 | 13 | 7 | 15 |
| Apr-92 | 66 | 15 | 8 | 11 |
| Sep-92 | 63 | 14 | 9 | 14 |
| Apr-93 | 52 | 21 | 11 | 16 |
| Apr-94 | 43 | 38 | | 19 |
| Dec-94 | 52 | 20 | 7 | 21 |
| Apr-95 | 56 | 16 | 11 | 18 |
| Sep-95 | 57 | 20 | 9 | 14 |
| Apr-97 | 50 | 23 | 14 | 14 |
| Oct-97 | 49 | 22 | 16 | 13 |
| Apr-98 | 58 | 22 | 8 | 13 |
| Oct-98 | 51 | 26 | 10 | 13 |
| Apr-99 | 54 | 20 | 10 | 15 |

## United Kingdom

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 34 | 20 | 27 | 19 |
| Oct-83 | 48 | 17 | 20 | 15 |
| Apr-84 | 34 | 23 | 24 | 19 |
| Oct-84 | 43 | 19 | 24 | 14 |
| Apr-85 | 40 | 19 | 23 | 19 |
| Oct-85 | 39 | 15 | 31 | 15 |
| Mar-86 | 33 | 19 | 29 | 19 |
| Oct-86 | 41 | 24 | 19 | 16 |
| Apr-87 | 35 | 20 | 28 | 17 |
| Oct-87 | 36 | 24 | 24 | 16 |
| Apr-88 | 37 | 23 | 22 | 18 |
| Oct-88 | 30 | 30 | 20 | 20 |
| Apr-89 | 35 | 22 | 20 | 23 |
| Jul-89 | 40 | 22 | 22 | 16 |
| Apr-90 | 42 | 18 | 20 | 20 |
| Oct-90 | 42 | 19 | 19 | 20 |
| Apr-91 | 50 | 15 | 17 | 18 |
| Oct-91 | 47 | 17 | 19 | 17 |
| Apr-92 | 43 | 20 | 18 | 19 |
| Sep-92 | 40 | 18 | 22 | 20 |
| Apr-93 | 38 | 18 | 26 | 18 |
| Apr-94 | 27 | 58 | | 16 |
| Dec-94 | 38 | 21 | 20 | 21 |
| Apr-95 | 40 | 16 | 24 | 19 |
| Sep-95 | 39 | 19 | 23 | 19 |
| Apr-97 | 26 | 17 | 34 | 24 |
| Oct-97 | 21 | 29 | 16 | 35 |
| Apr-98 | 31 | 22 | 16 | 31 |
| Oct-98 | 28 | 23 | 19 | 29 |
| Apr-99 | 28 | 17 | 20 | 36 |

European Union

| | a. | b. | c. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-83 | 52 | 16 | 10 | 22 |
| Oct-83 | 59 | 13 | 10 | 18 |
| Apr-84 | 50 | 17 | 10 | 23 |
| Oct-84 | 60 | 16 | 10 | 14 |
| Apr-85 | 56 | 18 | 10 | 16 |
| Oct-85 | 56 | 15 | 12 | 17 |
| Apr-86 | 50 | 16 | 10 | 24 |
| Oct-86 | 51 | 19 | 8 | 22 |
| Apr-87 | 47 | 18 | 12 | 23 |
| Oct-87 | 50 | 19 | 10 | 21 |
| Apr-88 | 49 | 20 | 9 | 22 |
| Oct-88 | 44 | 25 | 10 | 21 |
| Apr-89 | 49 | 20 | 9 | 22 |
| Jul-89 | 52 | 20 | 10 | 18 |
| Apr-90 | 52 | 19 | 9 | 20 |
| Oct-90 | 53 | 17 | 9 | 21 |
| Apr-91 | 62 | 15 | 8 | 16 |
| Oct-91 | 58 | 16 | 8 | 18 |
| Apr-92 | 56 | 16 | 9 | 19 |
| Sep-92 | 55 | 16 | 11 | 18 |
| Apr-93 | 50 | 20 | 12 | 18 |
| Apr-94 | 44 | 33 | | 23 |
| Dec-94 | 48 | 22 | 9 | 21 |
| Apr-95 | 49 | 17 | 13 | 20 |
| Sep-95 | 48 | 21 | 12 | 19 |
| Apr-97 | 46 | 18 | 15 | 21 |
| Oct-97 | 38 | 25 | 10 | 27 |
| Apr-98 | 43 | 21 | 9 | 26 |
| Oct-98 | 45 | 23 | 10 | 22 |
| Apr-99 | 41 | 22 | 11 | 26 |

**Question Eight:** "If there were a referendum (Denmark, Ireland, France: "another referendum") on whether to agree to the Maastricht Treaty or not, would you vote for or against?"

a. yes
b. no

### Belgium

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Apr-92 | 78 | 23 |
| Oct-92 | 82 | 18 |
| Apr-93 | 75 | 25 |
| Oct-94 | 75 | 25 |

### Denmark

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Apr-92 | 44 | 56 |
| Oct-92 | 47 | 53 |
| Apr-93 | 64 | 36 |
| Oct-94 | 57 | 43 |

### France

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Apr-92 | 57 | 43 |
| Oct-92 | 54 | 46 |
| Apr-93 | 55 | 45 |
| Oct-94 | 54 | 46 |

### Germany

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Apr-92 | 46 | 54 |
| Oct-92 | 59 | 41 |
| Apr-93 | 61 | 39 |
| Oct-94 | 62 | 38 |

### Greece

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Apr-92 | 62 | 38 |
| Oct-92 | 80 | 20 |
| Apr-93 | 73 | 27 |
| Oct-94 | 86 | 14 |

### Ireland

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Apr-92 | 76 | 24 |
| Oct-92 | 70 | 30 |
| Apr-93 | 79 | 21 |
| Oct-94 | 75 | 25 |

### Italy

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Apr-92 | 90 | 10 |
| Oct-92 | 85 | 15 |
| Apr-93 | 85 | 15 |
| Oct-94 | 83 | 17 |

### Luxembourg

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Apr-92 | 79 | 21 |
| Oct-92 | 72 | 28 |
| Apr-93 | 69 | 31 |
| Oct-94 | 73 | 27 |

### The Netherlands

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Apr-92 | 73 | 27 |
| Oct-92 | 78 | 22 |
| Apr-93 | 80 | 20 |
| Oct-94 | 86 | 14 |

### United Kingdom

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Apr-92 | 38 | 62 |
| Oct-92 | 38 | 63 |
| Apr-93 | 45 | 55 |
| Oct-94 | 39 | 61 |

### European Union

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Apr-92 | 61 | 39 |
| Oct-92 | 62 | 38 |
| Apr-93 | 63 | 37 |
| Oct-94 | 64 | 36 |

**Question Nine:** "Please tell me for [the] proposal, whether you are for it or against it. 'There should be a European Monetary Union with one single currency replacing by 1999 the (National currency) and all other national currencies of the Member States of the European Union' "

a. yes
b. no

### Belgium

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Oct-90 | 61 | 16 |
| Oct-91 | 62 | 18 |
| Oct-92 | 65 | 23 |
| Apr-93 | 69 | 21 |
| Oct-93 | 64 | 27 |
| Apr-94 | 62 | 28 |
| Oct-94 | 66 | 22 |
| Apr-95 | 67 | 22 |
| Oct-95 | 60 | 27 |
| Apr-96 | 53 | 22 |
| Oct-96 | 56 | 24 |
| Apr-97 | 59 | 32 |
| Oct-97 | 57 | 32 |
| Apr-98 | 68 | 23 |
| Oct-98 | 74 | 16 |
| Apr-99 | 76 | 17 |

### France

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Oct-90 | 62 | 19 |
| Oct-91 | 64 | 18 |
| Oct-92 | 59 | 33 |
| Apr-93 | 58 | 32 |
| Oct-93 | 59 | 31 |
| Apr-94 | 65 | 25 |
| Oct-94 | 60 | 32 |
| Apr-95 | 63 | 31 |
| Oct-95 | 65 | 26 |
| Apr-96 | 59 | 22 |
| Oct-96 | 55 | 30 |
| Apr-97 | 56 | 36 |
| Oct-97 | 58 | 36 |
| Apr-98 | 68 | 25 |
| Oct-98 | 74 | 20 |
| Apr-99 | 68 | 26 |

### Greece

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Oct-90 | 64 | 10 |
| Oct-91 | 61 | 14 |
| Oct-92 | 71 | 14 |
| Apr-93 | 71 | 15 |
| Oct-93 | 71 | 14 |
| Apr-94 | 65 | 21 |
| Oct-94 | 69 | 18 |
| Apr-95 | 67 | 19 |
| Oct-95 | 62 | 20 |
| Apr-96 | 64 | 21 |
| Oct-96 | 63 | 19 |
| Apr-97 | 65 | 24 |
| Oct-97 | 59 | 27 |
| Apr-98 | 67 | 17 |
| Oct-98 | 75 | 19 |
| Apr-99 | 65 | 21 |

### Denmark

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Oct-90 | 35 | 50 |
| Oct-91 | 35 | 54 |
| Oct-92 | 35 | 60 |
| Apr-93 | 29 | 66 |
| Oct-93 | 26 | 69 |
| Apr-94 | 29 | 65 |
| Oct-94 | 27 | 69 |
| Apr-95 | 30 | 66 |
| Oct-95 | 34 | 61 |
| Apr-96 | 36 | 58 |
| Oct-96 | 34 | 62 |
| Apr-97 | 34 | 60 |
| Oct-97 | 32 | 62 |
| Apr-98 | 34 | 57 |
| Oct-98 | 41 | 53 |
| Apr-99 | 44 | 48 |

### Germany

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Oct-90 | 50 | 27 |
| Oct-91 | 45 | 32 |
| Oct-92 | 36 | 53 |
| Apr-93 | 29 | 60 |
| Oct-93 | 56 | 33 |
| Apr-94 | 33 | 55 |
| Oct-94 | 38 | 53 |
| Apr-95 | 38 | 50 |
| Oct-95 | 38 | 49 |
| Apr-96 | 40 | 49 |
| Oct-96 | 39 | 42 |
| Apr-97 | 32 | 54 |
| Oct-97 | 40 | 45 |
| Apr-98 | 51 | 36 |
| Oct-98 | 54 | 32 |
| Apr-99 | 57 | 33 |

### Ireland

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Oct-90 | 58 | 17 |
| Oct-91 | 54 | 17 |
| Oct-92 | 66 | 20 |
| Apr-93 | 68 | 19 |
| Oct-93 | 68 | 19 |
| Apr-94 | 68 | 19 |
| Oct-94 | 68 | 19 |
| Apr-95 | 68 | 18 |
| Oct-95 | 69 | 15 |
| Apr-96 | 66 | 16 |
| Oct-96 | 63 | 17 |
| Apr-97 | 62 | 22 |
| Oct-97 | 67 | 18 |
| Apr-98 | 68 | 14 |
| Oct-98 | 75 | 11 |
| Apr-99 | 71 | 12 |

## Italy

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Oct-90 | 72 | 11 |
| Oct-91 | 69 | 12 |
| Oct-92 | 79 | 11 |
| Apr-93 | 80 | 11 |
| Oct-93 | 80 | 13 |
| Apr-94 | 74 | 13 |
| Oct-94 | 76 | 14 |
| Apr-95 | 76 | 13 |
| Oct-95 | 75 | 12 |
| Apr-96 | 78 | 9 |
| Oct-96 | 73 | 11 |
| Apr-97 | 74 | 15 |
| Oct-97 | 78 | 11 |
| Apr-98 | 83 | 8 |
| Oct-98 | 88 | 6 |
| Apr-99 | 84 | 9 |

## Luxembourg

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Oct-90 | 47 | 26 |
| Oct-91 | 48 | 35 |
| Oct-92 | 67 | 24 |
| Apr-93 | 63 | 28 |
| Oct-93 | 65 | 25 |
| Apr-94 | 65 | 27 |
| Oct-94 | 70 | 20 |
| Apr-95 | 72 | 20 |
| Oct-95 | 65 | 23 |
| Apr-96 | 63 | 26 |
| Oct-96 | 67 | 23 |
| Apr-97 | 67 | 27 |
| Oct-97 | 62 | 28 |
| Apr-98 | 79 | 18 |
| Oct-98 | 79 | 14 |
| Apr-99 | 85 | 9 |

## The Netherlands

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Oct-90 | 61 | 25 |
| Oct-91 | 58 | 31 |
| Oct-92 | 61 | 30 |
| Apr-93 | 58 | 32 |
| Oct-93 | 56 | 33 |
| Apr-94 | 59 | 32 |
| Oct-94 | 56 | 32 |
| Apr-95 | 61 | 28 |
| Oct-95 | 71 | 23 |
| Apr-96 | 66 | 26 |
| Oct-96 | 69 | 26 |
| Apr-97 | 52 | 42 |
| Oct-97 | 57 | 37 |
| Apr-98 | 73 | 23 |
| Oct-98 | 79 | 18 |
| Apr-99 | 71 | 23 |

## United Kingdom

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Oct-90 | 28 | 43 |
| Oct-91 | 40 | 42 |
| Oct-92 | 30 | 58 |
| Apr-93 | 32 | 61 |
| Oct-93 | 27 | 63 |
| Apr-94 | 35 | 56 |
| Oct-94 | 31 | 58 |
| Apr-95 | 38 | 55 |
| Oct-95 | 36 | 54 |
| Apr-96 | 34 | 53 |
| Oct-96 | 30 | 57 |
| Apr-97 | 26 | 61 |
| Oct-97 | 29 | 59 |
| Apr-98 | 34 | 49 |
| Oct-98 | 36 | 48 |
| Apr-99 | 28 | 55 |

## European Union

| | a. | b. |
|---|---|---|
| Oct-90 | 55 | 23 |
| Oct-91 | 54 | 25 |
| Oct-92 | 54 | 35 |
| Apr-93 | 53 | 37 |
| Oct-93 | 52 | 37 |
| Apr-94 | 54 | 35 |
| Oct-94 | 53 | 36 |
| Apr-95 | 52 | 36 |
| Oct-95 | 53 | 35 |
| Apr-96 | 53 | 33 |
| Oct-96 | 51 | 23 |
| Apr-97 | 47 | 40 |
| Oct-97 | 51 | 37 |
| Apr-98 | 60 | 28 |
| Oct-98 | 64 | 25 |
| Apr-99 | 61 | 28 |

**Question Ten:** Do you see yourself in the near future as (national), (national) plus European, European plus (national), or European?

a. national only
b. national plus European
c. European plus national
d. European only
e. No reply

## Belgium

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec-94 | 29 | 42 | 14 | 10 | 6 |
| Apr-95 | 33 | 44 | 10 | 8 | 4 |
| Sep-95 | 36 | 45 | 8 | 8 | 4 |
| Oct-96 | 47 | 36 | 7 | 6 | 3 |
| Apr-97 | 50 | 34 | 8 | 5 | 4 |
| Apr-98 | 43 | 38 | 8 | 7 | 3 |
| Oct-98 | 44 | 41 | 6 | 6 | 3 |

## Germany

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec-94 | 29 | 43 | 15 | 9 | 5 |
| Apr-95 | 34 | 44 | 11 | 7 | 3 |
| Sep-95 | 38 | 43 | 9 | 5 | 4 |
| Oct-96 | 49 | 35 | 6 | 5 | 4 |
| Apr-97 | 47 | 33 | 9 | 6 | 5 |
| Apr-98 | 49 | 35 | 7 | 5 | 4 |
| Oct-98 | 46 | 37 | 9 | 4 | 3 |

## Denmark

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec-94 | 48 | 44 | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| Apr-95 | 48 | 42 | 4 | 3 | 1 |
| Sep-95 | 56 | 38 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Oct-96 | 57 | 36 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| Apr-97 | 55 | 40 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Apr-98 | 48 | 45 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Oct-98 | 52 | 42 | 3 | 3 | 1 |

## Greece

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec-94 | 46 | 48 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| Apr-95 | 52 | 41 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| Sep-95 | 53 | 44 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Oct-96 | 61 | 34 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Apr-97 | 54 | 42 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| Apr-98 | 56 | 39 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Oct-98 | 50 | 46 | 3 | 1 | 0 |

## France

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec-94 | 22 | 52 | 12 | 11 | 3 |
| Apr-95 | 28 | 51 | 9 | 9 | 4 |
| Sep-95 | 30 | 55 | 7 | 6 | 3 |
| Oct-96 | 33 | 49 | 8 | 7 | 4 |
| Apr-97 | 32 | 50 | 8 | 5 | 4 |
| Apr-98 | 31 | 49 | 9 | 6 | 4 |
| Oct-98 | 35 | 49 | 9 | 7 | 1 |

## Ireland

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec-94 | 38 | 50 | 6 | 3 | 4 |
| Apr-95 | 40 | 49 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Sep-95 | 47 | 45 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Oct-96 | 50 | 40 | 4 | 4 | 3 |
| Apr-97 | 50 | 42 | 3 | 2 | 3 |
| Apr-98 | 53 | 37 | 4 | 3 | 4 |
| Oct-98 | 51 | 42 | 4 | 1 | 2 |

## Italy

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec-94 | 25 | 55 | 12 | 4 | 4 |
| Apr-95 | 22 | 56 | 11 | 6 | 4 |
| Sep-95 | 26 | 59 | 8 | 5 | 2 |
| Oct-96 | 35 | 52 | 6 | 4 | 2 |
| Apr-97 | 33 | 52 | 6 | 6 | 3 |
| Apr-98 | 28 | 55 | 7 | 5 | 5 |
| Oct-98 | 29 | 56 | 8 | 5 | 2 |

## United Kingdom

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec-94 | 49 | 34 | 7 | 7 | 3 |
| Apr-95 | 53 | 32 | 6 | 6 | 2 |
| Sep-95 | 57 | 31 | 4 | 6 | 2 |
| Oct-96 | 60 | 26 | 6 | 5 | 3 |
| Apr-97 | 57 | 29 | 3 | 6 | 5 |
| Apr-98 | 60 | 25 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Oct-98 | 62 | 27 | 4 | 5 | 3 |

## Luxembourg

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec-94 | 17 | 51 | 13 | 12 | 7 |
| Apr-95 | 17 | 50 | 13 | 14 | 6 |
| Sep-95 | 20 | 42 | 11 | 21 | 6 |
| Oct-96 | 26 | 44 | 14 | 13 | 4 |
| Apr-97 | 23 | 46 | 11 | 16 | 5 |
| Apr-98 | 31 | 43 | 7 | 13 | 6 |
| Oct-98 | 23 | 45 | 13 | 15 | 4 |

## European Union

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec-94 | 33 | 46 | 10 | 7 | 4 |
| Apr-95 | 37 | 45 | 9 | 6 | 3 |
| Sep-95 | 40 | 46 | 6 | 5 | 3 |
| Oct-96 | 46 | 40 | 6 | 5 | 3 |
| Apr-97 | 45 | 40 | 6 | 5 | 4 |
| Apr-98 | 44 | 41 | 6 | 5 | 4 |
| Oct-98 | 43 | 43 | 7 | 4 | 2 |

## The Netherlands

| | a. | b. | c. | d. | e. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec-94 | 33 | 50 | 9 | 6 | 3 |
| Apr-95 | 34 | 51 | 9 | 4 | 3 |
| Sep-95 | 43 | 46 | 6 | 4 | 1 |
| Oct-96 | 43 | 48 | 5 | 4 | 1 |
| Apr-97 | 42 | 48 | 5 | 4 | 1 |
| Apr-98 | 45 | 46 | 6 | 3 | 1 |
| Oct-98 | 40 | 51 | 6 | 2 | 0 |

**Source:** *Eurobarometre*
Refer European Commission in Bibliography

* Months listed are the approximate dates that fieldwork was carried out. For more specific times please see relevant *Eurobarometre.*

** Data taken directly from *Eurobarometre.* Editors of data have rounded figures to the nearest whole numbers. Consequently some lines may equal less than or more than 100 equal.

***Sample sizes are on average 1000 people per country with the except of Luxembourg (500), the United Kingdom (Great Britain 1000, Nothern Ireland 300), and Germany (1000 in both the former East and West since *Eurobarometre* 34).

# *Appendix Two*
## Voter Turnout

### A: Voter Turnout for European Elections

| | 1979 | 1984 | 1989 | 1994 | 1999 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | | | | 67.7 | 49 |
| Belgium | 91.6 | 92.2 | 90.7 | 90.7 | 90 |
| Denmark | 47.4 | 52.3 | 46.1 | 52.9 | 50.4 |
| Finland | | | | 60.3 | 30.1 |
| France | 60.7 | 56.7 | 48.7 | 52.7 | 47 |
| Germany | 65.7 | 56.8 | 62.4 | 60 | 45.2 |
| Greece | 78.6 | 77.2 | 79.9 | 71.2 | 70.2 |
| Ireland | 63.6 | 47.6 | 68.3 | 44.0 | 50.5 |
| Italy | 85.5 | 83.9 | 81.5 | 74.8 | 70.8 |
| Luxembourg | 88.9 | 87.0 | 87.4 | 88.5 | 85.8 |
| The Netherlands | 57.8 | 50.5 | 47.2 | 36.0 | 29.9 |
| Portugal | | 72.2 | 51.1 | 35.5 | 40.4 |
| Sweden | | | | 41.6 | 38.4 |
| Spain | | 68.9 | 54.8 | 59.1 | 64.4 |
| United Kingdom | 31.6 | 32.6 | 36.2 | 36.4 | 24.0 |
| European Union | 63.0 | 61.0 | 58.5 | 56.8 | 49.4 |

Source: European Parliament: United Kingdom Office
Refer to European Parliament in Bibliography

## B: Voter Turnout for National Elections

### Belgium

| Year | percentage |
|---|---|
| Nov-81 | 87.2 |
| Oct-85 | 86.2 |
| Sep-87 | 86.8 |
| Nov-91 | 85 |
| May-95 | 83.7 |

### The Netherlands

| Year | Percentage |
|---|---|
| May-81 | 86.1 |
| Sep-82 | 80.6 |
| May-86 | 85.7 |
| Sep-89 | 85.1 |
| May-94 | 78.3 |

### United Kindgom

| Year | Percentage |
|---|---|
| May-79 | 76 |
| May-83 | 72.7 |
| Apr-92 | 77.7 |
| May-98 | 71.5 |

Source: Journal of Electoral Studies
Refer: Journal of Electoral Studies in Bibliography